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WARRANTED AND WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN SOUTH 
AFRICAN INCOME TAX LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT, OPERATION, 
CONSTITUTIONALITY AND REMEDIES OF A TAXPAYER 
 
Section 74D of the Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962 (the Act) grants the power of 
search and seizure to the South African Revenue Service, the basic underlying 
principle being that the Commissioner has to obtain a warrant from a judge prior to 
a search and seizure operation. The previous section 74(3) of the Act provided that 
the Commissioner was allowed himself to authorise and conduct a search and 
seizure operation without the requirement of a warrant. Section 74D of the Act was 
recently reviewed and the Tax Administration Bill (the TAB) contains the new 
provisions on search and seizure that will replace section 74D of the Act. 
 
In this assignment, the concept of search and seizure was examined by considering 
the cases, academic writing and other material on the topic. The objectives were to 
analyse the development of search and seizure in South African income tax law, to 
provide a basic understanding of the warranted and warrantless search and seizure 
provisions of the Act and the TAB, to determine their constitutionality and to 
determine the remedies available to a taxpayer who has been subject to a search 
and seizure. 
 
It was found that search and seizure has developed from warrantless under the 
previous section 74(3) of the Act into the requirement of a warrant under section 
74D of the Act into a combination of both under the TAB.  
 
The concept of an ex parte application was analysed, which was shown to be 
permissible in certain circumstances under section 74D of the Act, while it is now 
compulsory in terms of the TAB. It was shown that the TAB closed the lacuna in the 
Act relating to the validity period of a warrant before it has been executed. It was, 
however, concluded, regarding whether a warrant expires when exercised or 
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whether the same warrant can be used again to conduct a second search and 
seizure, that the position is not quite certain in terms of the Act and the TAB. It was 
found that there is no defined meaning of the reasonable grounds criterion, which is 
often required to be met in terms of the Act and the TAB, but that anyone that has 
to comply with the criterion must be satisfied that the grounds in fact exist 
objectively.  
 
The new warrantless search and seizure provisions of the TAB were analysed. It was 
established that warrantless search and seizure provisions are not uncommon in 
other statutes, but that the content thereof often differs. The new warrantless 
provisions were compared to the warrantless search and seizure provisions of, inter 
alia, the Competition Act No 89 of 1998 (the Competition Act), and it was found that 
the warrantless TAB provisions are not in all respects as circumscribed as those of 
the Competition Act and recommendations for counterbalances were made.  
 
It was concluded that the warranted search and seizure provisions of the Act and the 
TAB should be constitutionally valid but that the constitutionality of the new 
warrantless provisions of the TAB is not beyond doubt.  
 
It was furthermore found that the remedies at the disposal of a taxpayer who has 
been subject to a search and seizure should indeed be sufficient, but that there are 
no remedies available to a taxpayer to prevent injustice or harm. 
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DEURSOEKING EN BESLAGLEGGING MET EN SONDER LASBRIEF IN DIE 
SUID-AFRIKAANSE INKOMSTEBELASTINGREG: DIE ONTWIKKELING, 
WERKING, GRONDWETLIKHEID EN REMEDIES VIR BELASTINGPLIGTIGES  
 
Artikel 74D van die Inkomstebelastingwet No 58 van 1962, (die Wet) verleen aan die 
Suid-Afrikaanse Inkomstediens die mag van deursoeking en beslaglegging, die 
grondliggende beginsel synde dat die Kommissaris ’n lasbrief van ’n regter moet 
verkry voor die deursoeking en beslaglegging kan plaasvind. Die vorige artikel 74(3) 
van die Wet het bepaal dat die Kommissaris self ’n deursoeking en beslaglegging kon 
magtig en uitvoer sonder die vereiste van ’n lasbrief. Artikel 74D van die Wet is 
onlangs hersien en die nuwe Belastingadministrasie-wetsontwerp (BAW) bevat die 
nuwe bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging wat artikel 74D van die Wet sal 
vervang.  
 
In hierdie werkstuk is die konsep van deursoeking en beslaglegging ondersoek deur 
oorweging van die hofsake, akademiese skrywe en ander materiaal oor die 
onderwerp. Die doelstellings was om die ontwikkeling van deursoeking en 
beslaglegging in die Suid-Afrikaanse inkomstebelastingreg te ontleed, om ’n basiese 
begrip van die bepalings in die Wet en die BAW oor deursoeking en beslaglegging 
met en sonder ’n lasbrief te verskaf, om die grondwetlikheid daarvan te bepaal en 
om die remedies te bepaal wat beskikbaar is vir ’n belastingpligtige wat onderworpe 
was aan deursoeking en beslaglegging.  
 
Daar is bevind dat deursoeking en beslaglegging ontwikkel het vanaf sonder ’n 
lasbrief ingevolge die vorige artikel 74(3) van die Wet tot die vereiste van ’n lasbrief 
ingevolge artikel 74D van die Wet tot die kombinasie van albei ingevolge die BAW. 
 
Die konsep van ’n ex parte-aansoek is ontleed, en dit blyk in sekere omstandighede 
ingevolge artikel 74D van die Wet toelaatbaar te wees, terwyl dit nou ingevolge die 
BAW verpligtend is. Daar is aangedui dat die BAW die lacuna in die Wet oor die 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
vi 
 
geldigheidsperiode van ’n lasbrief voordat dit uitgevoer is, verwyder het. Daar is 
egter bevind, rakende die vraag of ’n lasbrief verval wanneer dit uitgevoer word en 
of dieselfde lasbrief weer gebruik kan word om ’n tweede deursoeking en 
beslaglegging uit te voer, dat daar nie sekerheid ingevolge die Wet of die BAW 
bestaan nie. Daar is bevind dat daar geen gedefinieerde betekenis vir die kriterium 
van redelike gronde is nie, waaraan dikwels ingevolge die Wet en die BAW voldoen 
moet word, maar dat enigiemand wat aan die kriterium moet voldoen tevrede moet 
wees dat die gronde inderwaarheid objektief bestaan.   
 
Die nuwe bepalings van die BAW oor deursoeking en beslaglegging sonder ’n lasbrief 
is ondersoek. Daar is vasgestel dat bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging 
sonder ’n lasbrief nie ongewoon is in ander wette nie, maar dat die inhoud daarvan 
dikwels verskil. Die nuwe bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging sonder ’n 
lasbrief is vergelyk met die bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging sonder ’n 
lasbrief van, inter alia, die Mededingingswet No 89 van 1998 (die Mededingingswet), 
en daar is bevind dat die BAW-bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging sonder ’n 
lasbrief nie in alle opsigte so afgebaken is soos dié van die Mededingingswet nie en 
voorstelle vir teenwigte is gemaak. 
 
Die gevolgtrekking is gemaak dat die bepalings oor deursoeking en beslaglegging met 
’n lasbrief van die Wet en die BAW grondwetlik geldig behoort te wees, maar dat die 
grondwetlikheid van die nuwe bepalings van die BAW oor deursoeking en 
beslaglegging sonder ’n lasbrief nie onweerlegbaar is nie. 
 
Daar is verder bevind dat die remedies tot die beskikking van ’n belastingpligtige wat 
onderworpe was aan deursoeking en beslaglegging inderdaad genoegsaam behoort 
te wees, maar dat daar geen remedies aan ’n belastingpligtige beskikbaar is om 
ongeregtigheid of skade te voorkom nie.  
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1 Background 
The South African Revenue Service (SARS) was established by legislation to collect 
revenue and to ensure compliance with tax laws.
1
 A country cannot function 
properly without funds, and it is therefore necessary for the SARS to have certain 
powers and effective measures for the enforcement of the law and the collection of 
taxes.
2
 
 
One of those powers is contained in section 74D of the Income Tax Act No 58 of 
1962 (the Act), namely the power of search and seizure. Section 74D of the Act 
regulates the power of the SARS to search a person or premises and to seize certain 
material.   
 
Section 74D(1) of the Act provides that the Commissioner of the SARS (the 
Commissioner) can bring an application to a court for a warrant authorising a search 
and seizure. In terms of section 74D(2) of the Act, the SARS must support its 
application by information supplied under oath or solemn declaration, establishing 
the facts on which the application is based. Section 74D(3) of the Act provides that a 
warrant may then be issued by a judge if he is satisfied that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that:  
 there has been non-compliance by any person with his obligation in terms 
of the Act or an offence in terms of the Act has been committed by any 
person;  
 information, documents or things are likely to be found which may afford 
evidence of such non-compliance or the committing of such offence; and  
 the premises specified in the application are likely to contain such 
information, documents or things.  
 
Section 74D was inserted into the Act by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act No 46 of 
1996. This Act also repealed the then operative section 74(3) of the Act, which was 
                                                          
1
  South African Revenue Service Act No 34 of 1997 sections 3 and 4. 
2
  Olivier “The new search and seizure provisions of the Income Tax Act” 1997 (issue 350) De Rebus 
195. 
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the section regulating search and seizure prior to section 74D. Section 74(3) of the 
Act granted the power to the SARS to enter a taxpayer’s premises at any time during 
the day, without a warrant and without prior notice, to search the premises, seize 
certain material and to retain the seized material until it was no longer required for 
an assessment or criminal or other proceedings.  
 
Search and seizure has accordingly developed from warrantless under the previous 
section 74(3) of the Act into the requirement of a warrant, issued by an independent 
judge to scrutinise the Commissioner’s need for a search and seizure, under section 
74D of the Act.  
 
The current section 74D of the Act was, however, recently reviewed and the Tax 
Administration Bill (the TAB) contains the new provisions on search and seizure. The 
drafting of the TAB was announced in the 2005 Budget Review as a project “to 
incorporate into one piece of legislation certain generic administrative provisions, 
which are currently duplicated in the different tax Acts”.
3
 The first draft of the TAB 
was released on 30 October 2009. Changes were made to this first draft after 
consideration of the public comments received and a new draft TAB for second 
round public comments was released on 29 October 2010. Public comments could 
be submitted until 15 December 2010. On 23 June 2011, the third draft of the TAB, 
namely the Tax Administration Bill No 11 of 2011, was introduced in parliament. At 
time of writing of this assignment, no fourth or final draft was yet available. 
Reference in this assignment to the provisions of the TAB is on the TAB as it is 
currently available, i.e. the third draft of the TAB as introduced in parliament on 23 
July 2011. Once the TAB is signed into law, it will replace, inter alia, the current 
section 74D of the Act. The TAB provides in clause 272 that the Tax Administration 
Act (the TAA) shall come into operation on a date to be determined by the President 
by proclamation in the Gazette. This date is still unknown at time of writing.  
 
                                                          
3
  Draft Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft TAB (2009) 1.  
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The TAB still provides for an application for a warrant and the judge must still be 
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that:
4
 
 a person failed to comply with an obligation imposed under a tax Act or 
committed a tax offence; and  
 relevant material likely to be found on the premises specified in the 
application may provide evidence of the failure to comply or the commission 
of the offence. 
 
The basic principles of the application for a warrant will thus remain the same under 
the new TAA once it is signed into law. The other important provisions on search and 
seizure of the Act that should remain the same under the TAA once it is signed into 
law are, inter alia, the following: 
 the duty of an officer conducting the search and seizure to produce the 
warrant on demand;
5
 
 the retaining of the relevant material seized;
6
 
 the return of the relevant material seized;
7
 and  
 the right of a person to examine the material and make copies thereof.
8
  
 
Although the terminology and words used in the search and seizure provisions of the 
TAB are somewhat different from section 74D of the Act,
9
 it is submitted that the 
same legal concepts should mostly apply equally to the TAA once it is signed into 
law. This means that the case law laid down on the interpretation of the current 
section 74D of the Act, and the academic writing on the topic will still apply to the 
above listed similar provisions. However, when different wording is used, this is 
analysed throughout this assignment and the effect thereof is addressed. 
                                                          
4
  Clause 60(1) of the TAB. 
5
  Section 74D(7) of the Act and clause 61(1) of the TAB. 
6
  Section 74D(8) of the Act and clause 61(9) of the TAB. 
7
  Section 74D(9) of the Act and clause 66 of the TAB. 
8
  Section 74D(10) of the Act and clause 65 of the TAB. 
9
  An example: The Act refers to the search for and seizure of  ”information documents and things” 
whereas the TAB refers to “relevant material”. “Relevant material” is defined in section 1 of the 
TAB as “any information, document, or thing that is forseeably relevant for tax risk assessment, 
assessing tax, collecting tax, or showing non-compliance with an obligation under a tax Act or 
showing that a tax offence was committed”. This shows that the terminology is different, but that 
the same legal concepts could still apply.  
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There are, however, also certain new concepts introduced by the search and seizure 
provisions of the TAB which are not contained in section 74D of the Act, as well as 
some additions or changes to existing provisions of section 74D of the Act. Some of 
the most important provisions introduced by the TAB are the following:  
 Clause 59(3) of the TAB provides that the SARS, despite sub clause (2) 
which provides that the SARS must apply ex parte to a judge for a warrant, 
may apply for such a warrant to a magistrate, if the matter relates to an 
audit or investigation where the estimated tax in dispute does not exceed 
the amount determined in the notice issued under clause 109(1)(a) of the 
TAB. This amount is still unknown and must be determined by the Minister 
by notice in the Gazette. What is clear is that the word may is used in 
clause 59(3) of the TAB, which indicates that the SARS has a discretion 
about whether to bring the application to a High Court (a judge) or a lower 
court (a magistrate) when the amount in tax does not exceed the amount 
as determined by the Minister. Section 74D of the Act, however, only 
provides for an application to a High Court judge. It is furthermore not 
required in terms of section 74D of the Act that the SARS must bring the 
application ex parte. 
 
 Clause 60(3) of the TAB provides that a warrant must be exercised within 
45 business days or such further period as a judge or magistrate deems 
appropriate on good cause shown. The first draft of the TAB provided for 
60 days, which has now been changed in the second and third drafts to 45 
business days. There is, however, no similar time restraint in section 74D of 
the Act. 
 
 Clause 61 of the TAB sets out detailed provisions on the carrying out of the 
search. It regulates what the SARS officials must and may do when 
conducting a search and seizure. There are currently no such provisions in 
section 74D of the Act, which may show that the powers of SARS officials 
will be circumscribed more strictly by the new provisions. Clause 61(4) of 
the TAB requires that the SARS official must make an inventory of the 
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relevant material seized in the form, manner and at the time that is 
reasonable under the circumstances and provide a copy thereof to the 
person. There is no such duty on an officer conducting a search and seizure 
under section 74D of the Act. Furthermore, clause 61(5) of the TAB now 
clearly requires that the SARS official must conduct the search with strict 
regard for decency and order and in terms of clause 61(6) of the TAB, the 
SARS official may, at any time, request such assistance from a police officer 
as the official may consider reasonably necessary and the police officer 
must render the assistance. No similar provisions are contained in section 
74D of the Act.  
 
 Clause 61(8) of the TAB states that, subject to clause 66, the SARS official 
and the SARS are not liable for damage to property necessitated by reason 
of the search. There is no such exclusion of liability in section 74D of the 
Act.  Clause 66(1) of the TAB now specifically provides that a person may 
request the SARS to pay the costs of physical damage caused during the 
conduct of a search and seizure. If SARS refuses the request, the person 
may apply to a High Court for the payment of compensation for the 
physical damage caused.
10
 Neither is there such a remedy in terms of 
section 74D of the Act.  
 
 In terms of section 74D(5) of the Act, where the officer named in the 
warrant has reasonable grounds to believe that: 
§ information, documents or things are at any premises not identified 
in such warrant and about to be removed and destroyed; and 
§ a warrant cannot be obtained timeously to prevent such removal or 
destruction,  
such officer may search such premises and further exercise all the powers 
granted by section 74D of the Act, as if such premises had been identified 
in the warrant. It is accordingly permitted to search premises that are not 
identified in the warrant. This basic concept of search of premises not 
10
  Clause 66(2) of the TAB. 
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identified in the warrant is taken over by clause 62 of the TAB, with a few 
changes. Clause 62(1) of the TAB states that if a senior SARS official has 
reasonable grounds to believe that: 
§  the relevant material likely to be found on the premises and 
included in a warrant is at premises not identified in the warrant 
and may be removed or destroyed; 
§ a warrant cannot be obtained in time to prevent the removal or 
destruction of the relevant material; and 
§ the delay in obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of the 
search and seizure, 
SARS may enter and search the premises and exercise the powers granted 
in terms of part D of the TAB, as if the premises has been identified in the 
warrant. It is accordingly clear that a third requirement, namely that the 
delay in obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of the search and 
seizure, is added. It is thus still permitted under the TAB to search premises 
that are not identified in the warrant, but all three requirements must now 
be met, which is accordingly a fundamental change relating to the search 
of premises not identified in the warrant.  
 
 Clause 63 of the TAB is probably the most controversial new provision 
relating to search and seizure. It provides that a senior SARS official may 
without a warrant exercise the powers referred to in clause 61(3) 
§ if the person who may consent thereto so consents in writing; or 
§ if the senior SARS official on reasonable grounds is satisfied that 
 there may be an imminent removal or destruction of 
relevant material likely to be found on the premises; 
 if SARS applies for a search warrant under clause 59, a 
search warrant will be issued; and 
 the delay in obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of 
the search and seizure. 
Clause 63(3) of the TAB furthermore provides that the SARS official may 
not enter a dwelling-house or domestic premises, except any part thereof 
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used for purposes of trade, under this clause without the consent of the 
occupant. This aspect of the TAB has raised wide concern. A warrantless 
search and seizure will not be scrutinised by an independent judge. Control 
is currently built into section 74D of the Act by the need for a warrant 
issued by a judge, the judge being an independent party who can scrutinise 
the need of the SARS to search and seize.  In terms of the warrantless 
provisions, the SARS can exercise this power subjectively, without a 
warrant and without the independent examination by a judge. It is 
furthermore suggested by Klue, chief executive of the South African 
Institute of Tax Practitioners, that the warrantless search and seizure would 
give the SARS “absolute power” and that this would mean that the SARS 
could now “act as judge and jury”.
11
 
 
This last point on warrantless search and seizure shows the further development of 
search and seizure in South African income tax law. Search and seizure has thus 
developed from warrantless under section 74(3) of the Act into search and seizure 
by warrant under section 74D of the Act into a combination of both warranted and 
warrantless search and seizure under the TAB. The above listings also show that 
certain search and seizure provisions of the Act will remain the same, but that there 
are many new provisions introduced by the TAB.  
 
2 Problem Statement 
Two main problem statements on search and seizure in South African income tax law 
are identified. The first problem statement is further divided into sub-problems.  
 
2 1 Search and seizure by warrant  
How does the law on search and seizure by warrant operate in South African income 
tax law, is this process and are the provisions relating thereto constitutional and 
what are the remedies available to a taxpayer? 
                                                          
11
  Rawoot SARS may act as “judge and jury” (2009) http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-11-06-sars-
may-act-as-judge-and-jury (accessed 14 June 2010). 
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 Must or can the Commissioner bring the application ex parte and what are 
the consequences thereof?  
 What is the meaning of the “reasonable grounds” criterion? 
 What is the status of a warrant once it is exercised and how long is a warrant 
valid? 
 Are the warranted search and seizure provisions constitutional? 
 What are the remedies available to a taxpayer who has been subject to a 
search and seizure and are these remedies sufficient? 
 
2 2 Warrantless search and seizure  
How does a warrantless search and seizure operate, is this process and are the 
provisions relating thereto constitutional, what are the remedies available to a 
taxpayer and how does a warrantless search and seizure as proposed in the TAB 
compare to warrantless search and seizure in other spheres of the law, e.g. criminal 
law and competition law?  
 
3 Literature Review 
Each of the above problem statements is now briefly addressed in more detail, 
based on the case law and academic writing available thereon. A literature study was 
done on the previous section 74(3) of the Act and on section 74D of the Act to 
identify the problems as listed above. Not much literature is currently available on 
the TAB but since most principles are taken over by the TAB, it is submitted that the 
principles laid down by our courts and the opinions and remarks of academic writers 
will still equally apply to those similar provisions. However, any difference between 
the Act and the TAB is analysed throughout this assignment. 
 
3 1 Search and seizure by warrant  
 A warranted search and seizure requires an application to a judge. The 
question is, however, whether this application can or must be brought by the 
Commissioner ex parte. An ex parte application is an application made to the 
registrar of the court by one party only with no other party cited as a 
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respondent.
12
 Section 74D of the Act initially provided that the application 
must be made ex parte. This was changed in 1997 when the words ex parte 
were removed from section 74D of the Act.
13
 This might be a suggestion that 
there were problems with the words ex parte and that there might be a 
movement away from an ex parte application. Our courts are however not in 
agreement on this matter. In terms of the TAB, the SARS must now apply ex 
parte to a judge for a warrant.
14
 The problem thus revolves around the ex 
parte application and what the consequences of such an application are on a 
taxpayer.  This problem is addressed in chapter 3. 
 
 Section 74D(3) of the Act and clause 60(1) of the TAB require that the judge 
issuing the warrant must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that there was non-compliance with the Act/TAB or that a tax offence 
has been committed and that the relevant material that may afford evidence 
is likely to be found at the premises as specified in the application. It is, 
however, not clear what the phrase reasonable grounds entails, and the 
meaning thereof has not yet been clearly decided in a tax case. The 
reasonable grounds criterion occurs a few times in the search and seizure 
provisions of the Act and the TAB. It is an important criterion that must be 
satisfied in terms of clause 63 of the TAB when a warrantless search and 
seizure is considered. It is, however, not clear how and when the reasonable 
grounds criterion will be satisfied and this is addressed in chapter 3. 
 
 There are some uncertainties regarding the validity of a warrant before and 
after the exercising thereof. Once the Commissioner is in possession of a 
warrant to search and seize, the first question relates to the validity of the 
warrant before it has been exercised: For how long is a warrant valid, or in 
other words, when does it expire? It could then happen that the 
Commissioner exercises a valid warrant before its expiry, but that the 
                                                          
12
Harms Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts (2010) LexisNexis Butterworths Intranet Resources 
B6.13. 
13
  Section 74D(1) was amended by section 29 of Act No 28 of 1997.  
14
  Clause 59(2) of the TAB. 
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documents confiscated by the Commissioner reveal the existence of further 
documents. This leads to a second question: Can the same warrant be used 
again to conduct a further search or has the warrant expired when exercised? 
These questions are addressed in chapter 3. 
 
 Are the warranted search and seizure provisions constitutional? The 
constitutionality of section 74D of the Act has not yet been considered by our 
Constitutional Court but it is suggested by various commentators that the 
provisions should stand up to constitutional scrutiny.
15
 According to Silke, the 
constitutionality of section 74D of the Act is not beyond doubt.
16
 It is 
generally accepted that search and seizure provisions are in conflict with 
section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No 108 of 
1996 (the Constitution), which secures the right to privacy. However, the 
rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors.
17
 This means that even if the right of 
the Commissioner to search and seize might at first glance be 
unconstitutional and in breach of section 14 of the Constitution, it must be 
remembered that the rights guaranteed by the Constitution may be limited in 
terms of section 36 of the Constitution. A constitutional analysis of the search 
and seizure by warrant provisions is done in chapter 5.   
 
 What are the remedies available to a taxpayer who has been subject to a 
warranted search and seizure and are these remedies sufficient? In terms of 
both section 74D of the Act and the TAB provisions on search and seizure, a 
taxpayer may apply to a court for an order for the return of the material 
seized, and the court may, on good cause shown, make an order as it deems 
                                                          
15
French “What Revenue can’t do: Tax matters” 2007 (vol 193 issue 7) Finweek 101.
16
  Silke “Taxpayers and the Constitution: A battle already lost” 2002 Acta Juridica (vol 17 issue 1) 
282 291. 
17
  Section 36 of the Constitution or “the limitation clause”. 
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fit.
18
 In terms of the application for the return, the taxpayer must make out a 
case for a “good cause”. There is thus the burden on a taxpayer to prove this 
“good cause”, which makes it more difficult to rely on this remedy to correct 
the injustice or inconvenience suffered by a taxpayer. An aspect of 
uncertainty is whether a taxpayer can claim damages for damage and 
inconvenience suffered by a search and seizure. There is no provision for or 
exclusion of such a claim in section 74D of the Act. The TAB now provides in 
clause 61(8) that, subject to clause 66, the official or the SARS are not liable 
for damage to property necessitated by reason of the search. The general 
principle accordingly seems to be that the SARS is not liable.  However, clause 
66(1) of the TAB explicitly provides for a request to the SARS to pay 
compensation for the physical damage caused during the search and seizure. 
This incongruence between clause 66 and clause 68 of the TAB is addressed 
in chapter 6. The TAB has also introduced a new concept of an independent 
Office of the Tax Ombud. According to the Draft Memorandum on the 
Objects of the TAB (2010)
19
 the Tax Ombud‘s Office should “provide 
accessible and affordable remedies for taxpayers affected by non-adherence 
to procedures or failure to respect taxpayers‘ rights”. The effect of this 
Ombud Office on the rights and remedies of a taxpayer are also addressed in 
chapter 6. Chapter 6 investigates the stage after a search and seizure and the 
rights and duties of the SARS after a search and seizure are also addressed in 
this chapter. 
 
3 2 Warrantless search and seizure  
 How does the warrantless search and seizure as proposed by the TAB 
operate? Clause 63(1) of the TAB grants authority to a senior SARS official to, 
without a warrant, exercise the powers referred to in clause 61(3) if the 
person who may consent thereto so consents in writing; or if the senior SARS 
official on reasonable grounds is satisfied that: 
                                                          
18
  Section 74D(9) of the Act and clauses 66(2) and (3) of the TAB. 
19
  http:// www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=52833 (accessed 6 November 2010). 
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§ there may be an imminent removal or destruction of relevant 
material likely to be found on the premises; 
§ if SARS applies for a search warrant under clause 59, a search warrant 
will be issued; and 
§ the delay in obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of the search 
and seizure. 
The TAB however provides that the SARS official may not enter a dwelling-
house or domestic premises, except any part thereof used for purposes of 
trade, under this clause without the consent of the occupant.
20
 It needs to 
be determined exactly what the powers of the SARS are in terms of the 
warrantless provisions, and how and when these powers can be exercised. 
These problems are addressed in chapter 4. 
 
 Are the new warrantless search and seizure provisions constitutional? Since 
some writers claim that a section 74D of the Act warranted search and 
seizure is unconstitutional, they would probably come to a conclusion that a 
warrantless search and seizure would result in a more severe constitutional 
breach. A search and seizure without a warrant should always be the 
exception and not the rule.
21
 The right to privacy and the limitation thereof 
by warrantless search and seizure provisions are analysed in chapter 5.   
 
 What are the remedies available to a taxpayer who has been subject to a 
warrantless search and seizure and are these remedies sufficient? The 
remedies available to a taxpayer who has been subject to a warranted or a 
warrantless search and seizure is dealt with together in chapter 6.  
 
 How do the newly proposed warrantless search and seizure provisions of the 
TAB compare to warrantless search and seizure in other spheres of the law, 
e.g. in criminal law and competition law? The Criminal Procedure Act No 51 
of 1977 (the Criminal Procedure Act) provides for a search and seizure 
                                                          
20
  Clause 63(3) of the TAB. 
21
  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2005) 328. 
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without a warrant when consent to the search and seizure is given or where 
a delay would defeat the object thereof.
22
 This is, however, in a criminal law 
context. A search and seizure conducted by the Commissioner is in the 
context of a civil liability towards the state.
23
 Another Act permitting 
warrantless searches and seizures is the Competition Act No 89 of 1998 (the 
Competition Act). However, it sets out very strict boundaries to enter and 
search without a warrant. The warrantless provisions of the TAB are 
accordingly compared to the warrantless provisions of other statutes in 
chapter 4.   
 
4 Research Goals 
The following are the key research goals of the study: 
 To analyse the development of search and seizure from warrantless under 
the previous section 74(3) of the Act into the requirement of a warrant 
under section 74D of the Act into a combination of both under the TAB. 
This will show how the provisions originated and the history thereof will 
provide a basic understanding for the further detailed discussions. 
 To provide a basic understanding of the warranted search and seizure 
provisions in South African income tax law and to clarify the problems 
regarding the operation of a warranted search and seizure. The problems 
relate to the ex parte application, the status of a warrant once exercised, 
the validity of a warrant and the reasonable grounds criterion. Research is 
thus done to clarify these problems, and to provide for clarification of 
these problems.  
 To provide a basic understanding of the warrantless search and seizure 
provisions of the TAB. This a new mechanism available to the 
Commissioner which must be analysed to determine exactly what the 
Commissioner may do, how he may do it and when he may do it. These 
provisions of the TAB are compared to the warrantless search and seizure 
                                                          
22
  Section 22. 
23
  Williams “Taxpayers’ rights in South Africa” 1997 (vol 7 issue 2) Revenue Law Journal 14. 
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provisions of other acts to determine whether they are in line with what 
has been approved by our courts in other spheres of the law. 
 To evaluate whether the warranted search and seizure provisions of the 
Act and the TAB and the warrantless search and seizure provisions of the 
TAB are constitutional. This must be done to determine whether the 
legislative provisions on search and seizure are sustainable under the 
highest law of our country, namely the Constitution.  
 To determine what remedies are available to a taxpayer who has been 
subject to either a warranted or a warrantless search and seizure. These 
are counterbalances available to a taxpayer and the remedies available 
must be determined in order for justice to be done to an aggrieved 
taxpayer. 
 
5 Research Methods 
The methodology followed in this research consists of a literature review, an analysis 
of the relevant provisions of the Act and the TAB and a study of the cases on the 
topic of search and seizure in South Africa. Historical research is conducted on the 
previous provisions relating to search and seizure, thereby showing how this field 
has developed. Furthermore, comparative research is conducted by comparing the 
warrantless search and seizure of the TAB to warrantless search and seizure in other 
spheres of the law, e.g. criminal law and competition law. 
 
6 Assumptions and Limitations of Scope 
The assumption is made that the third draft of the TAB which was released on          
23 June 2011, will become law once it is signed by Parliament.   
 
It is noted that an almost exact replica of section 74D of the Act is found in section 
57D of the Value-Added Tax Act No 89 of 1991 (the VAT Act).
24
  This assignment does 
not address the search and seizure provisions of the VAT Act, but it is argued that, 
                                                          
24
  The only minor difference between the two sections is that section 74D(1)(a) refers to “taxpayer” 
whereas section 57D(1)(a) refers to “person”. 
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due to its similarity, that the analysis of section 74D of the Act could similarily be 
applied to section 57D of the VAT Act. 
 
The scope of this assignment does not include clause 64 of the TAB on legal 
professional privilege. Clause 64 is included in “Part D Search and Seizure” of the TAB 
but is not dealt with in this assignment. 
 
It should be noted that only a brief constitutional analysis is done in this assignment. 
It goes without saying that vast amounts of cases and literature exist on the general 
topic of the constitutionality of search and seizure provisions. Only general principles 
and some of the most important cases are highlighted in chapter 5. However, this 
chapter should not be construed as an exhaustive or in depth constitutional analysis 
of the search and seizure provisions of the Act and the TAB.   
 
7 Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 examines the development of search and seizure in South African income 
tax law. Search and seizure has developed from warrantless under the previous 
section 74(3) of the Act into the requirement of a warrant, issued by an independent 
judge to scrutinise the Commissioner’s need for a search and seizure, under section 
74D of the Act. The TAB now provides for a combination of a warranted and a 
warrantless search and seizure. This chapter provides a background and the history 
of and development to the current provisions. It also investigates those provisions 
on search and seizure in the Act that will remain the same once the TAB becomes 
the TAA, and the new provisions introduced by the TAB. This provides a basic 
understanding for the further detailed discussions. 
 
The operation of a warranted search and seizure, and the problems related thereto, 
are addressed in chapter 3. This entails the application for a warrant, the status of 
the warrant once it is exercised, the validity of a warrant and the meaning of the 
reasonable grounds criterion. 
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Chapter 4 discusses warrantless searches and seizures. This chapter firstly looks into 
the operation of a warrantless search and seizure and secondly compares the 
warrantless search and seizure provisions of the TAB to the provisions permitting a 
warrantless search and seizure in other acts. This is done to place the warrantless 
TAB provisions in perspective and to determine whether the TAB provisions are in 
line with what has been approved by our courts in other spheres of the law. 
 
Chapter 5 investigates the constitutionality of both the warranted and warrantless 
search and seizure provisions. The right to privacy is analysed and the limitations 
clause of the Constitution is also applied in order to determine the constitutionality 
of the warranted and warrantless search and seizure provisions. 
 
The remedies available to a taxpayer are discussed in chapter 6. This chapter focuses 
on the stage after a search and seizure has been conducted. The Commissioner has 
certain rights and duties,
25
 but the taxpayer is also protected by law.
26
 This chapter 
addresses the remedies available to a taxpayer who has been subject to either a 
warranted or warrantless search and seizure. These remedies are analysed and 
critically evaluated in order to determine whether any injustice that has been 
suffered by an aggrieved taxpayer can be made undone or could have been 
prevented.   
 
The last chapter, chapter 7, is the concluding chapter. It contains a summary of the 
research conducted and the conclusions made on the problems as identified.  
  
                                                          
25
  For example the right of the Commissioner in terms of section 74D(8) to retain the information, 
documents or things seized until the conclusion of any investigation or until they are required to 
be used for the purposes of any legal proceedings under the Act.  
26
  For example the right of a taxpayer in terms of section 74D(9) to apply to the High Court for the 
return of any information, documents or things seized. 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter firstly examines the history and development of search and seizure in 
South African income tax law. The enunciation of the development of the relevant 
search and seizure provisions provides a basic understanding for the further detailed 
discussions in the next chapters. Secondly, this chapter also provides the content of 
the search and seizure provisions and investigates those provisions on search and 
seizure of the Act that will remain the same once the TAB becomes the TAA, as well 
as the new provisions introduced by the TAB.  
 
2 The previous section 74(3) of the Act 
2 1 Introduction  
Section 74(3) of the Act, before being substituted in 1996,
27
 provided as follows: 
“Any officer engaged in carrying out the provisions of this Act who has in relation 
to the affairs of a particular person been authorized thereto by the Commissioner 
in writing or by telegram, may, for the purposes of the administration of this Act-  
(a) without previous notice, at any time during the day enter any premises 
whatsoever and on such premises search for any moneys, books, records, 
accounts or documents;  
(b) in carrying out any such search, open or cause to be opened or removed and 
opened, any article in which he suspects any moneys, books, records, 
accounts or documents to be contained;  
(c) seize any such books, records, accounts or documents as in his opinion may 
afford evidence which may be material in assessing the liability of any person 
for any tax;  
(d) retain any such books, records, accounts or documents for as long as they may 
be required for any assessment or for any criminal or other proceedings under 
this Act.”  
 
This section clearly shows that the Commissioner had an absolute discretion to grant 
authority for a search and seizure. No warrant was required and a search and seizure 
could be conducted merely by the authorisation of the Commissioner. Section 74(3) 
                                                          
27
  Section 14 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act No 46 of 1996 substituted section 74 of the Act, 
and added sections 74A, 74B, 74C and 74D. The new sections 74 and 74A-74D came into operation 
on 30 September 1996. 
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of the Act has for many years been criticised as arbitrary and unfair,
28
 and the 
powers of the Commissioner have been described as untrammelled.
29
 It gave the 
Commissioner extremely wide powers to acquire information regarding the 
taxpayer’s affairs and it was therefore argued by academic writers that the section 
prima facie violated a person’s right to privacy guaranteed by section 13 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No 200 of 1993 (the Interim 
Constitution).
30
  
 
The Interim Constitution came into operation on 27 April 1994 and the previous 
section 74(3) of the Act, which required a mere authorisation from the 
Commissioner to conduct a search and seizure, was thus still in operation when the 
Interim Constitution came into force. However, on 30 September 1996, the previous 
section 74(3) of the Act was substituted with a new section 74 and section 74D was 
inserted into the Act to regulate searches en seizures. The final Constitution then 
came into operation on 4 February 1997, thus after the substitution of the previous 
section 74(3) of the Act and the insertion of the new section 74D into the Act. The 
basic new principle of section 74D of the Act was that a warrant authorising a search 
and seizure must now be obtained by the Commissioner from a judge. Section 74D 
of the Act first required that the Commissioner must bring the application for a 
warrant ex parte, but section 74D was amended in 1997 by removing the words ex 
parte.
31
  
 
These dates can be illustrated as follows: 
 
                                                          
28
  Mosupa “Constitutional validity of search and seizure provisions: a perspective on section 74 of 
the Income Tax Act” 2001 (vol 12 issue 2) Stellenbosch Law Review 317. 
29
  Mokgatle “Entry, search and seizure: Any taxpayer rights?” 1997 (vol 13 issue 9) Management 
Today (South Africa) 38. 
30
  This was argued by, inter alia: Franzsen “Chapter 3 and tax law: privacy and religious freedom” 
1995 (issue 327) De Rebus 169; Meyerowitz, Davis & Emslie “The Constitution and the 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue” 1994 (vol 4 issue 10) The Taxpayer (Editorial) 181 and 
Mokgatle “Entry, search and seizure: Any taxpayer rights?” 1997 (vol 13 issue 9) Management 
Today (South Africa) 38. 
31
  Section 74D(1) of the Act was amended by section 29 of the Income Tax Act No 28 of 1997 and 
this amendment came into operation on 4 July 1997. 
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of the search and seizure provisions of the Act and the Interim and 
Final Constitution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is thus clear that search and seizure has develop from warrantless or mere 
authorisation from the Commissioner under section 74(3) of the Act into the 
requirement of a warrant under section 74D of the Act. The application for a warrant 
has in its turn developed from an ex parte application into just an application.  
 
The constitutionality of section 74(3) of the Act, the detailed content of section 74D 
of the Act and the further development of section 74D of the Act into the TAB are 
now analysed. 
 
2 2 The constitutionality of section 74(3) of the Act 
Section 13 of the Interim Constitution provided that every person shall have the right 
to his or her personal privacy, which shall include the right not to be subject to 
searches of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of private possessions 
or the violation of private communications. Rights are however not absolute and can 
be limited in certain circumstances. Section 33 of the Interim Constitution was the 
limitation clause and provided that rights may be limited by law of general 
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application, provided that such limitation shall be permissible only to the extent that 
it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom 
and equality and shall not negate the essential content of the right in question. 
When a right is limited in terms of the limitation clause, it means that there is a 
justifiable infringement of the right, and it means that the provision is not 
unconstitutional, even though a fundamental right is infringed.
32
 It was however 
suggested that section 74(3) of the Act could not be saved by the limitation clause of 
the Interim Constitution, since the powers vested in the Commissioner were too 
wide.
33
  
 
2 2 1 The Katz Commission 
The Commission of Inquiry into certain Aspects of the Tax Structure of South Africa 
(the Katz Commission), also came to the conclusion that section 74(3) of the Act was 
a prima facie violation of section 13 of the Interim Constitution. The Katz 
Commission came to their finding with reference to Hunter et al v Southam,
34
 a 
Canadian Supreme Court case, where similar provisions were held to be 
unconstitutional.
35
 The Katz Commission furthermore recommended the following:
36
  
“(a) Where feasible, prior authorisation must be obtained in order to execute a 
valid search and seizure; 
(b) authorization must be granted by neutral and impartial persons capable of 
acting judicially, which implies that the authorization provided in terms of Section 
74 from the Commissioner is not constitutionally valid; and  
(c) the minimum standard requires that the person issuing the warrant must on 
reasonable and proper grounds established by information given under oath, 
believe that an offence has been committed and that evidence will be found at the 
place of the search.” 
It is argued that the reason why the Commissioner should not himself give such 
authorisation is because he is not a neutral and impartial person capable of acting 
                                                          
32
  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2005) 164. 
33
  Meyerowitz, Davis & Emslie “The Constitution and the Commissioner for Inland Revenue” 1994 
(vol 4 issue 10) The Taxpayer (Editorial) 181 182 and Mokgatle “Entry, search and seizure: Any 
taxpayer rights?” 1997 (vol 13 issue 9) Management Today (South Africa) 38 39. 
34
  [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. 
35
  The Katz Commission Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects of the Tax 
Structure of South Africa (1994) 75 (6.3.27). 
36
  Ibid. 
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judicially, as required by recommendation (b), since he is also the person collecting 
the taxes and enforcing the law.  
 
Coming to the conclusion that section 74(3) of the Act was a violation of the right to 
privacy, the Katz Commission also recognised in its report that there might be 
circumstances where the right to privacy may be limited by section 33, the limitation 
clause, of the Interim Constitution.
37
 The Katz Commission thus merely came to the 
conclusion that section 74(3) of the Act was prima facie unconstitutional, which 
means that section 74(3) was a violation of the right to privacy but that the 
limitation of this right might be possible in certain circumstances. According to the 
Katz Commission, when deciding on the limitation of the right to privacy in the 
context of section 74(3) of the Act, one would then have to take the following factors 
into account:
38
  
 the circumstances, goal and purpose of the intrusion;  
 the absence of alternative methods of obtaining the necessary evidence; and 
 the likelihood of accomplishing the goal as a result of the intrusion.  
 
The Katz Commission, however, never made a final decision on whether section 
74(3) of the Act would be such a justifiable limitation of the right to privacy, it merely 
listed the above factors which must be taken into account when deciding whether 
the section could be limited in terms of the limitation clause. 
 
The changes made by the legislature to the Act from the previous section 74(3) to 
section 74D are in accordance with recommendations (a)-(c) made by the Katz 
Commission. As discussed in this chapter under 3 2 and 3 3 infra in more detail, 
section 74D of the Act now requires that prior authorisation must be obtained in 
order to execute a valid search and seizure and this authorisation must be granted 
by a neutral and impartial person capable of acting judicially.
39
 The minimum 
standard in the Act also requires that the person issuing the warrant must on 
                                                          
37
The Katz Commission Interim Report of the Commission of Inquiry into certain aspects of the Tax 
Structure of South Africa (1994) 75 (6.3.28). 
38
  Ibid.  
39
  Sections 74D(1) and (3) of the Act. 
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reasonable and proper grounds established by facts given under oath, believe that 
an offence has been committed and that evidence will be found at the place of the 
search, as recommended by the Katz Commission.
40
 This shows that the legislature 
acknowledged the inherent defects of section 74(3) of the Act, and it shows the 
legislature’s attempt to comply with the Constitution as recommended by the Katz 
Commission. 
 
2 2 2 Constitutionality of section 74(3) of the Act and the Rudolph saga 
The first reported case in which a taxpayer constitutionally challenged the Act was 
on the constitutionality of section 74(3) of the Act.
41
 The constitutionality of section 
74(3) of the Act was raised in what has been described in the literature as the 
Rudolph saga. The cases part of this saga are all reported as Rudolph and Another v 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue and Others, with only the difference in years and 
courts. The four Rudolph cases will respectively be referred to as the first Rudolph 
case which was decided by the Witwatersrand Local Division,
42
 the second Rudolph 
case, decided by the then Appellate Division,
43
 the third Rudolph case which was 
decided by the Constitutional Court
44
 and the fourth Rudolph case, decided by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA).
45
  
 
The facts were that Mr Rudolph had, during the years 1988 to 1992, failed to render 
proper returns for income tax purposes and he had also failed, despite numerous 
promises to do so, to remedy this situation. On 20 October 1993 the Chief Director 
of Administration in the service of the Department of Finance, issued fourteen 
authorisations in terms of section 74(3) of the Act to a number of named officials of 
the Revenue Department. This authorised the officials to exercise, in relation to the 
taxpayer and various of his companies and trusts, the powers prescribed in section 
74(3) of the Act. Acting under these authorisations, certain of the Commissioner’s 
officials interviewed the taxpayer at his home on 21 October 1993 and seized a 
                                                          
40
  Sections 74D(2) and (3) of the Act. 
41
  Olivier “The new search and seizure provisions of the Income Tax Act” 1997 (issue 350) De Rebus 
195. 
42
  56 SATC 249. 
43
  58 SATC 183. 
44
  58 SATC 219. 
45
  59 SATC 399. 
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number of documents. The information then obtained was however not satisfactory 
and the Commissioner later received further information. Six months after the first 
search and seizure, on 22 April 1994, members of the investigating team, acting 
again under the authority of the original written authorisations, searched for and 
found a mass of relevant documents which they wished to seize.  
 
When Mr Rudolph was informed that the documents would be removed at a 
specified time, he approached the Witwatersrand Local Division for an interim 
interdict preventing any further searches or the utilisation of any documents already 
seized, pending a determination by the Constitutional Court on the constitutionality 
of section 74(3) of the Act. The applicants contended that, as the Constitutional 
Court had not yet been brought into being, it was necessary in order to give effect to 
the intent and principles of the Constitution, for the Witwatersrand Local Division to 
grant interim relief until the Constitutional Court could rule on the constitutionality 
of section 74 of the Act. The applicants further contended that the searches and 
seizures constituted an infringement of or a threat to their rights in terms of section 
13 of the Interim Constitution, which guaranteed the right to privacy, including the 
right against unlawful searches.  
 
It was however held by the court in the first Rudolph case that section 74(3) of the 
Act remained in force unless repealed or amended by parliament or declared 
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.
46
 It would otherwise leave a serious 
gap in the Act pending new legislation or a decision by the Constitutional Court.
47
 
The court decided not to hear the arguments on the constitutionality of section 74(3) 
of the Act as those matters fell outside its jurisdiction.
48
 
In the second Rudolph case, Mr Rudolph appealed to the then Appellate Division, 
and challenged section 74(3) of the Act on what was said to be the common law 
grounds of invalidity. The appellants still contended that section 74(3) of the Act was 
unconstitutional and invalid but recognised that the Appellate Division could not 
pronounce on that issue. Therefore the common law grounds of invalidity were used 
                                                          
46
  On page 252. 
47
  Ibid. 
48
  On page 253. 
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and these grounds related to the giving of the authorisation. It was argued that the 
authorisation may not be used in perpetuity and had thus expired once executed, 
that the power to authorise the search and seizure was not properly delegated to 
the person who gave the authorisation and that the authorisations were invalid on 
the ground that they were vaguely and imprecisely worded. The appellants 
requested the court to adjudicate on these common law grounds of invalidity and if 
they were to fail on these grounds then requesting the court to refer the issue of the 
constitutionality of section 74(3) of the Act to the Constitutional Court.  
 
The court, however, decided that it was necessary, for the purpose of disposal of the 
appeal on the common law grounds, that the constitutional issue should be decided 
first.
49
 The court was not convinced that it had a parallel common law jurisdiction in 
these circumstances but that in any event, in order to decide whether the court 
would have jurisdiction such as was contended, the court would be obliged to 
interpret the Constitution, which it was not entitled to do, since the Appellate 
Division would have no jurisdiction to adjudicate on any matter within the 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.
50
 The matter was therefore, in the interest of 
justice, referred to the Constitutional Court and the common law grounds were not 
heard.
51
 
 
This referral gave rise to the third Rudolph case, where the Constitutional Court 
decided that the case had no constitutional merits. The Interim Constitution came 
into operation on 27 April 1994, a few days after the second search of Mr Rudolph’s 
premises. The searches and seizures had thus taken place prior to the Interim 
Constitution coming into force which means none of the events of which the 
applicant complains can be said to constitute a breach of any of his rights under the 
Interim Constitution. The court held that such rights had not yet come into existence 
when the events took place, nor could the subsequent advent of the Interim 
Constitution, by affording rights and freedoms which had not existed before, render 
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  On page 188. 
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unlawful actions that were lawful at the time at which they were taken.
52
 The court 
therefore decided that it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter since the Interim 
Constitution did not operate retroactively.
53
 It was however held by the 
Constitutional Court that the Appellate Division was competent to adjudicate upon 
and determine the common law grounds of invalidity on appeal and the case was 
referred back to the Appellate Division. 
 
Before addressing the decision of the Appellate Division, an argument of Silke 
relating to the Constitutional Court decision is relevant here. In a written submission 
to the Constitutional Court, a concession was made by the Commissioner and it was 
argued by Silke that this submission could have led to a success of Rudolph’s 
common law attack on section 74(3) of the Act when the appeal was referred back 
to the Appellate Division.
54
 This concession made by the Commissioner was as 
follows:
55
 
“In the light of the aforegoing it is submitted that common law grounds for 
invalidity of administrative action fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme court, 
including the Appellate Division, and that the Constitutional Court has no 
jurisdiction in such matters. Should it be held that this Court has such jurisdiction, 
it is conceded that one or more of the common law challenges should succeed.” 
 
According to Silke,
56
 it was hoped that the taxpayer would be successful with his 
common law grounds of attack, and with the concession of the Commissioner, he 
seemed to have the Commissioner on his side as it is clear that the Commissioner 
conceded that one or more of the common law challenges should succeed, if the 
court has jurisdiction. 
 
                                                          
52
  On page 224. 
53
  On page 227. 
54
  Silke “Rudolph and the red-faced officials” 1996 (vol 10 issue 6) Tax Planning: Corporate and 
Commercial 135 and Silke “Rudolph and the courts: the end of the saga” 1998 (vol 12 issue 5) Tax 
Planning: Corporate and Commercial 103-104. 
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  Rudolph and Another v Commissioner for Inland Revenue and Others 58 SATC 219 [19]. 
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  Silke “Rudolph and the courts: the end of the saga” 1998 (vol 12 issue 5) Tax Planning: Corporate 
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Finally, in the fourth Rudolph case, the SCA heard the common law grounds of 
attack. The SCA however decided that Mr Rudolph could not succeed with any of the 
common law grounds of attack. These were the same grounds as argued in the 
second case, all relating to the giving of the authorisation. The SCA accepted none of 
these attacks on section 74(3) of the Act and the appeal was therefore dismissed.  
 
Thus, despite the submission made by the Commissioner that should the court have 
jurisdiction, one or more of the common law grounds of appeal should succeed, the 
appeal was still dismissed. It was stated by Silke that it “would therefore seem that a 
court is likely to pay little or no attention to the Commissioner’s view as to what its 
judgement should be”.
57
 Although an attempt was made to attack the 
constitutionality of section 74(3) of the Act, it was in the end never decided by our 
courts.  
 
It seems clear now why these cases have been described as the Rudolph saga. Mr 
Rudolph fought a long battle from court to court, but according to Silke, taxpayers 
should not regard this last judgement of the Rudolph saga as a total loss since there 
is still hope in the fact that is shows that a court will not always agree with the 
Commissioner’s views.
58
 
 
2 2 3 Conclusion on the constitutionality of the previous section 74(3) of the Act 
The Rudolph saga related to the constitutionality of section 74(3) of the Act, but our 
courts never made a decision on its constitutionality. It was left to the legislature to 
correct the defects of the section. Academic writers agreed that section 74(3) of the 
Act was a prima facie violation of section 13 of the Interim Constitution, even though 
it was never decided by our courts.
59
 However, they were not in agreement on 
whether section 74(3) of the Act could be saved by the limitation clause.  
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According to Franszen, section 74(3) of the Act was a prima facie violation of section 
13 of the Interim Constitution, but he also acknowledges, in agreement with the Katz 
Commission, that a violation of the right to privacy may be reasonable and justifiable 
in terms of the limitation clause of the Interim Constitution.
60
  
 
However, Mokgatlo argued that the section could not be saved by the limitation 
clause since “the provision in question was not reasonable and justifiable according 
to the values of an open and democratic society”.
61
   
 
In the Editorial of The Taxpayer, the following was held on the issue of the 
constitutionality of section 74(3) of the Act:
62
 
“We venture the opinion that to an extent, but only to an extent, section 33 of the 
Constitution Act would enable the Commissioner or his officials to enter premises, 
carry out a search, seize books etc, but as section 74(3) stands we are of the view 
that it is unconstitutional and cannot be upheld in its present form merely 
because there could be some particular circumstances in some particular cases 
which would justify within the intent of section 33 of the Constitution Act some 
entry, some seizure etc.” 
 
Mosupa also argued that there is no doubt that section 74(3) of the Act was 
unconstitutional.
63
 The section could thus not be saved by the limitation clause. He 
came to this conclusion with reference to the case of Park-Ross v Director: Office for 
Serious Economic Offence.
64
  
 
In the case of Park-Ross, section 6 of the Investigation of Serious Economic Offences 
Act No 117 of 1991 (Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act) was 
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constitutionally challenged. This section empowered the Director of the Office for 
Serious Economic Offences (the Director) to enter any premises on which or in which 
anything connected with an inquiry was or was suspected to be without notice, to 
seize copies of or extracts from any book or document found there and to request 
from any person an explanation of any entry therein. The court found that this 
section was a limitation of the right to privacy, but also held that the rights 
entrenched by the Interim Constitution are not absolute and can thus be limited. The 
limitation clause of the Interim Constitution, section 33, was then considered and 
the court came to the conclusion that it was a prerequisite for a reasonable search 
and seizure that the power to authorise such a search and seizure should be given to 
an impartial and independent judicial authority. The Director cannot be an impartial 
arbiter to grant effective authorisation, and the section was therefore an 
unreasonable limitation to the right to privacy and therefore unconstitutional. 
 
It is argued that this case could provide precedent for the unconstitutionality of 
section 74(3) of the Act. The Commissioner is not, similarly to the Director in the 
Park-Ross case, an impartial arbiter to grant effective authorisation. He is the one 
collecting the taxes and enforcing the Act, and thus not independent and impartial. 
This would mean that the right to privacy could not be reasonably and justifiably 
limited by section 74(3) of the Act in an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality and this would in turn mean that section 74(3) is 
unconstitutional. 
  
The same approach was followed by the Constitutional Court in the case of Mistry v 
Interim National Medical and Dental Council of South Africa.
65
 In this case the power 
of search and seizure was given to inspectors in terms of section 28(1) of the 
Medicines and Related Substances Control Act No 101 of 1965 (Medicines and 
Related Substances Control Act) to conduct warrantless searches of business 
premises. The court held that, to the extent that the Medicines and Related 
Substances Control Act authorises a warrantless entry into private homes and the 
rifling through intimate possessions, breaches the right to personal privacy. The 
                                                          
65
  1997 (7) BCLR 933. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
31 
 
court then considered whether the right could be limited. There were no safeguards 
in the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, such as prior judicial 
authorisation, to limit the extent of the intrusion on the right to privacy. The 
Constitutional Court therefore held as follows:
66
 
“To sum up: irrespective of legitimate expectations of privacy which may be 
intruded upon in the process, and without any predetermined safeguards to 
minimise the extent of such intrusions where the nature of the investigations 
makes some invasion of privacy necessary, section 28(1) gives the inspectors carte 
blanche to enter any place, including private dwellings, where they reasonably 
suspect medicines to be, and then to inspect documents which may be of the 
most intimate kind. The extent of the invasion of the important right to personal 
privacy authorised by section 28(1) is substantially disproportionate to its public 
purpose; the section is clearly overbroad in its reach and accordingly fails to pass 
the proportionality test...” 
 
The court concluded that the desired and permissible ends of regulatory inspection 
could easily be achieved through means less damaging to the right to privacy, i.e. by 
the requirement of a warrant.
67
 When again applied to section 74(3) of the Act, it 
could be argued that the same conclusion on constitutionality could be reached. 
There are no safeguards in section 74(3) of the Act, such as prior judicial 
authorisation as only the authorisation of the Commissioner was required. Section 
74(3) of the Act, similarly to section 28(1) of the Medicines and Related Substances 
Control Act, gives the officer carte blanche to enter any place, including private 
dwellings, to search the premises and seize material from the premises. The Mistry 
case could accordingly be another precedent for the unconstitutionality of section 
74(3) of the Act.  
 
It is thus clear that changes had to be made to section 74(3) of the Act as it would 
most probably not have passed the constitutional test. Although Mr Rudolph had not 
been successful in his constitutional challenge, according to Olivier, “his actions 
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prompted the legislature to introduce new search and seizure provisions”.
68
 This was 
done by the legislature by enacting the Revenue Laws Amendment Act No 46 of 
1996 which substituted section 74 of the Act and inserted sections 74A-D into the 
Act. According to Mokgatle, the amendment of section 74(3) of the Act without the 
Constitutional Court ruling on the matter deserves an applause.
69
 This statement is 
however criticised by the writer since it is firstly clear that there were strong 
arguments for the unconstitutionality of section 74(3) of the Act, which would have 
only made it a question of time before a court had ruled the section 
unconstitutional. Secondly, the viewpoint should not be that the legislature must 
attempt to keep legislation in place which infringes upon a person’s rights until the 
Constitutional Court makes a ruling on the invalidity thereof.  
 
Another argument on the constitutionality of section 74(3) of the Act is that the 
“shotgun approach” of section 74(3) would have to be narrowed down.
70
 This means 
that the wide powers given to the Commissioner by section 74(3) of the Act would 
have to be reduced to powers that are in accordance with the Constitution.  
 
Nonetheless, the legislature addressed the problems of the previous section 74(3) of 
the Act in 1996 by enacting the new section 74 and sections 74A-D of the Act. 
Section 74D of the Act was the new section on search and seizure.  
 
3 Content of section 74D of the Act and further developments into the 
TAB 
3 1 Introduction 
Section 74D was inserted into the Act in 1996 by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 
No 46 of 1996. That Amendment Act also substituted the search and seizure 
provisions of the previous section 74(3) of the Act. The basic new principle of section 
74D of the Act is that a warrant authorising a search and seizure must now be 
                                                          
68
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obtained by the Commissioner from a judge. As discussed supra, there was a further 
development regarding the application for a warrant. An ex parte application was 
first required, but this was changed with effect from 4 July 1997 when the words ex 
parte were removed from section 74D(1) of the Act.  
 
Section 74D of the Act was however recently reviewed again and the TAB now 
contains new provisions on search and seizure. Once the TAB is signed into law, the 
TAA will replace, inter alia, the current section 74D of the Act. 
 
Most of the provisions on search and seizure of the Act and the TAB are similar but 
the TAB also contains certain new provisions which are not contained in section 74D 
of the Act, as well as some additions to existing provisions of section 74D of the Act. 
The following aspects relate to the search and seizure provisions of the Act and/or 
the TAB and will be discussed in this chapter:  
 the application for a warrant; 
 the issuance of a warrant; 
 the carrying out of the search;  
 the search of premises not identified in the warrant;  
 the seizure of material not identified in the warrant;  
 the preservation and retaining of the material;  
 the remedies; and  
 an introduction to the warrantless search and seizure provisions. 
 
3 2 Application for a warrant 
The application for a warrant is regulated by section 74D(1) and (2) of the Act and 
clause 59 of the TAB. However, some of the application provisions of section 74D(1) 
of the Act are also found in certain subsections of clause 61 of the TAB. These 
relevant provisions read and compare as follows:  
Section 74D of the Act: 
(1) For the purposes of the 
administration of this Act, a judge 
may, on application by the 
Clause 59 of the TAB:  
(1) The Commissioner personally or 
a senior SARS official may, if 
necessary or relevant to administer 
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Commissioner or any officer 
contemplated in section 74 (4), 
issue a warrant, authorising the 
officer named therein to, without 
prior notice and at any time— 
(a) (i) enter and search any 
 premises; and 
 (ii) search any person 
 present on the premises, 
 provided that such search is 
 conducted by an 
 officer of the same gender 
 as the person being 
 searched, for any 
 information, documents or
 things, that may afford 
 evidence as to the non-
 compliance by any taxpayer 
 with his obligations in terms 
 of this Act; 
(b) seize any such information, 
 documents or things; and 
(c)  in carrying out any such 
 search, open or cause to be 
 opened or removed and 
 opened, anything in 
 which such officer suspects 
 any information, 
 documents or things to be 
 contained. 
 
(2) An application under 
subsection (1) shall be supported by 
information supplied under oath or 
solemn declaration, establishing the 
a tax Act, authorise an application 
for a warrant authorising SARS to 
enter a premises where relevant 
material is kept to search the 
premises and any person present on 
the premises and seize relevant 
material. 
 
(2) SARS must apply ex parte to a 
judge for the warrant, which 
application must be supported by 
information supplied under oath or 
solemn declaration, establishing the 
facts on which the application is 
based. 
 
(3) Despite subsection (2), SARS 
may apply for the warrant referred 
to in subsection (1) and in the 
manner referred to in subsection 
(2), to a magistrate, if the matter 
relates to an audit or investigation 
where the estimated tax in dispute 
does not exceed the amount 
determined in the notice issued 
under section 109(1)(a).  
 
Clause 61(3)(a) of the TAB:  
The SARS official may open or cause 
to be opened or removed in 
conducting a search, anything which 
the official suspects to contain 
relevant material. Clause 61(5) of 
the TAB:  
The SARS official must conduct the 
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Section 74D(1) grants the power to bring an application for a warrant to the 
Commissioner or any officer contemplated in section 74(4) of the Act. Section 74(4) 
of the Act provides that, for the purposes of sections 74C and 74D, the 
Commissioner may delegate the powers vested in him by those sections, to any 
other officer. An “officer” is furthermore defined in section 74(4) of the Act as an 
officer contemplated in section 3(1) of the Act. Section 3(1) of the Act in turn 
provides that the powers conferred and the duties imposed upon the Commissioner 
by or under the provisions of the Act may be exercised or performed by the 
Commissioner personally, or by any officer or person engaged in carrying out the 
said provisions under the control, direction or supervision of the Commissioner. 
However, in terms of clause 59(1) of the TAB, the Commissioner personally or a 
senior SARS official may authorise an application for a search and seizure warrant.  
 
Clause 6(3) of the TAB provides that powers required by the TAB to be exercised by a 
senior SARS official must be exercised by— 
(a) the Commissioner; 
(b) a SARS official who has specific written authority from the Commissioner to 
exercise the power; or 
(c) a SARS official occupying a post designated by the Commissioner for this purpose. 
 
It is accordingly clear from section 74D(1) of the Act and clause 59(1) of the TAB that 
the power to bring an application for a warrant is granted to specific persons only. In 
terms of both the Act and the TAB, the Commissioner may bring the application. 
Section 74D(1) of the Act provides that this power can also be exercised by any 
officer or person engaged in carrying out the provisions of the Act under the control, 
direction or supervision of the Commissioner. However, in terms of clause 59(1) of 
the TAB, the SARS official must have specific written authority from the 
facts on which the application is 
based. 
 
 
 
search with strict regard for 
decency and order, and may search 
a person if the  official is of the 
same gender as the person being 
searched. 
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Commissioner to excercise the power to apply for a warrant. It could accordingly be 
argued that the Commissioner now has to specifically authorise an official in writing 
to bring an application for a warrant which is not required in terms of section 74D of 
the Act. The Commissioner could also appoint a SARS official in a post designated by 
the Commissioner for a purpose in terms of the TAB.  
 
In terms of section 74D(1) of the Act, the application for a warrant is made to a 
judge. However, in terms of clause 59(3) of the TAB, the SARS may bring this 
application to a judge or magistrate. Furthermore, in terms of clause 59(2) of the 
TAB, the SARS must bring the application ex parte. There are thus some fundamental 
changes in this regard. The first change relates to the difference in wording between 
the Act and the TAB with regard to the ex parte application. The effect thereof is 
analysed in chapter 3.  
 
Secondly, a new concept relating to the application for a warrant is introduced by 
clause 59(3) of the TAB, which provides that the SARS may apply to a magistrate for 
a warrant if the matter relates to an audit or investigation where the estimated tax 
in dispute does not exceed the amount determined in the notice issued under clause 
109(1)(a) of the TAB. Section 74D(1) of the Act, however, only provides for an 
application to a High Court judge. In this respect, the TAB has changed the position in 
favour of the Commissioner as he can now also apply to a lower court for a warrant. 
The amount mentioned in clause 59(3) of the TAB is still unknown and must be 
determined by the Minister of Finance by notice in the Gazette. In the first draft of 
the TAB, there was no reference to this determination by the Minister, but it was 
stated that the application could be brought to a magistrate if the matter related to 
an estimated amount of less than R500 000 in tax. It is argued that the second and 
third drafts of the TAB moved away from a fixed amount to an amount to be 
determined by the Minister, as it could be argued that it is not ideal to fix amounts in 
an Act.  
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 Under both the Act and the TAB, an application brought by the Commissioner shall 
be supported by information supplied under oath or solemn declaration, establishing 
the facts on which the application is based.
71
 
 
This application for a warrant can only be brought for the purposes of the 
administration of this Act in terms of section 74D(1) of the Act, and if necessary or 
relevant to administer a tax Act in terms of clause 59(1) of the TAB. Administration of 
this Act is defined in section 74(1) of the Act and administration of a tax Act is 
defined in clause 3(2) of the TAB and these definitions read and compare as follows: 
                                                          
71
  Section 74D(2) of the Act and clause 59(2) of the TAB. 
Section 74(1) of the Act: 
“Administration of this Act” means 
the— 
(a) obtaining of full information in 
relation to any— 
 (i) amount received by or 
 accrued to any person; 
 (ii) property disposed of for 
 no consideration; and 
 (iii) payment made or 
 liability  incurred by any 
 person; 
(b) ascertaining the correctness of 
any return, financial statement, 
document, declaration of facts, 
valuation or other information in 
the Commissioner’s possession; 
(c) determination of the liability of 
any person for any tax, duty or levy 
and any interest or penalty in 
relation thereto leviable under this 
Act; 
(d) collecting of any such liability; 
Clause 3(2) of the TAB:  
“Administration of a tax Act” means 
to— 
(a) obtain full information in 
relation to— 
 (i) anything that may affect 
 the liability of a person for 
 tax in respect of a previous, 
 current or future tax period; 
 (ii) a taxable event; or 
 (iii) the obligation of a 
 person (whether personally 
 or on behalf of another 
 person) to comply with a 
 tax Act; 
(b) ascertain whether a person has 
filed or submitted correct returns, 
information or documents in 
compliance with the provisions of a 
tax Act; 
(c) establish the identity of a person 
for purposes of determining liability 
for tax; 
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These definitions are important since the Commissioner would not be able to apply 
for a warrant if this purpose of the administration of this Act or a tax Act was 
(e) ascertaining whether an offence 
in terms of this Act has been 
committed; 
(f) ascertaining whether a person 
has, other than in relation to a 
matter contemplated in paragraphs 
(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of this 
definition, complied with the 
provisions of this Act; 
(g) enforcement of any of the 
Commissioner’s remedies under 
this Act to ensure that any 
obligation imposed upon any 
person by or under this Act, is 
complied with; and 
(h) performance of any other 
administrative function which is 
necessary for the carrying out of the 
provisions of this Act. 
(d) determine the liability of a 
person for tax; 
(e) collect tax and refund any tax 
overpaid; 
(f) investigate whether an offence 
has been committed in terms of a 
tax Act, and, if so— 
 (i) to lay criminal charges; 
 and 
 (ii) to provide the assistance 
 that is reasonably required f
 or the investigation and 
 prosecution of tax offences 
 or related common law 
 offences; 
(g) enforce SARS’ powers and duties 
under a tax Act to ensure that an 
obligation imposed by or under a 
tax Act is complied with; 
(h) perform any other 
administrative function necessary to 
carry out the provisions of a tax Act; 
and 
(i) give effect to the obligation of 
the Republic to provide assistance 
under an arrangement made with 
the government of any other 
country by an agreement entered 
into in accordance with a tax Act. 
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absent.
72
 The definitions are differently worded, but they are both wide definitions 
and include a catch-all which provides that the administration of this Act or a tax Act 
means to perform any other administrative function necessary to carry out the 
provisions of this Act or a tax Act.
73
 These definitions will not be compared in more 
detail since it does not seem from the case law on section 74D of the Act that any 
problems have arisen in this regard and since the new definition in terms of the TAB 
is still wide in nature.  
 
To sum up, the TAB still contains the general principle of the application for a 
warrant, but with some differences relating to the person who may bring the 
application, the express reference to an ex parte application and the new provision 
relating to the bringing of an application to a magistrate.  
 
3 3 Issuance of a warrant 
 Subsequent to an application made by the Commissioner, a warrant may be issued 
by a judge in terms of section 74D(3) of the Act, or by a judge or a magistrate in 
terms of clause 60(1) of the TAB. These relevant provisions read and compare as 
follows:  
                                                          
72
  Davis, Olivier & Urquhart Juta’s Income Tax (1999) 74-3. 
73
  Subsections (h) of the definitions in both the Act and the TAB.  
Section 74D(3) of the Act: A judge 
may issue the warrant referred to in 
subsection (1) if he is satisfied that 
there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that— 
(a) (i) there has been non-
 compliance by  any person 
 with his obligations in terms 
 of this Act; or 
 (ii) an offence in terms of 
 this Act has been 
 committed by any person; 
(b)  information, documents or 
Clause 60(1) of the TAB: A judge or 
magistrate may issue a warrant 
referred to in clause 59(1) if 
satisfied that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that-   
(a)  a person failed to comply 
 with an  obligation imposed 
 under a tax Act, or 
 committed a tax offence; 
 and  
(b)  relevant material likely to 
 be found on the 
 premises specified in the 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The use of the word may in both the Act and the TAB clearly indicates that the judge 
(or magistrate) has a discretion in the issuing of the warrant.
74
 
 
 Although the wording is somewhat different between the sections of the Act and the 
TAB, the basic principle relating to the issuance of a warrant stays the same. The 
judge (or in terms of the TAB the judge or magistrate) must be satisfied that there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that: 
 there has been non-compliance with obligations in terms of the Act (or a tax 
Act in terms of the TAB) or an offence in terms of the Act has been 
committed (the TAB refers to a tax offence); 
 information, documents or things (or in terms of the TAB relevant material) 
are likely to be found which may afford evidence of such non-compliance or 
the committing of such offence; and  
 the premises specified in the application are likely to contain such 
information, documents or things (or in terms of the TAB relevant material).  
 
The last two bullets, which refer to sections 74D(3)(b) and (c) of the Act, are merely 
incorporated into one sentence in clause 60(1)(b) of the TAB, which provides that 
                                                          
74
  Mosupa “Constitutional validity of search and seizure provisions: a perspective on section 74 of 
the Income Tax Act” 2001 (vol 12 issue 2) Stellenbosch Law Review 317 323. 
 things are likely to be found 
 which may afford evidence 
 of— 
 (i) such non-compliance; or 
 (ii) the committing of such 
 offence; and 
(c)  the premises specified in 
 the application  are likely to 
 contain such information, 
 documents or things. 
 application may 
 provide evidence of the 
 failure to comply or 
 commission of the offence. 
 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
41 
 
the relevant material likely to be found on the  premises specified in the application 
may provide evidence of the failure to comply or commission of the offence. 
 
In terms of the Act, there must be non-compliance with obligations in terms of this 
Act or an offence in terms of this Act must have been committed. In terms of the 
TAB, however, a person must have failed to comply with an obligation imposed 
under a tax Act, or must have committed a tax offence. The difference in wording 
from this Act in the Act to the words a tax Act in the TAB is attributable to the fact 
that the TAB is a consolidation of the administrative provisions of different tax 
Acts.
75
 Section 74D of the Act is only applicable to the Act but clauses 59-66 of the 
TAB are applicable to, amongst others, the Act, the VAT Act, the Transfer Duty Act 
No 40 of 1949 and the Estate Duty Act No 45 of 1955.   
 
One of the grounds on which a judge (or magistrate) may issue a warrant is when an 
offence in terms of the Act has been committed, or under the TAB, when a tax 
offence has been committed. Offences in terms of the Act are regulated by sections 
75 and 104 of the Act. Clause 1 of the TAB defines a tax offence as an offence in 
terms of a tax Act or any other offence involving fraud on SARS or on a SARS official 
relating to the administration of a tax Act and chapter 17 of the TAB further sets out 
the criminal offences. The difference between the offences in terms of the Act and 
the TAB will however not be not be compared in more detail.  
 
The TAB refers to relevant material which must be likely to be found to afford 
evidence, whereas the Act refers to information, documents or things. The TAB 
defines relevant material in clause 1 as “any information, document or thing that is 
forseeably relevant for tax risk assessment, assessing tax, collecting tax, showing 
noncompliance with an obligation under a tax Act or showing that a tax offence was 
committed". This new reference to relevant material thus still refers to information, 
documents and things as it stands in section 74D of the Act, with the difference now 
                                                          
75
  Draft Memorandum on the Objects of the TAB (2010) http://www.sars.gov.za/ 
home.asp?pid=52833 (accessed 6 November 2010). 
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being that the relevant material should be foreseeably relevant by meeting one of 
the following criteria: 
 tax risk assessment;  
 assessing tax; 
 collecting tax;  
 showing noncompliance with an obligation under a tax Act; or 
 showing that a tax offence was committed. 
 
Despite these criteria, clause 60(1) of the TAB specifically provides that the relevant 
material may provide evidence of the failure to comply or commission of the 
offence. This basically refers to the last two bullets of the above mentioned list of 
criteria. In terms of section 74D(3)(b) of the Act, the information, documents or 
things likely to be found should also afford evidence of non-compliance or the 
committing of an offence. It is therefore argued that relevant material in terms of 
the TAB still refers to information, documents and things that provide evidence of 
non-compliance or the commission of an offence, with the addition that the relevant 
material could now also be relevant for tax risk assessment, assessing tax and 
collecting tax. The definition of relevant material is accordingly wider in terms of the 
TAB but it is submitted that the last two bullets of the above mentioned list are the 
most significant in the context of the search and seizure provisions.     
 
When the warrant is issued by a judge, or magistrate in terms of the TAB, certain 
information must be included in that warrant in terms of section 74D(4) of the Act 
and clause 60(2) of the TAB. These relevant provisions read and compare as follows: 
Section 74D(4) of the Act: A warrant 
issued under subsection (1) shall: 
(a) refer to the alleged non-
 compliance or offence in 
 relation to which it is 
 issued; 
(b) identify the premises to be 
searched;
Clause 60(2) of the TAB:  a warrant 
issued under subsection (1) must 
contain the following information:  
(a) the alleged failure to 
 comply or offence that is 
 the basis for the 
 application; 
(b) the person alleged to have 
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It is argued that the use of the words shall in section 74D(4) of the Act and must in 
clause 60(2) of the TAB indicates that this information must be included in the 
warrant.
76
 The only part of the content of a warrant that is not strict under section 
74D(4) of the Act is subsection (d) which only requires that the warrant shall be 
reasonably specific as to any information, documents or things to be searched for 
and seized. Clause 60(2)(d) of the TAB requires that the warrant shall contain the 
fact that relevant material as defined in clause 1 is likely to be found on the 
premises. There is thus no requirement to refer to the specific relevant material in a 
warrant issued under the TAB, as it seems from the wording used in clause 60(2)(d) 
that a mere statement would be sufficient. The reason for this is dealt with in this 
chapter under 3 6 infra. It is submitted by the writer that clause 60(2)(d) is 
somewhat contradictory. It refers to the fact that relevant material is likely to be 
found. It is doubted whether the likely finding of material could be seen as a fact. It 
is rather an opinion of the SARS that material is likely to be found.    
 
Once a warrant has been issued, clause 60(3) of the TAB provides that the warrant 
must be exercised within 45 business days or such further period as a judge or 
magistrate deems appropriate on good cause shown. The first draft of the TAB 
provided for 60 days, which was changed to 45 business days in the second and third 
drafts of the TAB. There is however no similar time restraint in section 74D of the 
                                                          
76
  This is a general principle of interpretation, see e.g. Clegg & Stretch Income Tax in South Africa 
(2009) LexisNexis Butterworths Intranet Resources 2.9. 
 
(c) identify the person alleged 
 to have failed to comply 
 with the provisions of the 
 Act or to have committed 
 the offence; and 
(d) be reasonably specific as to 
 any information, 
 documents or things to be 
 searched for and seized. 
 failed to comply or to have 
 committed the offence; 
(c) the premises to be 
 searched; and 
(d) the fact that relevant 
 material as defined in 
 section 1 is likely to be 
 found on the premises. 
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Act. Chapter 3 deals with the status of a warrant once it is executed and the validity 
period of a warrant. The status of a warrant once it is executed relates to the 
question of whether the same warrant can be used again once it has been executed, 
or whether it expires on the execution thereof. The validity period of a warrant 
relates to the time period for which a warrant is valid before it has been executed. 
Both these questions are addressed in chapter 3. 
 
Furthermore, in terms of section 74D(7) of the Act, the officer exercising any power 
under this section shall on demand produce the relevant warrant (if any). This is also 
contained in the TAB in clause 61(1) which provides that a SARS official exercising a 
power under a warrant referred to in clause 60 of the TAB must produce the 
warrant. Clause 61(2) of the TAB provides that, subject to clause 63 of the TAB 
(which contains provisions regarding a warrantless search and seizure), a SARS 
official’s failure to produce a warrant entitles a person to refuse access to the 
official. It is thus clear that an official conducting a search and seizure must be in 
possession of the warrant issued by a judge or magistrate. In terms of the Act, the 
warrant must however only be produced on demand, whereas the wording of the 
TAB requires is to be produced regardless of whether it is demanded or not and that 
the failure to produce entitles a person to refuse access to the official.  
 
The use of the words “if any” in section 74D(7) of the Act is interesting. According to 
Mosupa, these words can have two different interpretations.
77
 The one meaning 
could be that a warrant was issued to the Commissioner, but that the officer 
executing the warrant is not in possession thereof. The other meaning could be that 
it authorises a search and seizure without a warrant since the warrant must only be 
produced if there is one. This second meaning is however doubful since section 74D 
of the Act was a movement away from the warrantless provisions of the previous 
section 74(3) of the Act and furthermore since section 74D of the Act does not in any 
way refer to a warrantless search and seizure. 
 
                                                          
77
  Mosupa “Constitutional validity of search and seizure provisions: a perspective on section 74 of 
the Income Tax Act” 2001 (vol 12 issue 2) Stellenbosch Law Review 317 321. 
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To sum up, the Act and the TAB allow the Commissioner to bring an application to a 
court for a warrant which will authorise a search and seizure and the judge, or judge 
or magistrate in terms of the TAB, then has a discretion to issue the warrant. The 
main differences between the Act and the TAB in this regard relate to the content of 
the warrant and the validity period of a warrant which is now addressed in the TAB.  
 
3 4 Carrying out the search 
Clauses 61(1)-(9) of the TAB set out detailed provisions on the carrying out of the 
search. It regulates what the SARS officials must and may do when conducting a 
search and seizure. Clauses 61(1) and 61(2) of the TAB relate to the producing of the 
warrant and clause 61(3) of the TAB provides as follows: 
“The SARS official may—  
 (a) open or cause to be opened or removed in conducting a search, anything which the 
 official suspects to contain relevant material;  
 (b) seize and retain a computer or storage device in which relevant material is stored 
 for as long as it is necessary to copy the material required;  
 (c) make extracts from or copies of relevant material, and require from a person an 
 explanation of relevant material; and  
 (d) if the premises listed in the warrant is a vessel, aircraft, or vehicle, stop and board 
 the vessel, aircraft or vehicle, search the vessel, aircraft or vehicle or a person found in 
 the vessel, aircraft or vehicle, and question the person with respect to a matter dealt 
 with in a tax Act.” 
 
Clause 61(3)(a) of the TAB is similar to section 74D(1)(c) of the Act (as compared 
supra under 3 2) but clauses 61(3)(b)-(d) of the TAB are new provisions.  
 
Clause 61(3)(b) of the TAB now provides for the seizure and retention of a computer 
or storage device in which relevant material is stored for as long as it is necessary to 
copy the material required. There is no exact similar provision relating to the seizure 
of computers or storage devices in the Act but it is argued that a computer and a 
storage device can also be seized under section 74D(1)(b) of the Act since it would 
fall under a thing, which is defined in section 74 of the Act to include any corporeal 
or incorporeal thing and any document relating thereto.  
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Clause 61(3)(c) of the TAB allows the SARS official to make extracts from or copies of 
relevant material. In this regard the following is stated in the Draft Memorandum on 
the Objects of the TAB (2010): “If the removal of original documents or computers 
may prejudice the continuance of a taxpayer‘s business, SARS has a discretion to 
make and remove copies if appropriate.”
78
 According to this Memorandum, it is a 
provision affording further protection to taxpayers subjected to a search and seizure. 
It is however argued by the writer that the discretion of the official to make and 
remove copies is still subjective. The warrant would authorise the official to seize the 
relevant material. It would then be within the officials’ discretion to decide whether 
to seize the original or whether to make and remove copies. Even though addressed 
in the Memorandum, there is no requirement in terms of the TAB that copies must 
be made and removed if the removal of original documents or computers may 
prejudice the continuance of a taxpayer‘s business. 
 
Clause 61(3)(d) of the TAB allows a SARS official to stop and board a vessel, aircraft 
or vehicle, search the vessel, aircraft or vehicle or a person found in the vessel, 
aircraft or vehicle, and question the person with respect to a matter dealt with in a 
tax Act. The search of premises is thus now broader than in terms of the Act and 
includes a vessel, aircraft or vehicle. However, this vessel, aircraft or vehicle, which is 
a premises, must still be included in the warrant issued by a judge or magistrate in 
terms of clause 60(2)(c) of the TAB. Clause 62 of the TAB has to be complied with if 
the vessel, aircraft or vehicle was not identified in the warrant.
79
 
 
Clause 61(4) of the TAB relates to the inventory which the SARS official must make 
and this is further addressed in this chapter under 3 7 infra. Furthermore, clause 
61(5) of the TAB now clearly states that the SARS official must conduct the search 
with strict regard for decency and order, and may search a person if the official is of 
the same gender as the person being searched. Section 74D(1)(a)(ii) of the Act also 
requires that a search is conducted by an officer of the same gender as the person 
being searched, but section 74D of the Act makes no further reference to decency 
                                                          
78
  http:// www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=52833 (accessed 6 November 2010). 
79
  See 3 5 infra on the search of premises not identified in a warrant. 
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and order. Reference in the TAB to the conduct of the search with strict regard for 
decency and order has been held to be affording further protection of taxpayers 
subjected to a search and seizure in the Draft Memorandum on the Objects of the 
TAB.
80
  
 
In terms of clause 61(6) of the TAB, the SARS official may, at any time, request such 
assistance from a police officer as the official may consider reasonably necessary and 
the police officer must render the assistance. Clause 61(7) of the TAB states that no 
person may obstruct a SARS official or a police officer from executing the warrant or 
without reasonable excuse refuse to give such assistance as may be reasonably 
required for the execution of the warrant. Neither of these provisions relating to the 
assistance from a police officer or the obstruction of a SARS official or the refusal to 
give assistance is contained in section 74D of the Act.  
 
Clause 61(8) of the TAB provides that, subject to clause 66, the SARS official and 
SARS are not liable for damage to property necessitated by reason of the search. This 
is addressed in chapter 6 which focuses on the stage after a search and seizure was 
conducted. Lastly, clause 61(9) of the TAB is on the preservation and retention of the 
seized material and this is addressed in this chapter under 3 7 infra.  
 
To sum up, clause 61 of the TAB has on the one hand broadened the scope of the 
carrying out of a search (for example relating to  vessels, aircrafts and vehicles) but 
at the same time also circumscribed certain powers of the SARS officials (for example 
the requirement of an inventory and the specific reference to decency and order).   
 
3 5 Search of premises not identified in the warrant 
The Act and the TAB both allow for a search and seizure of premises not identified in 
the warrant. Section 74D(5) of the Act and clause 62(1) of the TAB read and compare 
as follows: 
                                                          
80
  http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=52833 (accessed 6 November 2010), p 13 of the 2010 
Memorandum. 
Section 74D(5) of the Act:  Where Clause 62(1) of the TAB: (1) If a 
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Section 74D(5) of the Act and clause 62(1) of the TAB grant the same power to the 
SARS, but in terms of clause 62(1)(c) of the TAB one extra requirement is added, 
namely that the delay in obtaining the warrant would defeat the object of the search 
and seizure. It is submitted that this third requirement was added to bring the search 
of a premises not identified in the warrant in line with the warrantless provisions of 
clause 63 of the TAB. Clause 63 of the TAB is addressed in this chapter under 3 9 
infra and in chapter 4 
 
Another difference in wording from section 74D(5) of the Act is that clause 62(1)(a) 
of the TAB requires that the relevant material may be removed or destroyed, 
the officer named in the warrant 
has reasonable grounds to believe 
that –  
(a) such information, 
 documents or things are – 
 (i) at any premises not 
 identified in such warrant; 
 and 
 (ii) about to be  removed or 
 destroyed; and 
(b) a warrant cannot be 
 obtained timeously to 
 prevent such removal or 
 destruction,  
such officer may search such 
premises and further exercise all 
the powers granted by section 74D, 
as if such premises had  been 
identified in a warrant. 
 
senior SARS official has reasonable 
grounds to believe that—  
(a)  the relevant material 
 referred to in clause 
 60(1)(b) and included in a 
 warrant is at premises not 
 identified in the warrant 
 and may be removed or 
 destroyed;  
(b) a warrant cannot be 
 obtained in time to prevent 
 the removal or destruction 
 of the relevant material; 
 and  
(c)  the delay in obtaining a 
 warrant would defeat the 
 object of the search and 
 seizure,  
SARS may enter and search the 
premises and exercise the powers 
granted in terms of this  Part, as if 
the premises had been identified in 
the warrant.  
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whereas section 74D(5) of the Act states that it is about to be removed or destroyed. 
The TAB is thus wider in this regard since material that may be removed is not 
necessarily about to be removed. This is therefore a change in favour of the 
Commissioner since there might be more situations where material may be removed 
than where it would be about to be removed. 
 
It is furthermore submitted that different interpretations of clause 62(1)(a) of the 
TAB could lead to unintended results. In terms of clause 62(1)(a) of the TAB, the 
official must have reasonable grounds to believe that the relevant material included 
in the warrant is at premises not identified in the warrant and may be removed or 
destroyed before he may enter and search premises not identified in a warrant. 
However, clause 60(2) of the TAB does not require that the material to be searched 
for and seized should be contained in the warrant. There is only a requirement that a 
warrant must include the fact that relevant material is likely to be found on the 
premises. There is thus a contradiction when clause 62(1)(a) of the TAB refers to the 
relevant material as included in the warrant but clause 60(2) of the TAB does not 
require the details of the material to be included in the warrant. It is argued that, in 
terms of clause 60(2)(d), it would be sufficient to merely state (as a fact, or rather 
opinion) that relevant material is likely to be found on the premises.  It is therefore 
argued that there could have been an oversight in the drafting of clause 62(1)(a) of 
the TAB with the referral to “and included in a warrant”. The only other tenable 
interpretation would be that a statement in a warrant of the fact that relevant 
material is likely to be found on the premises  would satisfy clause 62(1)(a) of the 
TAB. 
 
Clause 62(2) of the TAB has also introduced a provision which is in favour of the 
taxpayer. In terms of this clause, a SARS official may not enter a dwelling-house or 
domestic premises, except any part thereof used for purposes of trade, under this 
clause without the consent of the owner or occupant. This was not contained in 
section 74D(5) of the Act and it was also not contained in the first draft of the TAB. It 
is however clear now that a premises which is not identified in the warrant may not 
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be entered or searched under clause 62 of the TAB without the consent of the owner 
or occupant if the premises is a dwelling-house or domestic premises.  
 
To sum up, the basic principle relating to the search of premises not identified in the 
warrant is retained in the TAB. There is an extra requirement to be met but there 
might be more situations where material may be removed (as required in terms of 
the TAB) than where it would be about to be removed (as required in terms of the 
Act).  
 
3 6 Seizure of material not identified in the warrant 
In terms of section 74D(6) of the Act, any officer who executes a warrant may seize, 
in addition to the information, documents or things referred to in the warrant, any 
other information, documents or things that such officer believes on reasonable 
grounds afford evidence of the non-compliance with the relevant obligations or the 
committing of an offence in terms of the Act.  There is no similar provision in the TAB 
but this can be explained with regard to the difference between section 74D(4) of 
the Act and clause 60(2) of the TAB. These provisions list which information must be 
contained in a warrant when issued by a judge.  
 
In terms of section 74D(4)(d) of the Act, there is a requirement that a warrant issued 
shall be reasonably specific as to any information, documents or things to be 
searched for and seized, but this is not required to be contained in a warrant issued 
under the TAB. Clause 60(2)(d) of the TAB merely requires that a warrant must 
contain the fact that relevant material is likely to be found on the premises. The 
material to be searched for and seized under a warrant issued in terms of the Act is 
thus limited and provision is therefore made in section 74D(6) of the Act to search 
for and seize other material. A TAB-warrant, however, does not require to list the 
material to be searched for and seized, giving the official executing the warrant a 
wider discretion, and it is thus argued that no further need exists to extend the 
search and seizure to material not identified in the warrant.   
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3 7 Preservation and retention of the seized material 
The Act and the TAB contain certain provisions regarding the preservation and 
retaining of the material seized. Section 74D(8) of the Act and clause 61(9) of the 
TAB read and compare as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The same principle on the preservation and retention of the seized material still 
applies under the TAB, but the wording is somewhat different. These sections will, 
however, be further addressed in chapter 6 which focuses on the stage after a 
search and seizure was conducted. 
 
3 8 Remedies 
Sections 74D(9) and 74D(10) of the Act relate to the remedies available to a person 
who has been subject to a search and seizure. In terms of section 74D(9)(a) of the 
Act, any person may apply to the relevant division of the High Court for the return of 
any information, documents or things seized under the section. The court hearing 
such application may, in terms of section 74D(9)(b) of the Act, on good cause shown, 
make such order as it deems fit. Furthermore, section 74D(10) of the Act allows that 
Section 74D(8) of the Act: The 
Commissioner, who shall take 
reasonable care to ensure that the 
information, documents or things 
are preserved, may retain them 
until the conclusion of any 
investigation into the non-
compliance or offence in relation to 
which the information, documents 
or things were seized or until they 
are required to be used for the 
purposes of any legal proceedings 
under this Act, whichever event 
occurs last. 
 
Clause 61(9) of the TAB: If the SARS 
official seizes relevant material, the 
official must ensure that the 
relevant material seized is 
preserved and retained until it is no 
longer required for—  
(a) the investigation into the 
 non-compliance or the 
 offence described under 
 clause 60(1)(a); or  
(b) the conclusion of any legal 
 proceedings under a tax Act 
 or criminal proceedings in 
 which it is required to be 
 used.  
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the person to whose affairs any information, documents or things seized under this 
section relate, may examine and make extracts therefrom and obtain one copy 
thereof at the expense of the State during normal business hours under such 
supervision as the Commissioner may determine. The principles of a person’s right to 
examine and to make extracts or copies as well as the bringing of an application for 
return of the seized material is taken over by the TAB, with a few changes, in 
respectively clauses 65 and 66. These remedies available to a taxpayer are discussed 
in further detail in chapter 6.  
 
3 9 Warrantless search and seizure 
Clause 63 of the TAB is probably the most controversial and radical new provision 
relating to search and seizure. It provides that a senior SARS official may without a 
warrant exercise the powers referred to in clause 61(3) of the TAB:  
 if the person who may consent thereto so consents in writing; or 
 if the senior SARS official on reasonable grounds is satisfied that 
 there may be an imminent removal or destruction of relevant 
material likely to be found on the premises; 
 if SARS applies for a search warrant under clause 59, a search 
warrant will be issued; and 
 the delay in obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of 
the search and seizure. 
 
Control is currently built into section 74D of the Act by the need for a warrant issued 
by a judge. A judge is an independent party who can scrutinise the need of the SARS 
to search and seize.  In terms of the warrantless provisions, the SARS can, provided 
that one of the two abovementioned requirements are met, exercise this power 
subjectively, without a warrant and without the independent examination by a 
judge. The warrantless search and seizure provisions are examined in chapter 4 and 
the constitutionality thereof is tested in chapter 5. 
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4 Conclusion 
It was shown in this chapter that search and seizure has developed from warrantless 
under section 74(3) of the Act into search and seizure by warrant under section 74D 
of the Act. The search and seizure by warrant in terms of section 74D of the Act has 
further changed from the requirement of an ex parte application into just an 
application. Section 74D of the Act is now in further development into a combination 
of both warranted (by way of an ex parte application for a warrant) and warrantless 
search and seizure under the TAB. The above summary of the content of the relevant 
search and seizure provisions shows that certain aspects will remain the same, but 
that there are also certain new provisions introduced by the TAB, as well as some 
additions to existing provisions of section 74D of the Act. Chapter 3 examines the 
problems associated with a warranted search and seizure. 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the problems as identified in chapter 1 on the operation of a 
warranted search and seizure. These problems relate to the following aspects of a 
search and seizure by warrant: 
 the application for a warrant;  
 the status and validity of the warrant before and after it has been exercised; 
and 
 the meaning of the reasonable grounds criterion. 
 
2 The application for a warrant 
2 1 Introduction and development of the application provisions 
A warranted search and seizure self-evidently requires a warrant. This warrant can 
be obtained by the Commissioner by bringing an application to a court and this 
application procedure is regulated by section 74D(1) of the Act and will be replaced 
by clause 59 of the TAB. The basic principles regarding these two sections have been 
discussed in chapter 2 supra under 3 2.  
 
The previous section 74(3) of the Act did, however, not make provision for an 
application to a judge for a warrant authorising a search and seizure. Section 74(3)(a) 
of the Act granted wide powers to the SARS to enter a taxpayer’s premises at any 
time during the day, without a warrant and without previous notice. Section 74(3) of 
the Act was however repealed and the new section 74D came in operation on 30 
September 1996.81 Section 74D(1) of the Act then provided that an application must 
be brought ex parte by the Commissioner.  
 
Less than a year later, with commencement on 4 July 1997, section 74D(1) of the Act 
was however amended by section 29 of the Income Tax Act No 28 of 1997. The 
words ex parte before the word application were removed and there has since been 
some controversy as to whether an application can or must be brought by the 
                                                          
81
  Section 14 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act No 46 of 1996 substituted section 74 of the Act, 
and added section 74D which came into operation on 30 September 1996. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
56 
 
Commissioner ex parte in terms of the Act, and what the effects are of the changes 
made to the section by the amendment in 1997.  
 
The TAB now again provides for an ex parte application. Clause 59(2) of the TAB 
clearly states that the SARS must apply ex parte to a judge for the warrant. This 
shows that the application procedure for a warrant to search and seize has thus 
developed under the Act from a compulsory ex parte application to just an 
application, after the amendment in 1997, and now again to a compulsory ex parte 
application in terms of the TAB.  
 
2 2 What is an ex parte application? 
The Oxford English dictionary defines ex parte as “on one side only”.82 An ex parte 
application is an application made to the registrar of the court by one party only with 
no other party cited as a respondent.83 It means that the court only hears one side of 
a case and that no notice of the application is given to the other party.84  
  
According to Harms, an applicant may only apply for relief by way of an ex parte 
application in the following very limited instances:85 
 if the relief sought affects the rights of the applicant only and not those of 
anyone else; 
 if the relief sought is preliminary to the main proceedings and is necessary to 
bring other interested parties before court. Examples are applications for 
edictal citation, substituted service, arrests to found or confirm jurisdiction, 
removal of restrictive conditions and the like; 
 if the nature of the relief sought is such that notice to the respondent may 
render the relief nugatory; 
 if, due to the urgency of the matter, notice cannot be given to the 
respondent, for instance, if the harm is imminent; and 
                                                          
82
  http://dictionary.oed.com.ez.sun.ac.za/cgi/entry/50080313?single=1&query_type=word& 
queryword=ex+parte&first=1&max_to_show=10 (accessed 15 October 2010). 
83
Harms Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts (2010) LexisNexis Butterworths Intranet Resources 
B6.13. 
84
  Ibid B6.14. 
85
  Ibid B6.12. 
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 if the identity of the respondent or respondents is not readily ascertainable 
(in which event the relief sought will be for a rule nisi with directions on how 
to serve the rule nisi).
86
  
 
It is argued that possibly two of the above points could justify an ex parte application 
in the context of a search and seizure application brought by the Commissioner. The 
first justification would be if the nature of the relief sought is such that notice to the 
respondent may render the relief nugatory. This refers to a situation where there is a 
possibility that a taxpayer could for example destroy, remove, hide, edit or create 
information, documents or things when notice is given to him that the SARS is 
applying for a warrant to search and seize. That is exactly why notice would render 
the relief nugatory. The idea is that the search and seizure should come as a surprise 
to the taxpayer. 
 
Another justification for the Commissioner bringing the application ex parte could be 
if the matter is so urgent that notice cannot be given to the respondent because the 
harm is imminent. It is however a settled principle in our law that an applicant 
cannot create his own urgency.87 This refers to a situation where the SARS is aware 
that the taxpayer is about to destroy, remove, hide, edit or create information, 
documents or things, and that there is no time to give notice of the application. 
However, it is argued that this situation overlaps with and could also fall under the 
above nugatory provision since the notice would most likely also lead to actions of 
the taxpayer that would render the relief futile and nugatory.  
 
It seems accordingly that there is justification in the law of civil procedure for the 
bringing of an ex parte application by the Commissioner.  
                                                          
86
  A rule nisi is defined in Volume 3(1) of LAWSA as follows: “Where an application has been granted 
ex parte and it appears to the court that the rights of other persons may be affected by it, the 
court will not make a final order but will order a rule nisi to be issued calling upon such persons to 
show cause why the order should not be made final.” 
87
  Harms Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts (2010) LexisNexis Butterworths Intranet Resources 
B6.64. 
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2 3 The case law on the application for a warrant 
It might be self-evident to think that the application must be brought ex parte by the 
Commissioner since notice could defeat the purpose of a search and seizure 
operation. However, it has been a topic of much debate in our case law. As stated 
above, the application procedure for a warrant to search and seize has developed 
under the Act from a compulsory ex parte application to just an application, and now 
again to a compulsory ex parte application in terms of the TAB. These changes back 
and forth might be an indication of the uncertainty in this regard. 
 
After removal of the words ex parte in section 74D(1) of the Act, the section merely 
required that the Commissioner had to bring an application. The deletion of the 
words ex parte and the meaning of an application in terms of section 74D(1) of the 
Act has been dealt with in a number of cases by our courts. 
 
In Ferela (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue,88 decided after the removal of 
the words ex parte in section 74D(1) of the Act, Botha J noted that it was clear from 
the express terms of section 74D(1) that no prior notice need be given of an 
application for a warrant.89 He also expressed the view that the deletion of the 
words ex parte had no significant effect.90 Accordingly, this case is authority to 
conclude that section 74D still permitted an ex parte application, even though the 
express words to that effect were removed. 
 
In Deutschmann NO; Shelton v Commissioner for the SARS,91 it was submitted on 
behalf of both applicants that the purpose of the amendment of section 74D(1) of 
the Act, which deleted the words ex parte, was to indicate clearly that applications 
for a search and seizure warrant should not be brought ex parte. They should comply 
with the Rules of Court, which means that notice of the application must be given. 
The applicants further argued that the changed wording signified a change of 
intention by the legislature and that the change was clearly calculated and not 
                                                          
88
  60 SATC 513. 
89
  On page 524. 
90
  Ibid. 
91
  62 SATC 191. 
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inadvertent. However, the court rejected these arguments and held that, if regard 
were had to the wide ambit of search contemplated by the provisions, it was 
inconceivable that the legislature could have contemplated that prior notice of an 
application to conduct such a search could be required in every instance.92  
 
The court in the Deutschmann case furthermore held that a requirement of prior 
notice would also render the provisions of section 74D(9) of the Act redundant.93 
Section 74D(9) provides that any person may apply to the relevant division of the 
High Court for the return of any information, documents or things seized. The court 
thus suggests that if prior notice of an application for a warrant were given, then 
there would be no need for a provision authorising the return of anything seized. 
This is however a questionable remark and it is submitted that whether prior notice 
is given or not, any person should still be able to apply for the return of the seized 
material.  
 
What is, however, clear is that the Ferela and the Deutschmann cases are in 
agreement with regard to the notice of an application. It was decided in both cases 
that no such notice is required from the Commissioner and that an ex parte 
application is thus permissible in terms of section 74D(1) of the Act, even though the 
express words were removed.   
 
However, in Haynes v Commissioner of Inland Revenue,94 Lockie J expressed his 
disagreement with the views of the High Court decisions in Ferela and Deutschmann 
that the deletion of the words ex parte did not have a significant effect. In Lockie J’s 
view, the deletion of the words ex parte appearing before the word application is of 
considerable significance.95 It was held that the Commissioner was not obliged to 
bring an application in terms of section 74D of the Act ex parte without any notice to 
the person adversely affected. Nor was the judge considering the application bound 
                                                          
92
  On page 203. 
93
  Ibid. 
94
  64 SATC 321. 
95
  On page 349. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
60 
 
to consider or determine such an application on that basis.96 It is required that the 
applicant should lay a basis for bringing the application ex parte and thus without 
prior notice and in the instant case no such basis had been laid.97 There should 
accordingly be a serious basis for bringing the application ex parte. According to the 
judge, the amendment which removed the words ex parte had brought the section 
into line with the Constitution and the common law, which required that before 
someone’s rights or interests were adversely affected by administrative action, he or 
she should be given a hearing.98 The court’s conclusion was summarised as follows:99  
“The Commissioner’s failure to give the applicant notice of the application and 
failure of the Commissioner to adduce facts and make averments justifying the 
bringing of the application without notice, in my view invalidates the application 
for the warrant and the decision to issue the warrant.” 
 
It is accordingly clear from the Haynes case that an ex parte application would not as 
such be disallowed, but that proper grounds should exist for the bringing of the 
application ex parte.  
  
After the Haynes case, the SCA also dealt with the problem of prior notice when an 
application is made in terms of section 74D(1) of the Act for a warrant to search and 
seize. This was in the case of Shelton v Commissioner for SA Revenue Services100 
where the warrant was applied for and issued on the basis of allegations suggesting 
that the respondent failed to comply with his obligations in terms of the Income Tax 
Act of the former Transkei in that he did not submit income tax returns. 
Furthermore, that he committed an offence in terms of the Act in that there were 
reasonable grounds for believing that he, with intent to evade the payment of 
income tax levied, made a false statement in relation to his personal assets and 
liabilities in a return rendered. The appellant submitted that the Commissioner had 
to give him notice of the application for a warrant unless a case could be made out 
that notice should be dispensed with. However, the court held that the giving of 
                                                          
96
  On page 351. 
97
  On page 350. 
98
  On page 352. 
99
  Ibid. 
100
  64 SATC 179. 
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prior notice of the application for a warrant would, in these circumstances, have 
defeated the object and purpose of the section.101 The court also held that one of the 
purposes of the section is to enable the Commissioner to enter premises to search 
for information intentionally concealed from him and that the section, therefore, by 
necessary implication, did not require the giving of notice.102  
 
Accordingly, the SCA decided in the Shelton case that prior notice of the bringing of 
an application is not a requirement of section 74D(1) of the Act. However, it does not 
seem from this judgement that the application must be made ex parte. It was merely 
decided that the giving of prior notice of the application for a warrant would, in 
these circumstances, have defeated the object and purpose of the section. It could 
however be that certain other circumstances would require the giving of prior 
notice. 
 
The words without prior notice in section 74D(1) of the Act also created some 
uncertainty. The relevant part of section 74D(1) reads as follows: “For the purposes 
of the administration of this Act, a judge may, on application by the Commissioner or 
any officer contemplated in section 74(4), issue a warrant, authorising the officer 
named therein to, without prior notice and at any time…”. It was held in the 
Deutschmann case that, when notice of an application for a warrant would be 
required, it would render the words without prior notice in section 74D(1) of the Act 
nugatory.103 This case therefore suggests that the words without prior notice in 
section 74D(1) of the Act still mean that the Commissioner must bring the 
application ex parte, even though the express words ex parte do not appear in the 
section anymore.   
 
However, in the Haynes case, Locke J did not concur with the above reasoning on the 
words without prior notice. 104 According to Locke J, section 74D(1) of the Act 
provides that the officer named in the warrant may without prior notice enter and 
                                                          
101
  On page 187. 
102
  Ibid. 
103
  On page 203.  
104
  On page 349. 
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search any premises, and search any person present on the premises. The without 
prior notice provision does not apply to the bringing of the application. 
 
It is argued that the Haynes decision should be correct in this regard. The words 
without prior notice in section 74D(1) of the Act refer to the search and seizure 
which can be conducted without prior notice rather than to the application for the 
warrant without prior notice.   
 
To sum up on the above cases and on the bringing of an ex parte application in terms 
of section 74D(1) of the Act, the Ferela and Deutschmann cases held that prior notice 
of the application is not required in terms of section 74D(1). The court held in the 
Haynes case that the Commissioner is not obliged to bring the application ex parte, 
but if it is brought ex parte, a proper basis should be laid. The SCA held in the Shelton 
case that the giving of notice of the application was not required. However, none of 
the cases held expressly that section 74D(1) of the Act required either strictly ex 
parte or that it could never be made ex parte. The principles from the cases, and the 
interpretation of the application in terms of section 74D(1), is accordingly 
summarised as follows: 
 the Commissioner is not obliged to bring the application ex parte; 
 the Commissioner may bring the application for a warrant ex parte; and 
 should the Commissioner bring the application ex parte, a basis for bringing 
the application ex parte should be laid. 
 
2 4 Conclusion on the application for a warrant 
Section 74D(1) of the Act does not specify that the application must be brought ex 
parte. However, in terms of general procedure law and case law, the Commissioner 
would be entitled to bring the application ex parte if, for example, the nature of the 
relief sought is such that notice to the respondent may render the relief nugatory or 
if, due to the urgency of the matter, notice cannot be given to the respondent, for 
instance, if the harm is imminent.105  
                                                          
105
  Harms Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts (2010) LexisNexis Butterworths Intranet Resources 
B6.12. 
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However, in terms of the TAB it is now required that the Commissioner must bring 
the application ex parte. It could therefore be argued that the Commissioner would 
have to lay a basis in each ex parte application that is made by him. This basis could 
be, for example, that notice to the respondent may render the relief nugatory or if, 
due to the urgency of the matter, notice cannot be given to the respondent.  
  
However, according to Klue, the following problem could arise with an ex parte 
application:106 
“Another issue with an ex parte application by the Commissioner arises where the 
application for a warrant is tainted with incorrect facts. It is common knowledge 
that the Commissioner regularly receives tip-offs from estranged spouses, many of 
which are vexatious, and no doubt some may be factually incorrect. Under these 
circumstances, the judge may authorise the issue of a warrant which otherwise 
may not have been issued.” 
 
The conclusion could thus be reached that there are two incongruent interests with 
regard to an ex parte application. The Commissioner has a need to bring the 
application ex parte in order to act on a surprise basis, but this could lead to 
situations where an application is brought by the Commissioner, based on incorrect 
false facts, which could lead to serious infringements on taxpayers’ rights. The TAB 
now again explicitly requires an ex parte application in clause 59(2) of the TAB. In the 
Haynes case, Lockie J expressed his view on the ex parte application as follows:107 
“On the contrary, as has been seen, on 4 July 1997, the words, ‘ex parte’ which 
previously appeared before the word ‘application’ were deleted. By so doing, in 
my view, the sections were brought into line with the Constitution and the 
common law, which requires that before someone’s rights or interests are 
adversely affected, by administrative action, he or she should be given a hearing.” 
 If Lockie J’s view is applied, the TAB could perhaps be constitutionally challenged 
because of the compulsory requirement of an ex parte application. It is however 
submitted that unconstitutionality of clause 59(2) of the TAB merely because of the 
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  Klue, Arendse & Williams Silke on Tax Administration (2009) § 8.1 
107
  On page 351-352. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
64 
 
fact that it must be brought ex parte is unsound. An ex parte application is widely 
recognised in our law in the lower and superior courts and the constitutionality of 
the principle of an ex parte application has never been challenged. It is therefore 
concluded that the compulsory ex parte application as required by the TAB would 
not justify unconstitutionality per se but it is still submitted that this is an aspect of 
the application procedure which is in favour of the Commissioner. 
 
3 Validity of a warrant before and after the exercising thereof 
3 1 Introduction 
There are some uncertainties regarding the validity of a warrant before and after the 
exercising thereof. Once the Commissioner is in possession of a warrant to search 
and seize, the first question relates to the validity of the warrant before it has been 
exercised: How long is that warrant valid for, or in other words, when does it expire? 
It could then happen that the Commissioner exercises a valid warrant before its 
expiry, but that the documents confiscated by the Commissioner reveal the 
existence of further documents. This leads to a second question: Can the same 
warrant be used again to conduct a further search or has the warrant expired when 
exercised? These two questions on the validity of a warrant are now addressed. 
 
3 2 How long is the warrant valid for? 
This question relates to the validity of a warrant before it has been exercised. 
Section 74D of the Act does not provide for the expiry of a warrant after a certain 
time period has lapsed. It could be argued that the legislature might have accepted 
that the Commissioner, when in possession of a valid warrant, would want to 
exercise it as soon as possible to prevent, for example, a destruction of records. 
There are also no reported cases on when a warrant issued by a judge in terms of 
section 74D of the Act expires. However, clause 60(3) of the TAB has now addressed 
this lacuna in the Act.108  
 
                                                          
108
  A lacuna is defined in the Oxford English dictionary as “a gap, an empty space, spot, or cavity” and 
it is often used as a legal word to indicate that there is a gap or omission in an Act. 
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Clause 60(3) of the TAB states that the warrant must be exercised within 45 business 
days, or such further period as a judge or magistrate deems appropriate on good 
cause shown. It is argued that this section, with the use of the words must be 
exercised within 45 business days, prescribes a validity period of a warrant. It is 
required that the warrant must be exercised in that time period, which leads to the 
conclusion that the warrant will not be valid after the 45 business days period. 
Therefore, if the SARS do not exercise the warrant within the prescribed time period, 
it is submitted that the warrant will expire and accordingly the SARS cannot conduct 
a valid search and seizure on that warrant anymore.  
 
The first draft of the TAB provided for a 60 days period, which has now been 
amended to 45 business days in the second and third drafts of the TAB. There was 
thus a change from 60 days to 45 business days. Clause 1 of the TAB defines a 
business day as follows:  
“Any day which is not a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday, and for purposes of 
determining the days or a period allowed for complying with the provisions of 
Chapter 9, excludes the days between 16 December of each year and 15 January 
of the following year, both days inclusive”.  
 
The search and seizure provisions are not part of Chapter 9, and the meaning of a 
business day for purposes of clause 60(3) of the TAB is accordingly “any day which is 
not a Saturday, Sunday or public holiday”. Clause 1 of the first draft of the TAB 
defined a day as “a calendar day”. It is argued that a day in terms of the first draft of 
the TAB would have included Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays, as those days 
are also calendar days. Those days are however not business days in terms of the 
second and third drafts of the TAB. It is therefore argued that the change from 60 
days to 45 business days is not radical since the exclusion of the Saturdays, Sundays 
and public holidays would more or less lead to the same amount of business days.  
This new provision of the TAB relating to the validity of a warrant also provides for a 
judicial discretion. Clause 60(3) of the TAB provides that the warrant must be 
exercised within 45 business days, or such further period as a judge or magistrate 
deems appropriate on good cause shown. The applicant will have to convince the 
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judge or magistrate, by showing a good cause, why the warrant needs to be valid for 
more than 45 business days. There is however no literature or comments yet 
available on this specific aspect of the TAB and it will be left to the judge or 
magistrate to decide whether a good cause is shown before he or she will grant a 
further period for the warrant to be exercised in. In the case of Cohen Bros v 
Samuels109 the following was held, in general, regarding the definition of a good 
cause:110 
“Mr Tindall says the Court has never defined a good cause. In the nature of things 
it is hardly possible, and certainly undesirable, for the court to attempt to do so. 
No general rule which the wit of man could devise would be likely to cover all the 
varying circumstances which may arise in applications of this nature. We can only 
deal with each application on its merits, and decide in each case whether good 
cause has been shown.” 
 
There is no similar provision on the validity of a warrant in the Act. Other legislation 
is accordingly considered to determine how the position is regulated in other 
spheres of the law.  
 
Section 21(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that a search warrant shall 
be of force until it is exercised or is cancelled by the person who issued it or, if such 
person is not available, by a person with like authority. No guidelines in respect of 
the time period after which the warrant expires by exercising or cancellation are 
however given. It merely relates to the expiry of a warrant when exercised. Applied 
to a search and seizure by the Commissioner, it would mean that the warrant 
obtained by the Commissioner expires on the exercising thereof or the cancellation 
thereof by the judge who issued it.  
 
In terms of section 6 of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and 
Provision of Communication-Related Information Act No 70 of 2002, an entry 
warrant expires when the period or extended period for which the interception 
direction concerned has been issued, lapses, or it is cancelled by the designated 
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judge who issued it or, if he or she is not available, by any other designated judge, 
whichever occurs first.  
 
A solution for the lacuna in section 74D of the Act could thus be that the warrant 
issued by a judge under section 74D should provide for a time period in which the 
warrant must be exercised. The warrant would then expire when the period as 
prescribed by the judge has lapsed. Furthermore, when the TAB becomes law, all the 
warrants authorised under section 74D of the Act will still fall under section 74D.  
Therefore, as argued supra, a judge issuing a warrant under section 74D of the Act 
should prescribe a validity period. It could be argued that the 45 business days 
validity period, as provided for in the TAB, should in the interim be adopted to 
achieve uniformity.   
 
3 3 What is the status of a warrant once exercised? 
There is a lacuna in both the Act and the TAB regarding the validity of a warrant after 
it has been exercised. It is not clear what the status of an exercised warrant is and 
the question is thus whether a warrant expires when exercised or whether the same 
warrant can be used again to conduct a second search and seizure. This is often the 
case when the first search reveals the existence of other documents which the SARS 
now wants to seize in terms of a second search for new material. This could also be 
the case when the SARS has not seized all the relevant material during the first 
search and now wants to go back for a second search, not necessarily for new 
material but for the information, documents or things which were not seized the 
first time. Can the SARS conduct this second search on the same warrant or is a new 
warrant, and thus a whole new application procedure, required? 
 
Even though the previous section 74(3) of the Act did not require a warrant to 
conduct a search and seizure, some case law decided on section 74(3) provides 
guidance on this question. Section 74(3) of the Act required a mere authorisation by 
the Commissioner to search and seize. In the fourth Rudolph case, as discussed in 
chapter 2 supra, such authorisations had been granted on 20 October 1993 and the 
taxpayer’s home and business had been searched on 21 October 1993 and again on 
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22 April 1994. The second search was conducted under the authority of the original 
written authorisation. The taxpayer contended that the authorisations, having once 
been executed in October 1993, could not validly be executed again in April 1994. 
The authorisations could thus not be re-activated to validate the search and seizure 
on the second occasion. The court, however, held that this contention was without 
substance since there is nothing in the Act which suggested at that time that the 
mandate conferred by an authorisation under section 74(3) of the Act expires once 
documents or other articles discovered in the course of an authorised search have 
been seized and retained.111 The court further explained as follows:112 
“It is obvious that documents discovered as a result of a search may, in many 
cases, reveal the existence of other documents or articles for which further 
searches have to be made; and it is not easily conceivable that the Legislature 
would in such cases require a fresh authorisation for each further search. Be that 
as it may, the question whether several consecutive searches are authorised by 
any particular authorisation must be answered by reference to the terms of the 
authorisation itself. An authorisation under s 74(3), after all, confers a mandate 
and the duration of the mandate depends, in the absence of any statutory 
direction, upon the terms of the authorisation itself.” 
 
The court found that the authorisations in this case had allowed for consecutive 
searches and the court thus held that the authorisation did not expire on the 
execution of the first search and seizure. 
 
What can be concluded from this Rudolph judgment, even though section 74(3) of 
the Act is not applicable anymore, is that the authorisation now given by a warrant 
will be valid as prescribed in the warrant itself. This means that a warrant which 
provides for multiple searches and seizures could be used to conduct those further 
searches and seizures. It is however questionable whether it is permissible to issue 
such a warrant authorising consecutive searches under the Act or the TAB. Both 
require that a judge or magistrate must be satisfied that there are reasonable 
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grounds to believe that the relevant material is likely to be found.113 This would 
exclude the possibility of a second search if the material required was only revealed 
during the first search. If the existence of certain new material is only revealed after 
the first search and seizure, a judge could not be satisfied to believe that that 
material was likely to be found when the application was brought. Therefore, this 
could lead to a conclusion that a warrant permitting multiple searches is not 
permissible. 
 
It is however submitted that a distinction could be made, in terms of the Act, 
between a second search for new relevant material based on information gathered 
during the first search and seizure and a second search for relevant material which 
was originally contained in the warrant but which was not seized during the first 
search. Section 74D(4)(d) of the Act requires that a warrant shall be reasonably 
specific as to any information, documents or things to be searched for and seized. It 
is therefore argued that a second search might be permissible only in the case where 
the relevant material to be searched for and seized was contained in the warrant but 
not seized during the first search and seizure. This has not yet been decided by our 
courts and the position is thus not clear.  
 
Furthermore, in terms of section 74D(6) of the Act,  any officer who executes a 
warrant may seize, in addition to the information, documents or things referred to in 
the warrant, any other information, documents or things that such officer believes 
on reasonable grounds afford evidence of the non-compliance with the relevant 
obligations or the committing of an offence in terms of the Act. It seems as if this 
section could permit a further search even though the information, documents or 
things were not listed in the warrant. It is however argued that section 74D(6), which 
has not yet been interpreted by our courts, would only be applicable during the first 
(and possible the only permissible) search and seizure operation. During such 
operation, it would be permissible to seize other material not identified in the 
warrant, should reasonable grounds for such seizure exist. However, it is submitted 
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that a second search for material not identified in the warrant would amount to a 
warrantless search which is not permissible in terms of the Act.  
 
Clause 63 of the TAB now provides for a warrantless search and seizure and this 
provision of the TAB could thus be used by the SARS to conduct a second search and 
seizure. It should furthermore be noted that it is not required in terms of the TAB 
that a warrant must contain the relevant material to be searched for and seized, as 
contained in section 74D(4)(d) of the Act. The distinction described above relating to 
a second search for new material which was not identified in the original warrant 
and a second search for material which was contained in the original warrant would 
thus not apply to the TAB. It is not required to include the relevant material in the 
warrant in terms of the TAB, and it seems accordingly that this could lead to a 
conclusion that a second search would be permissible under the TAB in terms of the 
warrantless provisions.  
 
It is argued that there is however uncertainty under the TAB relating to a second 
search because of the 45 business days time period as prescribed in clause 60(3) of 
the TAB. In terms of this clause, a warrant is valid for 45 business days. It could thus 
be argued that any number of searches and seizures would be permissible, as long as 
they are exercised within the prescribed 45 business days time period.   
 
It could be argued that the TAB is too broad regarding the validity of a warrant in 
general. Firstly, it is not required in terms of the TAB that a warrant must contain 
details of the relevant material to be searched for and seized. Secondly, there is 45 
business days validity period which does not specify whether that would allow 
multiple searches within such period. Thirdly, the SARS could use clause 63 of the 
TAB to conduct a warrantless second search and seizure should the requirements of 
clause 63 be met. In terms of the Act, however, such multiple searches are limited 
due to the requirement that the warrant must contain the relevant material to be 
searched for and seized and since warrantless searches and seizures are not 
permissible under the Act. 
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It is therefore submitted that there is a serious lacuna in the TAB in this regard and 
that this aspect should be regulated more comprehensively. Section 21(3)(b) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act provides that a search warrant shall be of force until it is 
executed or is cancelled by the person who issued it or, if such person is not 
available, by a person with like authority. Applied to a search and seizure by the 
Commissioner, it would mean that the warrant obtained by the Commissioner 
expires once it is exercised. This should be adopted in the TAB as this would provide 
more certainty for taxpayers and would not expose them to endless further searches 
and seizures once the original warrant was exercised. 
 
3 4 Conclusion 
The TAB now provides for the 45 business days validity period but there are still 
some uncertainties regarding the validity of a warrant before and after it has been 
exercised. It is argued that these aspects need further legislative regulation and 
could be brought in line with the Criminal Procedure Act, which would mean that the 
warrant lapses once it is exercised.  
 
4 The reasonable grounds criterion 
4 1 Introduction 
The phrase reasonable grounds occurs quite a few times in the relevant search and 
seizure provisions of both the Act and the TAB. It is either a judge or magistrate or a 
SARS official who must be satisfied on reasonable grounds before something can be 
done. The reasonable grounds criterion in the Act and in the TAB is used as follows: 
 a judge or magistrate may issue a warrant if satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe certain things as set out in section 74D(3)(a)-
(c) of the Act and clause 60(1)(a)-(b) of the TAB; 
 in terms of both the Act and the TAB, where a SARS official has reasonable 
grounds to believe that relevant material is at premises not identified in 
the search warrant, it is permitted to search those premises that are not 
identified in the warrant;
114
 
114
  Section 74D(5) of Act and clause 62 of the TAB. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
72 
 
 section 74D(6) of the Act provides that an officer may seize, in addition to 
information, documents or things referred to in the warrant, any other 
information, documents or things that such officer on reasonable grounds 
believes to afford evidence; and  
 a search and seizure without a warrant also requires a reasonable grounds 
satisfaction. In terms of clause 63 of the TAB, a senior SARS official may 
without a warrant exercise the powers referred to in clause 61(3) of the 
TAB if the senior SARS official on reasonable grounds is satisfied that: 
o there may be an imminent removal or destruction of relevant material 
likely to be found on the premises;  
o if SARS applies for a search and seizure warrant under clause 59 of the 
TAB, a search warrant will be issued; and  
o the delay in obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of the search 
and seizure.  
 
The above listing shows that a reasonable grounds satisfaction is often required in 
the context of search and seizure. It is in fact a criterion that will always be applied 
regardless of whether it is a warranted or a warrantless search and seizure. It will 
always be exercised by a judge or magistrate when an application is made for a 
warrant and it will always be exercised by a SARS official when a warrantless search 
and seizure is contemplated. It will also be a criterion required to be satisfied when 
the officials are in the process of conducting a search and seizure, when there is for 
example a need to search premises or seize things not identified in the warrant. It is 
therefore an important criterion and it needs to be determined how and when it will 
be satisfied.  
 
4 2 Reasonable grounds criterion considered in tax cases 
In the case of Haynes v Commissioner for Inland Revenue,115 the High Court decided 
the following: 116 
                                                          
115
  2000 (6) BCLR 596 (Tk). 
116
  On page 630. 
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“The provisions of sections 74D [of the Income Tax Act] and 57D [of the Value-
Added Tax Act] constitute a draconian remedy available to the respondent. The 
presiding judge hearing the application brought in terms of section 74D(1) must be 
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that there had been non-
compliance by the taxpayer with his obligations in terms of the Act and that 
information, documents or things are likely to be found which will afford evidence 
of such non-compliance. In my view, the Commissioner would have to show that 
the measures provided for in section 74A and 74B provided non-compliance by 
the taxpayer with his obligations in terms of the Act and that the information, 
documents or things could not be obtained by way of the provisions of section 
74B thereby necessitating the application brought in terms of section 74D. In the 
absence thereof, in the application brought in terms of section 74D(2), the judge 
hearing the application would in the normal course not be able to be satisfied that 
there were ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ as required by section 74D(3).” 
 
This shows that the Commissioner has to use other measures available to him before 
he can bring an application for a warrant. The Commissioner must first, in terms of 
section 74A of the Act, require a taxpayer to furnish information, documents or 
things as the Commissioner may require. He must also use his powers under section 
74B of the Act, which provides that the Commissioner may require a taxpayer, with 
reasonable prior notice, to furnish, produce or make available any information, 
documents or things. These two sections require reasonable prior notice. If the 
Commissioner does not succeed with his powers under sections 74A and 74B of the 
Act, only then can he approach a court for a warrant authorising a search and 
seizure. Should the Commissioner approach a court for a warrant to search and 
seize, he would have to show, in terms of the Haynes case, that he exhausted his 
other remedies in terms of sections 74A and 74B of the Act. If the Commissioner 
does not show this, a judge will not be able to satisfy himself on reasonable grounds 
to issue the warrant. 
 
The above part of the Haynes dictum is on the reasonable grounds criterion which 
needs to be satisfied by a judge when considering an application. The court also 
considered the reasonable grounds discretion exercised by a SARS officer when he 
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wishes to seize information, documents or things other than those referred to in the 
warrant in terms of section 74D(6) of the Act. An officer may only seize other 
information, documents or things as such officer believes on reasonable grounds 
afford evidence. The court held that, in practical terms, this would mean that such 
documents, information and things would have to be inspected to enable the 
authorised officer to satisfy himself on reasonable grounds that such documents, 
information or things do afford evidence of non-compliance with the relevant 
obligations or the committing of an offence in terms of the Act by the taxpayer.
117
 
The court also held that the onus rests on the Commissioner to show that the 
officers seizing the said documents, information or things had reasonable grounds to 
believe that such information documents or things were entitled to be seized,
118
 and 
the court held the same regarding the onus when the officers search a premises that 
was not identified in the warrant in terms of section 74D(5) of the Act. The 
Commissioner has to show that there were reasonable grounds to believe that 
information, documents or things not at the premises as identified in the warrant 
were about to be removed or destroyed and that a warrant could not be obtained 
timeously to prevent such removal or destruction. 
 
To sum up, it was decided in the Haynes case that before a judge can be satisfied on 
reasonable grounds to issue a warrant, the Commissioner must show that he has 
exhausted his powers under sections 74A and 74B of the Act. Once the 
Commissioner is in possession of a warrant, and the officers make a decision in 
terms of sections 74D(5) or 74D(6) of the Act, based on reasonable grounds, the 
onus is afterwards on the Commissioner to show that there were in fact reasonable 
grounds for such a decision.  
 
The Haynes case is a High Court decision. The SCA has only once made a statement 
on the reasonable grounds criterion in terms of search and seizure in tax law. In the 
Shelton case it was emphasized by the SCA that it must be the judge who must be 
                                                          
117
  On pages 642-643. 
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  On page 643. 
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satisfied on reasonable grounds.119 It is thus irrelevant whether the person who 
supplied the information under oath, which must be attended to an application for a 
warrant to a judge, was satisfied that reasonable grounds existed for the 
application.120 It is argued that this could also be applied to the discretion of a SARS 
officer when he has to be satisfied on reasonable grounds. The emphasize is on his 
satisfaction, he cannot rely on the satisfaction of another person. 
 
There is however still not a clear guideline in the tax cases as to when and how the 
reasonable grounds criterion will be met. The reasonable grounds criterion is, 
however, often found in other spheres of the law when some discretion is required. 
A comparative approach can provide guidance as to the application and the meaning 
thereof in the context of a search and seizure in tax law.  
 
4 3 Reasonable grounds criterion in other spheres of the law 
It is one of the essentialia of a contract of sale and a contract of lease that the 
purchase price or the lease price must be ascertained or ascertainable.121 In the case 
of Engen Petroleum Ltd v Kommandonek (Pty) Ltd,122 the question to be decided was 
whether a lease was valid where it provides that the lessee is entitled to vary the 
lease on reasonable grounds. It was argued by the respondent, who wanted the 
lease to be declared void because of vagueness, that such a provision in the lease 
contract gave the other party an unfettered right to determine the rental. The court 
however found that there was no such unfettered right since the rental could only 
be varied on reasonable grounds. This meant that the variation was subject to 
objective criteria and that the contract was thus valid.123  
 
This shows that the reasonable grounds criterion is an objective one. It means that a 
judge, magistrate or SARS official has to be objectively satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds when exercising their various discretions. It is therefore argued 
                                                          
119
  On page 185. 
120
  Ibid. 
121
  Kahn, Havenga, Havenga & Lotz Principles of the Law of Sale and Lease 2ed (2010) 17. 
122
  2001 (2) SA 170 (W). 
123
  On page 173. 
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that a mere subjective suspicion or inkling would not be sufficient to satisfy the 
reasonable grounds criterion.     
 
In an insolvency case, Bruwil Konstruksie (Edms) Bpk v Whitson NO,124 it was held 
that reasonable grounds contemplates a lesser burden than a prima facie case and 
that a magistrate to whom an application for a warrant is made has a duty to insist 
on the facts being placed before him on which he could then make his decision for a 
warrant.125  
 
A prima facie proof was defined in Ex parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Jacobson and 
Levy as “in the absence of rebuttal, ... clear proof leaving no doubt”.126 Applied to tax 
law, it would mean that it is not required from the Commissioner to make out a 
prima facie case when applying for a warrant to search and seize, since reasonable 
grounds is a lesser burden. However, he needs to place facts before the judge as to 
enable the latter to exercise his reasonable grounds discretion. Similarly, an officer 
exercising his discretion when conducting a search and seizure does not have to be 
satisfied with certainty but there must be reasonable grounds based on the facts 
before him. 
 
Similar to the provisions in the Act and the TAB, it is also required in terms of the 
Criminal Procedure Act that a judge must be satisfied on reasonable grounds before 
he may issue a warrant authorising a search and seizure.127 According to Bekker et 
al,128 the judicial officer must exercise his discretion in a judicial manner, which 
means that “he must exercise the discretion in a reasonable and regular manner, in 
accordance with the law and while taking all the relevant facts into account”.   
The Criminal Procedure Act also provides for a warrantless search and seizure in 
section 22. Similar to the warrantless provisions of the TAB, one of the circumstances 
in which articles may be seized in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act without a 
                                                          
124
  1980 (4) SA 703 (T). 
125
  On pages 710 and 711. 
126
  1931 AD  474. 
127
  Section 21. 
128
  Bekker, Geldenhuys, Joubert, Swanepoel, Terblanche & Van der Merwe Criminal Procedure 
Handbook 9ed (2009) 134 135. 
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warrant is when the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a search 
warrant will be issued to him if he applies for such warrant and that the delay in 
obtaining such warrant would defeat the object of the search.129 In the case of 
Mnyungula v Minister of Safety and Security,130 a case considering the warrantless 
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, the court held that the onus is on the 
police to prove, objectively viewed, the existence of ample facts upon which the 
police base the reasonable belief, which facts must exist at the time when the police 
acted without a warrant, and not only at a later stage.131 The court further referred 
to the case of Ndabeni v Minister of Law and Order132 where that court in turn 
quoted the following from Milne J:133 
"(T)here can only be reasonable cause to believe... where, considered objectively, 
there are reasonable grounds for the belief... (I)t cannot be said that an officer has 
reasonable cause to believe... merely because he believes he has reasonable cause 
to believe." 
 
This means that the reasonable grounds must exist objectively at the time when a 
warrantless search and seizure is conducted, and not afterwards. This would 
practically mean that a SARS officer cannot satisfy himself on reasonable grounds 
only after he has already seized the documents that bring the facts to light on which 
he “based” his reasonable belief. There needs to be this reasonable belief 
beforehand and it needs to be based on objective and true facts. An officer cannot 
form his reasonable belief based on what he subjectively believes.  
 
The court in Mnyungula also had to consider the following question:134  
“Is it the law of this land that once a policeman on incorrect ‘facts’ formed a ‘bona 
fide’ reasonable belief that there are sufficient grounds to seize a vehicle, that that 
seizure is ‘forever’ or can the ‘reasonable belief’ later be rebutted by the true facts 
being shown, causing the seizure to lapse?” 
 
                                                          
129
  Section 22(b). 
130
  [2003] JOL 11934 (Tk). 
131
  On pages 5-6. 
132
  1984 (3) SA 500 (D). 
133
  On page 511. 
134
  On page 12. 
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The court held that it can, in terms of its inherent powers, set aside the seizure in the 
interest of justice and order the seized article to be returned when it is shown that 
the "facts" or "grounds" relied upon by the policeman when forming the "reasonable 
belief", did not in reality exist or were false.135 This could mean that a SARS officers’ 
belief, which later turns out to be based on unreasonable grounds, can lead to the 
setting aside of the seizure. 
 
4 4 Conclusion on the reasonable grounds criterion 
It is thus clear that anyone exercising the reasonable grounds criterion in terms of a 
warranted or a warrantless search and seizure must be satisfied that the grounds in 
fact exist objectively. It is not sufficient that the SARS officer subjectively and bona 
fide believed that they existed. A mere hope is also not enough to satisfy the 
reasonable grounds criterion. This can similarly be applied to a judge’s or 
magistrate’s discretion. He must have reasonable grounds at the time of the granting 
of the application for a warrant, based on the objective facts existing at that time.   
 
It is however necessary, in the context of the discretion of a judge or magistrate, that 
the information put before the judge or magistrate must contain sufficient detail to 
enable him to satisfy himself on reasonable grounds. It is therefore a burden on the 
Commissioner to place the correct facts before the judge or magistrate to allow him 
or her to be satisfied on reasonable grounds. 
 
5 Conclusion  
As shown in chapter 2 supra, the basic principles of a search and seizure by warrant 
remain the same under the TAB. In terms of clause 59(2) of the TAB, however, the 
SARS must now bring this application ex parte and this could be seen as a 
fundamental difference between the Act and the TAB. It was shown in this chapter, 
with reference to case law, that an ex parte application is permissible in terms of 
section 74D of the Act, while it is compulsory in terms of the TAB. The effect thereof 
has been analysed in this chapter and the conclusion is reached that the compulsory 
ex parte application as required by the TAB would not justify its unconstitutionality 
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per se but it is still submitted that this is an aspect of the application procedure 
which is now in favour of the Commissioner. It is however also acknowledged that an 
ex parte application makes sense in this regard as notice of the search and seizure 
could render the object of the search and seizure nugatory. It is difficult to reach a 
balance between the needs of the Commissioner and the protection of a taxpayer in 
this regard. 
 
It was furthermore concluded in this chapter that the TAB has now closed the lacuna 
in the Act relating to the validity period of a warrant before it has been executed. 
There is now provision for a 45 business day period wherein the warrant must be 
exercised. However, regarding whether a warrant expires when exercised or 
whether the same warrant can be used again to conduct a second search and 
seizure, it was concluded that the position is not quite certain in terms of the Act or 
the TAB. In terms of the TAB, however, the warrantless provisions of clause 63 could 
be invoked to conduct further searches. 
 
This chapter also discussed the meaning of the reasonable grounds criterion and it 
was concluded, with reference to case law, when and how this criterion could be 
satisfied. It is an objective criterion and the facts need to exist at the time of the 
exercising of this discretion by the judge, magistrate or SARS officer. 
 
Chapter 4 addresses the new warrantless search and seizure provisions. 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter firstly addresses the content of the warrantless search and seizure 
provisions of the TAB. Clause 63 of the TAB now authorises a search and seizure 
without a warrant, which is not allowed in terms of section 74D of the Act. Secondly, 
this chapter analyses commentaries on the warrantless provisions. Lastly, this 
chapter compares the warrantless search and seizure provisions of the TAB to the 
provisions permitting a warrantless search and seizure in other acts. This places the 
warrantless search and seizure provisions of the TAB in perspective and it can then 
be determined whether the TAB provisions are in line with the warrantless 
provisions in other spheres of the law. The constitutionality of the warrantless 
search and seizure provisions is addressed in chapter 5. 
 
2 Content of clause 63 of the TAB 
2 1 Introduction  
Clause 63 of the TAB provides as follows:  
(1) A senior SARS official may without a warrant exercise the powers referred to in 
clause 61(3) – 
 (a) if the person who may consent thereto so consents in writing; or 
 (b) if the senior SARS official on reasonable grounds is satisfied that 
  (i) there may be an imminent removal or destruction of relevant 
  material likely to be found on the premises; 
  (ii) if SARS applies for a search warrant under clause 59, a search 
  warrant will be issued; and 
  (iii) the delay in obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of the 
  search and seizure. 
(2) Clause 61(3) to (9) applies to a search conducted under this section. 
(3) A SARS official may not enter a dwelling-house or domestic premises, except 
any part thereof used for purposes of trade, under this section without the 
consent of the occupant. 
 
Since the substitution of the previous section 74(3) of the Act and the insertion of 
section 74D into the Act in 1996, warrantless searches and seizures were no longer 
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permitted in South African Income Tax law.
136
 It could be argued that section 74D(5) 
of the Act, which allows for a search and seizure of premises not identified in the 
warrant, is similar to a warrantless search and seizure. However, this section can 
only be implemented when there is already a warrant, but the premises that the 
SARS wants to search are not indentified in that warrant. It means that some form of 
judicial control was thus involved when that original warrant was authorised and it is 
therefore argued that it is not warrantless in the very strict sense.  
 
A similar clause authorising a warrantless search and seizure was also contained in 
the first and second drafts of the TAB. Clause 55 of the first draft of the TAB read as 
follows: 
(1) A senior SARS official may without a warrant exercise the powers referred to in 
clause 53(3)—  
 (a) if the person who may consent thereto so consents in writing; or  
 (b) if the official on reasonable grounds is satisfied— 
  (i) that there may be an imminent removal or destruction of relevant 
  material likely to be found on the premises;  
  (ii) that if SARS applies for a search warrant under clause 51, a search 
  warrant will be issued; and  
  (iii) that the delay in obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of the 
  search and seizure.  
(2) Clause 53(4) to (8) applies to a search conducted under this section. 
 
Clause 63 of the second draft of the TAB read as follows: 
(1) A senior SARS official may without a warrant exercise the powers referred to in 
section 61(3)—  
(a) if the person who may consent thereto so consents in writing; or  
(b) if the senior SARS official on reasonable grounds is satisfied that—  
(i) there may be an imminent removal or destruction of relevant material 
likely to be found on the premises;  
(ii) if SARS applies for a search warrant under section 59, a search warrant 
will be issued; and  
                                                          
136
  Section 14 of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act No 46 of 1996 substituted section 74 of the Act, 
and added section 74D, which came into operation on 30 September 1996.  
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(iii) the delay in obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of the search 
and seizure.  
(2) Section 61(3) to (8) and section 64(2)(b) applies to a search conducted under this 
section. 
 
It is submitted that there were no substantial changes to the warrantless provisions 
from the first draft to the second draft of the TAB. The only minor differences 
related to the fact that all the clause numbers had changed in the second draft, and 
references were changed accordingly.  However, the third draft of the TAB has now 
introduced an additional sub clause in clause 63 which provides that a SARS official 
may not enter a dwelling-house or domestic premises, except any part thereof used 
for purposes of trade, under this clause without the consent of the occupant. There 
was no such limitation in the warrantless search and seizure provisions of the first or 
second draft of the TAB. 
 
In terms of clause 63 of the TAB, the power to conduct a warrantless search and 
seizure is granted to a senior SARS official. Clause 6(3) of the TAB provides that the 
powers required by the TAB to be exercised by a senior SARS official must be 
exercised by— 
(a) the Commissioner; 
(b) a SARS official who has specific written authority from the Commissioner to 
exercise the power; or 
(c) a SARS official occupying a post designated by the Commissioner for this purpose. 
 
It is thus clear from clause 6(3) of the TAB that only a very limited number of persons 
will be authorised to conduct a warrantless search and seizure. It is furthermore 
clear that there are only two circumstances under which a warrantless search and 
seizure may be conducted, namely if the person who may consent thereto so 
consents in writing or if the senior SARS official on reasonable grounds is satisfied of 
the three requirements as listed in clause 63(1)(b)(i)-(iii) of the TAB.  
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2 2 Consent  
None of the reasonable grounds requirements need to be satisfied when consent is 
obtained by the SARS.  Accordingly, if the person who may consent thereto so 
consents in writing to the warrantless search and seizure, it would not lead to the 
same kind of complexity than it could when the reasonable grounds criterion needs 
to be satisfied. It would in turn make any burden of proof easier since no discretion 
is involved in the obtaining of consent. It is thus argued that consent should always 
be the first option when a warrantless search and seizure is conducted. However, 
the reality is that consent will not always be easily obtainable by the SARS. 
Furthermore it is not clear from clause 63(1)(a) of the TAB who the person is “who 
may consent thereto”. Is it the owner of the premises to be searched or of the thing 
to be seized? Is it the occupant? Or is it a person in control of the property? The 
following provisions of the Act and the TAB also relate to the giving of consent and 
provide as follows: 
 In terms of section 74B(3) of the Act, relating to the power of the 
Commissioner to require a taxpayer or any other person to furnish, produce 
or make available any information, documents or things required for 
inspection, audit, examination or obtaining, the Commissioner or any officer 
contemplated in the section, shall not enter any dwelling-house or domestic 
premises (except any part thereof as may be occupied or used for the 
purposes of trade) without the consent of the occupant.  
 Clauses 45(2) of the TAB, on the inspection powers of the SARS, and  clause 
48(5) of the TAB, on the audit or criminal investigation powers of the SARS, 
provide that a SARS official may not enter a dwelling-house or domestic 
premises (except any part thereof used for the purposes of trade) under 
these clauses without the consent of the occupant.  
 Clause 62(2) of the TAB, on the search of premises not identified in the 
warrant, provides that a SARS official may not enter a dwelling-house or 
domestic premises, except any part thereof used for purposes of trade, under 
this clause without the consent of the occupant. 
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 Clause 63(3) of the TAB provides that a SARS official may not enter a 
dwelling-house or domestic premises, except any part thereof used for 
purposes of trade, under clause 63 without the consent of the occupant. 
 
It is accordingly clear that certain provions of the Act and the TAB refer specifically to 
the consent of the occupant. However, clause 63(1)(a) of the TAB is not specific in 
this regard, and it is accordingly not clear how our courts will interpret this clause. 
Therefore, other areas of the law could provide some guidance.  
 
In terms of section 22(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, a police official may without 
a search warrant search any person or container or premises for the purpose of 
seizing any article referred to in section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act if the 
person concerned consents to the search for and the seizure of the article in 
question, or if the person who may consent to the search of the container or 
premises consents to such search and the seizure of the article in question. 
 
This part of section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act was considered in the case of 
Ngamlana v MEC for Safety & Security and Another.
137
 The court held the following 
regarding the “person who may consent” thereto:
138
 
“To require the person who may consent to the search of the premises to have 
authority to consent to the seizure of a section 20 article found on the premises is 
to read into section 22(a) words which it does not contain. It would also be 
impractical to require a police official to be satisfied that the person consenting to 
the seizure has authority to do so, more particularly when it is borne in mind that 
in relation to many articles falling within the purview of section 20 of the Act it 
would be difficult to know at the time of seizure who the person or persons may 
be who might have a lawful right to possess the article. In my view therefore the 
mere fact that the person who may consent to the search of the premises gives 
consent to the search and seizure suffices to validate a search and seizure that 
was not done pursuant to a warrant. If the person who may consent to the search 
of the premises withholds consent to either, or both, the search and the seizure, 
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then what was not consented to can only be done by obtaining a warrant, unless 
the circumstances are such that the provisions of section 22(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act 
can be invoked.” 
 
In this case, counsel for the applicant submitted that it was required that the person 
who gave the consent was in charge of the premises or that he or she had authority 
to consent to the seizing of the item. It was however decided that it is not required 
that the person who may consent thereto must have the authority to consent. It was 
also held by the court that it is not required for the person giving the consent to 
have a lawful right to possess the article. It seems accordingly that the giving of 
consent is not limited to the true owner of a thing or the lawful possessor. The 
person giving the consent is also not required to have authority from the true owner 
or lawful possessor to give consent for the search and seizure of that owners’ or 
possessors’ thing.  
  
No further clear guidelines were however given as to whom exactly the person is 
who may consent thereto in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act. It was only stated 
whom the person does not have to be. The Competition Act also makes provision for 
permission to conduct a search and seizure. Section 47(2)(a) of the Competition Act 
provides that the inspector conducting the search in terms of the Competition Act 
must get permission from the owner or person in control of the premises to enter 
and search the premises. There is thus a clear indication here of whom the person is 
that must consent to the search and seizure. 
 
To sum up on the interpretation of the person “who may consent thereto” in terms 
of clause 63(1)(a) of the TAB, it is not clear whether it would be the owner, occupant 
or person in control as no specific reference is made. The Memorandum on the 
Objects of the TAB, 2011 merely indicates that the warrantless power “may only be 
invoked if the person affected consents thereto or if a senior SARS official on 
reasonable grounds is satisfied that...”.  It is however still not clear who the “affected 
person” would be and it could perhaps be argued that all these categories of 
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persons, i.e. owner, occupant or person in control, would fall under the broad term 
of “the person who may consent” which is used in clause 63(1)(a) of the TAB. 
 
Regarding the giving of consent in general in terms of Criminal Procedure law, the 
following principles apply:
139
 
 the consent must be valid; 
 the consent must be given voluntarily; and 
 consent cannot validate an irregular search warrant. This refers to the 
position where a warrant is obtained but that warrant is later found to be an 
invalid warrant. Consent can then not validate such an irregular search 
warrant. 
 
It is argued that the above general principles should be equally applicable to the 
giving of consent in terms of clause 63(1)(a) of the TAB. Thus, consent has to be 
valid, must be given voluntarily and consent cannot validate an irregular search 
warrant.  
 
2 3 Satisfied on reasonable grounds 
The only other justification for the SARS to conduct a warrantless search and seizure 
is when the senior SARS official is satisfied on reasonable grounds that:
140
 
 (i) there may be an imminent removal or destruction of relevant  
 material likely to be found on the premises; 
 (ii) if SARS applies for a search warrant under clause 59, a search  
 warrant will be issued; and 
 (iii) the delay in obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of the  
 search and seizure. 
 
The reasonable grounds criterion and the meaning thereof is discussed supra in 
chapter 3. It is clear from the word and between sub clauses (b)(ii) and (b)(iii) of  
clause 63 of the TAB that all three of the above requirements need to be complied 
                                                          
139
  Basdeo A Constitutional Perspective of Police Powers of Search and Seizure in the Criminal Justice 
System. Masters of Law thesis University of South Africa (2009) 102-105. 
140
  Clause 63(1)(b) of the TAB. 
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with.  This part of the warrantless search and seizure provisions of the TAB is again 
very similar to the warrantless provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act which shows 
that an attempt was perhaps made to bring the warrantless provisions of the TAB in 
line with the warrantless provisions of other acts. Section 22(b) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act reads as follows:  
“A police official may without a search warrant search any person or container or 
premises for the purpose of seizing any article referred to in section 20— 
 (a) … 
 (b) if he on reasonable grounds believes— 
  (i) that a search warrant will be issued to him under paragraph (a) of 
  section 21(1) if he applies for such warrant; and 
  (ii) that the delay in obtaining such warrant would defeat the object of 
  the search.” 
 
Sections 22(b)(i) and (ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act are similar to clauses 
63(1)(b)(ii) and (iii) of the TAB. However, clause 63 of the TAB has a third 
requirement, namely that the senior SARS official must on reasonable grounds be 
satisfied that there may be an imminent removal or destruction of relevant material 
likely to be found on the premises.
141
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines the word 
imminent as follows: “Of an event, etc. (almost always of evil or danger): Impending 
threateningly, hanging over one's head; ready to befall or overtake one; close at 
hand in its incidence; coming on shortly”. It shows that the removal or destruction of 
the relevant material must be impending or threatening.  
 
It is furthermore also necessary to establish that if the SARS applies for a search 
warrant under clause 59 of the TAB, a search warrant will be issued and the delay in 
obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of the search and seizure.
142
 To satisfy 
the requirement that if the SARS applies for a warrant, a warrant will be issued, it 
could be argued that the SARS must exercise the discretion of clause 60(1) of the 
TAB, which is the discretion that a judge or magistrate would exercise when deciding 
                                                          
141
  Clause 63(1)(b)(i) of the TAB. 
142
  Clause 63(1)(b)(ii) and (iii) of the TAB. 
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on the issuance of a warrant. In terms of clause 60(1) of the TAB, the judge or 
magistrate must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: 
(a) a person failed to comply with an obligation imposed under a tax Act, or 
committed a tax offence; and  
(b) relevant material likely to be found on the premises specified in the application 
may provide evidence of the failure to comply or commission of the offence.  
 
The SARS should thus place itself in the position of the judge or magistrate in order 
to decide that if the SARS applies for a search warrant, a search warrant will be 
issued. 
 
The last requirement is that the delay in obtaining a warrant would defeat the object 
of the search and seizure.
143
 It is argued that the object of a search and seizure in 
terms of the Act or the TAB would be the gaining of relevant material if a person 
failed to comply with an obligation imposed under a tax Act or committed a tax 
offence. If the time needed to apply for a warrant would defeat that object, this 
requirement could be satisfied.  
 
It should, however, be noted that it is a general principle in our law that one cannot 
create its own urgency.
144
 It is thus argued that the SARS should not be able to use 
the warrantless search and seizure provisions in a situation where there is urgency, 
but where that urgency was created by the SARS when they did not apply for a 
warrant when there was still time available to do so.  
 
As shown in chapter 3 supra, when it is required to be satisfied on reasonable 
grounds, those grounds must in fact exist objectively. It is not sufficient that the 
senior SARS official subjectively and bona fide believed that the grounds existed. A 
mere hope is also not enough to satisfy the reasonable grounds criterion. It is thus 
clear that this is not an easy burden on the SARS. When a warrantless search and 
seizure is conducted in terms of clause 63 of the TAB, the SARS will have to prove 
                                                          
143
  Clause 63(1)(b)(iii) of the TAB. 
144
  Harms Civil Procedure in the Superior Courts (2010) LexisNexis Butterworths Intranet Resources 
B6.64. 
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that reasonable grounds for all three requirements of clause 63(1)(b) of the TAB 
existed at that time.  
 
2 4 Dwelling-house or domestic premises 
Clause 63(3) of the TAB now specifically provides that a SARS official may not enter a 
dwelling-house or domestic premises, except any part thereof used for purposes of 
trade, under clause 63 without the consent of the occupant.  
 
The words dwelling-house and domestic premises are not defined in the TAB. 
Dwelling-house is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as ”a house occupied as a 
place of residence, as distinguished from a house of business, warehouse, office, 
etc”. The ordinary meaning of a dwelling-house or domestic premises would be a 
domestic residence, as opposed to a place of business. The SARS may not use its 
clause 63 warrantless power to enter such a domestic residence without the consent 
of the occupant. However, should any part of that residence be used for purposes of 
trade, that part of the residence may be entered under clause 63 of the TAB. 
 
This sub clause was not contained in any of the previous versions of the TAB. It was 
only introduced in the third draft of the TAB, which might be an indication that the 
legislature found the previous warrantless powers of the TAB, which did not exclude 
such domestic residences, to be too wide and that greater protection of the right to 
privacy is perhaps intended.  
 
2 5 Conclusion on the content of clause 63 of the TAB 
The above new provisions of the TAB show the further development of search and 
seizure in South African income tax law. Search and seizure has thus developed from 
warrantless under section 74(3) of the Act into search and seizure by warrant under 
section 74D of the Act into a combination of both warranted and warrantless search 
and seizure under the TAB. However, these new warrantless search and seizure 
provisions did not come into being without commentaries from all quarters. 
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3 Commentary on the warrantless provisions of the TAB 
3 1 Commentary from the SARS  
In the Draft Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft TAB (2009), the SARS comments 
as follows on the warrantless search and seizure provisions:
145
  
“The extension of search and seizure powers to enable SARS to conduct a search 
and seizure without a warrant if such warrant cannot be obtained in time to 
prevent the imminent removal or destruction of records, i.e. in effect to stop a 
crime in progress. This power should assist in addressing the problem of tax 
evaders who, upon approach by SARS, waste no time to destroy all records and 
evidence of their fraudulent activities and details of income derived.”  
 
The SARS is accordingly of belief that it needs these provisions to deal with the 
limited number of people who SARS believes will destroy or remove documents to 
prevent SARS from determining their non-compliance with tax laws or tax evasion.
146
  
 
One of the objects of the TAB is explained as follows in the Draft Explanatory 
Memorandum on the Draft TAB (2009):
147
 
“The TAB also extends SARS‘ powers, for example its information gathering, 
assessment and collection powers. The purpose of the TAB in this regard is the 
extension of powers to more effectively target tax evaders who demonstrate 
certain behaviour, not ordinarily compliant taxpayers. Thus the power to search a 
premise without a warrant is narrowly circumscribed, for example a senior SARS 
official must be satisfied that there may be an imminent removal or destruction of 
records.” 
 
With reference to clause 63 of the second draft of the TAB, the following is explained 
in the Draft Memorandum on the Objects of the TAB (2010):
148
 
                                                          
145
  Draft Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft TAB (2009) 7 
http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=52833 (accessed 13 March 2010). 
146
  http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:yrzE94VFZBAJ:www.persfin.co.za/index 
php%3FfSectionId%3D591%26fArticleId%3D5746450+tax+administration+bill+warrantless+search
+and+seizure&hl=en&gl=za&strip=1 (accessed 14 December 2010). 
147
  Draft Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft TAB (2009) 1-2 http:// 
www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=52833 (accessed 13 March 2010). 
148
  Draft Memorandum on the Objects of the TAB (2010) 12 
http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=52833 (accessed 6 November 2010). 
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“This power is consistent with that found in other legislation in South Africa and 
has been reviewed and approved by the courts in that context. It should inter alia 
assist in tax base broadening and addressing the reality that tax evaders who, 
upon approach by SARS, waste no time in destroying all records and evidence of 
their fraudulent activities and details of income derived.” 
 
Franz Tomasek, SARS's group executive for legislative drafting and research says the 
following:
149
 
“The Constitutional Court has held that there are times when a search without a 
warrant and the seizure of documents are justified and constitutional. This power 
can be used only in very narrow circumstances, and there are more than 15 other 
pieces of legislation in South Africa that also allow warrantless search and 
seizure.” 
 
The constitutionality of the warrantless search and seizure provisions will be further 
addressed in chapter 5. What is however clear from the above is that the SARS is 
certain that the warrantless search and seizure provisions of the TAB are acceptable 
and constitutional. It seems that the SARS only intends to use the warrantless 
provisions in very limited circumstances. It has been said a few times that the target 
would be tax evaders and that it would only be applied to a very limited number of 
taxpayers.   
 
However, there has also been wide concern about the newly proposed warrantless 
search and seizure provisions.  
 
3 2 Public commentary  
The warrantless provisions of the TAB have been widely dispraised and criticised and 
some of the commentary reads as follows: 
 Klue, chief executive of the South African Institute of Tax Practitioners, 
argues that the warrantless search and seizure provisions would give the 
                                                          
149
  http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:yrzE94VFZBAJ:www.persfin.co.za/index 
php%3FfSectionId%3D591%26fArticleId%3D5746450+tax+administration+bill+warrantless+search
+and+seizure&hl=en&gl=za&strip=1 (accessed 14 December 2010). 
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SARS “absolute power” and that this would mean that the SARS could now 
“act as judge and jury”.
150
 Klue also raised concern about the fact that a 
senior SARS official is not necessarily legally trained and that the senior SARS 
official could authorise such a warrantless search and seizure based on 
information from a junior SARS official or an informant, which information 
may be tainted with incorrect facts.
151
 According to him, the search and 
seizure would in those circumstances not have been authorised by a judge. 
 According to the Submissions of the Draft TAB of the Law Society of South 
Africa (“the LSSA”), the “search without a warrant would be the same as a 
blanket warrant. This would be too broad and unjustifiable violate a 
taxpayers right to privacy.”
152
  In the same report, the LSSA also said that “it 
is not appropriate that SARS should be seen to be promoting a Bill in which 
absolute powers inimical to constitutional values are sought.”
153
 This was not 
said specifically with regard to the warrantless provisions of the TAB but since 
they expressd their strong expostulation on the search and seizure 
provisions, it is argued that this could refer to the warrantless provisions of 
the TAB. The view of the LSSA is that “some of the provisions of the TAB are 
profoundly disturbing, whether or not they are constitutionally justified.”
154
  
 In a memorandum prepared by Milton Seligson SC, Trevor Emslie SC and Joe 
van Dorsten commenting on the provisions of the first draft of the TAB, the 
following was said regarding clause 55 of the first draft of the TAB (which is 
now clause 63 of the TAB): “Taxpayers must be able to assert the right to 
prevent any unlawful search and seizure by officials acting without a 
warrant.”
155
  However, according to them, taxpayers will be able to do so 
since the official’s decision will be justiciable by a court. 
                                                          
150
  Rawoot SARS may act as “judge and jury” (2009) http://www.mg.co.za/article/2009-11-06-sars-
may-act-as-judge-and-jury (accessed 14 June 2010). 
151
  Du Preez SARS wants power to search and seize without a warrant (2009) http://www. 
persfin.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=5275002 (accessed 22 March 2010). 
152
  Law Society of South Africa Submissions on the Draft TAB (2010) 24. 
153
Ibid 1.
154
  Ibid 1. 
155
  Meyerowitz, Davis & Emslie “Comment on the Draft Tax Administration Bill” 2010 (vol 59 issue 2) 
The Taxpayer (Editorial) 24 28. 
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 Journalists have also described the new warrantless search and seizure 
provisions as “controversial” and “draconian”.
156
     
 
3 3 Conclusion on the commentary on the warrantless provisions of the TAB 
It is thus clear from the above list that there is strong discontentment and concern 
about the new warrantless search and seizure provisions of the TAB. The 
constitutional aspects of the warrantless provisions are discussed in chapter 5 infra 
and will enlighten the acceptability or not of the provisions. It must however be kept 
in mind that the comments of especially journalists are often used to catch the 
public’s eye and to create sensation with words such as “controversial” and 
“draconian”. 
 
On the other hand, it seems that the SARS really has a need for provisions 
authorising them to conduct a warrantless search and seizure. The fact that these 
provisions are proposed might be an indication that the current provisions on search 
and seizure are not adequate enough to meet the needs of the SARS.  
 
It could thus be that the criticism on clause 63 of the TAB is too wide when the 
context in which the SARS wants to execute the provisions is as limited as said by 
them. However, the TAB still grants the wide powers and the comments of the SARS 
that they will only target serious tax evaders and that it would only be applied to a 
very limited number of taxpayers is not binding. 
 
4 Warrantless provisions in other acts 
4 1 Introduction 
The warrantless search and seizure provisions of the TAB have been compared to the 
warrantless search and seizure provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act under 2 2 
and 2 3 of this chapter. The provisions of the TAB are now also compared to the 
Competition Act, i.e. not in a criminal law context. The legislation analysed in this 
chapter should however not be seen as an exhaustive list of legislation containing 
                                                          
156
  Du Preez SARS wants power to search and seize without a warrant (2009) http://www. 
persfin.co.za/index.php?fArticleId=5275002 (accessed 22 March 2010). 
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warrantless provisions. It is merely by way of example that the Criminal Procedure 
Act and the Competition Act were chosen to compare the warrantless TAB 
provisions.  As indicated above, according to Franz Tomasek, it seems that 
warrantless provisions are contained in more than 15 other pieces of legislation in 
South Africa. 
  
4 2 The Competition Act 
Section 47 of the Competition Act authorises a warrantless search and seizure and 
provides as follows: 
(1) An inspector who is not authorised by a warrant in terms of section 46 (2) may 
enter and search premises other than a private dwelling. 
(2) Immediately before entering and searching in terms of this section, the 
inspector conducting the search must provide identification to the owner or 
person in control of the premises and explain to that person the authority by 
which the search is being conducted, and must— 
  (a) get permission from that person to enter and search the premises; 
  or 
  (b) believe on reasonable grounds that a warrant would be issued 
  under section 46 if applied for, and that the delay that would ensue by 
  first obtaining a warrant would defeat the object or purpose of the 
  entry and search. 
(3) An entry and search without a warrant may be carried out only during the day, 
unless doing it at night is justifiable and necessary in the circumstances. 
 
It is clear from the above that the Competition Act sets out strict boundaries for a 
warrantless search and seizure. These safeguards are as follows: 
 private dwellings may not be entered and searched;
157
 
 immediately before entering and searching, the inspector conducting the 
search must provide identification to the owner or person in control of the 
premises and explain to that person the authority by which the search is 
being conducted;
158
 and 
                                                          
157
  Section 47(1) of the Competition Act. 
158
  Section 47(2) of the Competition Act. 
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 an entry and search without a warrant may be carried out only during the 
day, unless doing it at night is justifiable and necessary in the 
circumstances.
159
 
 
One of the grounds in terms of which an inspector may conduct a warrantless 
search in terms of section 47(2)(a) of the Competition Act is when the owner or 
person in control of the premises gives permission. There is accordingly clear 
reference to the person who may give permission as being the owner or person in 
control of the premises. Furthermore, the word permission is used, as opposed to 
the word consent in clause 63(1)(a) of the TAB and section 22(a) of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. Permission is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “the action 
of permitting, allowing, or giving consent; consent, leave, or liberty to do 
something” whereas consent is defined as “voluntary agreement to or acquiescence 
in what another proposes or desires; compliance, concurrence, permission”. It is 
accordingly submitted that permission and consent are merely synonyms and this 
difference in wording between the Competition Act and the TAB should be of no 
relevance. Another difference between the Competition Act and the TAB in this 
regard is that consent must be given in writing in terms of the TAB. This writing-
requirement could then provide proof for the SARS that consent was in fact given to 
conduct the search and seizure without a warrant. This is not required in terms of 
the Competition Act, which might make it more difficult for an officer to prove, 
when in dispute, that actual permission was given when not given in writing. 
 
One of the other grounds in terms of which a warrantless search may be conducted 
in terms of section 47(2)(b) of the Competition Act is when the inspector believes on 
reasonable grounds: 
 that a warrant would be issued under section 46 if applied for; and 
 that the delay that would ensue by first obtaining a warrant would defeat 
the object or purpose of the entry and search. 
 
159
  Section 47(3) of the Competition Act. 
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These two reasonable grounds requirements are also contained in clause 63(1)(b) of 
the TAB, however, with one additional requirement in terms of the TAB. Clause 
63(1)(b)(i) of the TAB requires that the senior SARS official must also be satisfied on 
reasonable grounds that there may be an imminent removal or destruction of 
relevant material likely to be found on the premises. This is not required in terms of 
the Competition Act and it is accordingly submitted that the burden of proof of an 
officer conducting a warrantless search in terms of the Competition Act would be 
lighter as there is no need to establish, on reasonable grounds, that there may be an 
imminent removal or destruction of material. 
 
Similar to clause 63(3) of the TAB, the Competition Act also excludes entries into 
private dwellings. Some other safeguards in the Competition Act which are, 
however, not included in the TAB are as follows: 
 the inspector must provide identification before entering and searching; 
 the inspector must explain the authority on which the search is conducted; 
and 
 the entry and search may only be carried out during the day, unless doing it 
at night is justifiable and necessary in the circumstances. 
 
It is argued that the provisions of the Competition Act on the identification of the 
inspector to the owner or person in control of the premises and the explanation of 
the authority by which the search is being conducted would be desirable in a tax 
context. The same goes for the provision in the Competition Act on the entry and 
search without a warrant which may be carried out only during the day, unless 
doing it at night is justifiable and necessary in the circumstances. These provisions 
would confine and restrict the powers of the SARS.  
 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the warrantless search and seizure provisions as contained 
in clause 63 of the TAB. Comments and criticism from all quarters were analysed and 
converged to find a balance. It was also found that warrantless search and seziure 
provisions are not uncommon in other statutes, but the content thereof often 
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differs. The provisions were compared to section 22 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
which is very similar to clause 63 of the TAB. It should however be kept in mind that 
the Criminal Procedure Act falls under criminal law and that the context and 
objectives of the Criminal Procedure Act are very different from the TAB. Therefore, 
the warrantless provisions of the TAB were also compared to a statute outside the 
sphere of criminal law, i.e. the Competition Act, and the conclusion is made that the 
TAB provisions are not in all respects as circumscribed as the warrantless provisions 
of the Competition Act. It is therefore recommended that the warrantless provisions 
of the TAB should contain some counterbalances as found in the Competition Act to 
equal the rights of taxpayers to the needs of the SARS. Those counterbalances 
should include the following: 
 a requirement that the official identifies him or herself to the owner or 
person in control of the premises before entering and searching; 
 an explanation from that official to that person on the authority by which the 
search is being conducted; and 
 a requirement that an entry and search without a warrant may only be 
carried out during the day, unless doing it at night is justifiable and necessary 
in the circumstances. 
 
The constitutionality of the warranted and warrantless search and seizure provisions 
of the Act and the TAB is addressed in chapter 5.  
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1 Introduction 
A constitutional analysis of the search and seizure provisions of the Act and the TAB 
should be done in order to determine whether they are sustainable under the 
highest law of our country, namely the Constitution. The constitutionality of the 
previous section 74 of the Act was analysed in chapter 2 with reference to, inter alia, 
the Katz Commission and the Rudolph cases. It was concluded that the 
constitutionality of the previous section 74(3) of the Act was never decided by our 
courts. The Rudolph saga was a long battle in which the Constitutional Court held 
that the case had no constitutional merit. The searches and seizures had taken place 
prior to the Interim Constitution coming into force which meant that none of the 
events of which the applicant complained could be said to constitute a breach of any 
of his rights under the Interim Constitution. However, with reference to the findings 
of the Katz Commission and court decisions in which similar provisions in other acts 
were found to be unconstitutional, it was argued in chapter 2 that section 74(3) of 
the Act was unconstitutional. 
 
The constitutionality of the current section 74D of the Act has not yet been tested by 
our Constitutional Court. There have, however, been several submissions that the 
section should stand to constitutional scrutiny. According to Silke, the 
constitutionality of section 74D of the Act is not beyond doubt.
160
  However, 
according to Juta’s Income Tax, section 74D of the Act “has been drafted to ensure 
compatibility with the Constitution in that the previous section 74 possessed far too 
few safeguards for this purpose.”
161
 It is thus clear that there is no unanimity 
between academic writers on the constitutionality of section 74D of the Act. It could 
be argued that, since some writers claim that a section 74D of the Act warranted 
search and seizure is unconstitutional, they would probably come to a conclusion 
that a warrantless search and seizure in terms of the TAB would result in an even 
more severe constitutional breach. 
 
                                                          
160
  Silke “Taxpayers and the Constitution: A battle already lost” 2002 Acta Juridica (vol 17 issue 1) 
282 291. 
161
  Davis, Olivier & Urquhart Juta’s Income Tax (1999) 74D-2.  
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The search and seizure provisions of the Act and the TAB are tested in this chapter 
against section 25 of the Constitution, the right to property, and section 14 of the 
Constitution, which secures the right to privacy. However, section 36 of the 
Constitution provides that the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited in terms of 
law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom, taking into account all relevant factors. This means that even if the right of 
the Commissioner to search and seize might at first glance be in breach of 
constitutional rights, it must be remembered that the rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution may be limited in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.  
 
2 The right to property   
Section 25(1) of the Constitution provides that no one may be deprived of property 
except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property. 
 
In the case of Deutschmann NO and Others; Shelton v Commissioner for the SARS,
162
 the 
applicants contended, inter alia, that the processes of search and seizure under the 
warrants in terms of section 74D of the Act had constituted a serious encroachment 
on their right against arbitrary deprivation of property contained in section 25 of the 
Constitution.  
 
A full bench of the High Court held that reliance on the Constitution was misplaced 
in this case.
163
 According to the court, the provisions in terms of which the warrant 
was sought and obtained, i.e. section 74D of the Act, do anything but permit 
arbitrary deprivation of property. Section 74D of the Act requires an application 
supported by information supplied under oath and the exercise of a discretion by a 
judge. The judge who authorises the warrant does not thereby affect the property or 
the rights to such property vesting in an individual. According to the court, any party 
remains free, in terms of the statute, to establish his entitlement and claim delivery.  
                                                          
162
  62 SATC 191. 
163
  On page 205. 
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It is accordingly submitted that the aim of the search and seizure provisions under 
consideration in the Act and the TAB is not to keep the property in question as 
payment of tax but as an information gathering tool. Therefore, section 25 of the 
Constitution is not further analysed in this chapter since the search and seizure 
provisions of the Act and the TAB should not infringe the right to property. 
 
3 The right to privacy  
3 1 Introduction 
Section 14 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to privacy, which 
includes the right not to have their person or home searched, their property 
searched, their possessions seized or the privacy of their communications infringed.  
 
As discussed supra under the right to property, section 74D of the Act has come 
under constitutional scrutiny in the Deutschmann case. The applicants contended 
that the search and seizure in terms of section 74D of the Act violated their right to, 
inter alia, privacy but the High Court held that reliance on the Constitution was 
misplaced.
164
 In coming to this conclusion, the court referred to the case of Bernstein 
and Others v Bester NO and Others.
165
  
 
The Constitutional Court held in the Bernstein case that privacy is an individual 
condition of life characterised by seclusion from the public and publicity which 
implies an absence of acquaintance with the individual or his personal affairs in this 
state.
166
 The court further defined the right to privacy in the Bernstein case as 
follows:
167
 
“In the context of privacy this would mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a 
person, such as his/her family life, sexual preference and home environment, 
which is shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the community. This implies 
that community rights and the rights of fellow members place a corresponding 
obligation on a citizen, thereby shaping the abstract notion of individualism 
                                                          
164
  Ibid. 
165
  1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC). 
166
  On page 484. 
167
  Ibid. 
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towards identifying a concrete member of civil society. Privacy is acknowledged in 
the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into communal relations and 
activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal space 
shrinks accordingly.” 
 
This personal concept of the right to privacy is now known as the Bernstein 
“continuum” of privacy interests.
168
 With reference to the Bernstein case, the court 
held in Deutschmann, in the context of section 74D of the Act, that reliance on the 
Constitution was misplaced since the right to privacy does not extend to include the 
carrying on of business activities. On the facts of the Deutschmann case, the 
documents had been seized from the applicants’ business premises, and they could 
accordingly not rely on the right to privacy. 
 
However, in the case of Haynes v Commissioner for Inland Revenue,
169
 the court 
justifiably disagreed with these findings in the Deutschmann case that reliance on 
the Constitution was misplaced and that the concept of privacy does not extend to 
include the carrying on of business activities. Locke J in the Haynes case was of the 
view that reliance in the Deutschmann case on the Bernstein dicta was incorrect 
since the judge in Bernstein was dealing with wrongful intrusions of the right to 
privacy in terms of the common law when reference was made to the carrying on of 
business activities.
170
 The Bernstein case never held that the right to privacy in terms 
of the Constitution does not include the carrying on of business activities. Locke J 
quoted from numerous foreign cases where it was in fact held that the right to 
privacy is applicable to a home and business premises. Accordingly, even though it 
was held in the Deutschmann case that reliance on the constitution was misplaced, it 
is argued that the Deutschmann case should not be seen as section 74D’s 
constitutional assent to the right to privacy. The Haynes case pointed the 
deficiencies of the Deutschmann case out and a further constitutional analysis is still 
required. 
                                                          
168
  Cheadle, Davis & Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2009) 9.2.1. 
169
  64 SATC 321. 
170
  On page 339. 
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3 2 Application of the right to privacy   
It has been held by the Constitutional Court in the case of Investigating Directorate: 
Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and 
Others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and 
Others
171
 that the right to privacy is applicable to any person, therefore including 
juristic persons. In terms of section 8(4) of the Constitution, a juristic person is 
entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the 
rights and the nature of that juristic person. In the Hyundai case, the Constitutional 
Court referred to the Bernstein case, where it was decided that privacy concerns only 
the inner sanctum of a person. The court held in Hyundai that juristic persons are 
nevertheless bearers of the right to privacy, even though they are not the bearers of 
human dignity. Their privacy rights can never be as intense as those of human 
beings, but this does not mean that juristic persons are not protected by the right to 
privacy.
172
  
 
There is accordingly a fine line between a juristic person being a bearer of the right 
to privacy and the right to privacy being related to the very personal inner sanctum 
of a person. It seems clear, however, that a non-natural person taxpayer would still 
be a bearer of constitutional rights. 
 
3 3 The limitation of the right to privacy and search and seizure by warrant 
It is clear that the Commissioner prima facie violates the right to privacy of a person 
when a search and seizure operation is conducted since there is an infringement of 
the section 14 guaranteed right not to have one’s person or home searched, 
property searched or possessions seized. The question is however whether there can 
be a reasonable and justifiable limitation of the right to privacy in terms of section 
36(1) of the Constitution, which provides as follows: 
“The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an 
                                                          
171
  2000 (10) BCLR 1079 (CC) at par 17. 
172
  On page 1087-1088. 
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open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including   
a. the nature of the right;  
b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
c. the nature and extent of the limitation;  
d. the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
 
Olivier submits that “although the amended section [section 74D of the Act] clearly 
still infringes the right to privacy … it will in all likelihood fall within the scope of the 
general limitations clause”.
173
 She submits accordingly that section 74D of the Act 
should be constitutional since it constitutes a valid limitation of the right to privacy. 
 
Locke J furthermore held as follows in the Haynes case:
174
 
“Whilst in my view the provisions of s 74D constitute a reasonable limitation upon 
the rights provided for in ss 14 and 25 of the final Constitution, this would not 
constitute a reasonable limitation in respect of such entities where the 
Commissioner has at his disposal the remedies provided for by the Income Tax Act 
and the VAT Act in terms of s 74A and B and 57A and B respectively.” 
 
Accordingly, it was held in the Haynes case that section 74D of the Act is a 
reasonable limitation of the right to privacy, but only when the Commissioner has 
used the remedies available to him in terms of sections 74A and 74B of the Act. The 
interaction between section 74D of the Act and sections 74A and 74B is also 
discussed under 4 2 supra in chapter 3.  
 
According to Currie & De Waal the general rule for searches and seizures that violate 
the right to privacy, is that they must be authorised by a warrant and that the 
invasion of the right to privacy is only permissible to achieve compelling public 
objectives.
175
 It is helpful to consider cases where the constitutionality of warranted 
                                                          
173
  Olivier “The new search and seizure provisions of the Income Tax Act” 1997 (issue 350) De Rebus 
195 196. 
174
  On page 365. 
175
  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2005) 325. 
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search and seizure provisions in terms of other legislation was constitutionally 
challenged. Numerous other acts contain search and seizure provisions similar to 
those contained in the Act and the TAB.  
 
In the Hyundai case the, Constitutional Court declined to confirm the order of the 
High Court which declared certain provisions of the National Prosecuting Authority 
Act No 32 of 1998 (NPA Act) inconsistent with the Constitution and thus invalid. The 
provisions of the NPA Act under consideration were the granting of the power to an 
Investigating Director in the office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions to 
search and seize on authority of a warrant issued by a judge. The Constitutional 
court held that it was clear that the search and seizure provisions of the NPA Act 
constituted a limitation of the right to privacy, but what had to be determined was 
whether the limitation was constitutionally justifiable in terms of the limitation 
clause.
176
 For the purposes of this inquiry, the court had to ascertain the proper 
meaning of the relevant provisions of the NPA Act. The court concluded that there 
are considerable safeguards in the NPA Act to protect the right of privacy of 
individuals, which makes the scope of the limitation of the right to privacy narrow.
177
 
These safeguards were the following:
178
 
“The warrant could only be issued where the judicial officer had concluded that 
there was a reasonable suspicion that such an offence had been committed, that 
there were reasonable grounds to believe that objects connected with an 
investigation into that suspected offence might be found on the relevant 
premises, and in the exercise of his or her discretion, the judicial officer 
considered it appropriate to issue a search warrant.” 
 
The court also considered the purpose of the NPA Act to combat crime. The search 
and seizure provisions served an important purpose in the fight against crime, 
especially in South Africa, where it is a notorious fact that the rate of crime is very 
high.
179
  The court found that a balance must be struck between the interests of the 
individual and those of the State, and that this balance was achieved by the 
                                                          
176
  Par 20 of the Hyundai case.  
177
  Par 52 of the Hyundai case. 
178
  Ibid. 
179
  Par 53 of the Hyundai case. 
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safeguards as discussed above. The privacy right was not meant to shield criminal 
activity or to conceal evidence of crime from the criminal justice process.
180
  
 
The conclusion from this case is that a statute authorising a search and seizure on 
the authority of a warrant can be a justifiable limitation of the right to privacy, as 
long as there is a balance between the interests of the individual and those of the 
State. This balance can be struck by setting up objective standards that have to be 
met prior to the violation of the right, such as the safeguards in the NPA Act. 
 
Currie & Waal lay down the following rules in order for a law authorising a search 
and seizure to be constitutional in terms of the limitation clause:
181
  
“To comply with section 36, the authorising law must properly define the scope of 
the power to search and seize. Secondly, prior authorisation by an independent 
authority is usually required. Thirdly, the Act must require the independent 
authority to be persuaded by evidence on oath that there are reasonable grounds 
for conducting the search.”  
 
Davis & Steenkamp submit the following on the limitation of the right to privacy in 
the context of search and seizure:
 182
 
“The safeguards against an unjustified interference in the right to privacy include 
prior judicial authorisation and an objective standard – that is, whether there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has been or is likely to be 
committed; that the articles sought or seized may provide evidence of the 
commission of the offence; and that the articles are likely to be on the premises to 
be searched.” 
 
It seems that the warranted search and seizure provisions of the Act and the TAB are 
in compliance with the Hyundai case and the above quoted literature and 
accordingly constitutional. There are proper safeguards in place since a judge may 
only issue the warrant in terms of both the Act and the TAB when satisfied of certain 
aspects as specified in the search and seizure provisions in the Act and the TAB on 
                                                          
180
  Par 54 of the Hyundai case. 
181
  Currie & De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2005) 325. 
182
  Cheadle, Davis & Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2009) 9.6. 
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reasonable grounds. This must be supported by information supplied under oath in 
terms of both the Act and the TAB. An objective judicial discretion and prior 
authorisation is accordingly required. Furthermore, the scope of a search and seizure 
is clearly defined in section 74D(1) of the Act and clause 61 of the TAB. However, this 
is only applicable to warranted searches and seizures. It is for the very reason that an 
independent judge authorises the search and seizure that it is considered to be 
constitutional. Accordingly, the constitutionality of the warrantless provisions, where 
that judicial discretion is absent, should still be considered.  
 
3 4 The limitation of the right to privacy and warrantless search and seizure 
The above conclusion on the constitutionality of the warranted search and seizure 
provisions could lead in a different direction when considered in the context of a 
warrantless search and seizure as proposed in clause 63 of the TAB. Section 74D(5) 
of the Act and clause 62(1) of the TAB on the search of premises not identified in a 
warrant and section 74D(6) of the Act on the seizure of material not identified in a 
warrant could also fall under the analysis of the constitutionality of the warrantless 
search and seizure provisions.
183
 The cases of Park-Ross and Mistry are discussed 
under 2 3 3 supra in chapter 2 as part of the discussion on the constitutionality of the 
previous section 74(3) of the Act, which also permitted a warrantless search and 
seizure.   
 
It was held in the Park-Ross case that section 6 of the Serious Economic Offences Act 
No 117 of 1991, which empowered the Director of the Office for Serious Economic 
Offences to conduct a warrantless search and seizure, was unconstitutional. A similar 
conclusion was reached in the Mistry case where it was found that section 28(1) of 
the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act No 101 of 1965, which authorised 
inspectors to conduct warrantless searches of business premises, was 
unconstitutional. These cases accordingly indicate that a warrantless search and 
seizure may be unconstitutional under certain circumstances.  
 
                                                          
183
  The content of these sections of the Act and the TAB are discussed in chapter 2 supra under 3 5 
and 3 6. 
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Another case dealing with the constitutionality of warrantless search and seizure 
powers is the case of South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 
and Others.
184
 In this case, the applicant contended that certain subsections of 
section 6 of the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act No 74 of 1996 
infringed and limited the constitutional right to privacy guaranteed by section 14 of 
the Constitution. In terms of section 6 of the Special Investigating Units and Special 
Tribunals Act, the general principle is that a search warrant is required. However, in 
terms of section 6(6) of that Act, the powers of entry, search, attaching and removal 
can be exercised without a warrant if the person conducting the search, on 
reasonable grounds, believes that a warrant will be issued to him or her if he or she 
were to apply for such a warrant and that the delay in obtaining such a warrant 
would defeat the object of the entry and search. 
 
The High Court found in the Heath case that this section was constitutionally valid 
because the circumstances under which such a warrantless search and seizure could 
be conducted were narrowly defined. The Heath case went on appeal to the 
Constitutional Court where the Constitutional Court held there was no threat to the 
appellant or its members that the search and seizure powers will be used against 
them. There was accordingly no need for the Constitutional Court to deal with the 
challenge to the constitutionality of section 6 of the Special Investigating Units and 
Special Tribunals Act.
185
  
 
In the Heath case, the High Court distinguished the legislative provisions under 
consideration from those considered in the Mistry case. In the Mistry case, the 
legislation did not qualify the powers of entry, examination, search and seizure by 
inspectors of medicines. Inspectors could enter and search business premises 
without a warrant and without any satisfaction on reasonable grounds. The only 
requirement imposed by the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act No 101 
of 1965 is that the powers of search and seizure must be exercised at reasonable 
                                                          
184
  2000 (10) BCLR 1131 (T). 
185
  South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath and Others 2001 (1) BCLR 77 (CC) par 
[66]. 
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times and this was found to be insufficient to pass the constitutional test in the 
Mistry case.  
 
Of particular importance is the following part of the Constitutional Court’s dicta in 
the Mistry case:
186
  
“At the end of the day, the reasonableness and justifiability of the powers given to 
the inspectors will depend on the overall scheme of checks and balances put in 
place to regulate their authority. Such scheme would have to take account of the 
statutory and social context in which the inspectors would have to function and 
would include, where appropriate, independent prior authorisation. Thus, the 
failure to distinguish between the circumstances where such authorisation would 
be required and those where a warrantless regulatory inspection would be quite 
in order, is, in my view, a sufficiently material defect to undermine the scheme of 
section 28(1) as a whole.”  
 
It is clear from this quote that there must be a distinction between circumstances 
where prior judicial authorisation is required and those circumstances where a 
warrantless search and seizure would be permitted. The absence of this distinction, 
or the granting of “instant” warrantless powers, lead to the failure of the 
constitutional test in the Mistry case. On the other hand, in the Heath case, the 
circumstances were distinguished and a warrantless search and seizure could only be 
conducted if the person conducting the search, on reasonable grounds, believes that 
a warrant will be issued to him or her if he or she were to apply for such a warrant 
and that the delay in obtaining such a warrant would defeat the object of the entry 
and search. The general principle was that a warrant should be obtained, with 
provision for a warrantless search and seizure in certain exceptional circumstances. 
 
The Park-Ross case can also be distinguished from the Heath case in this regard. 
Section 6(1) of the Investigation of Serious Economic Offences Act No 117 of 1991 
only provided for a warrantless search and seizure, and was accordingly also an 
“instant” power where no provision was made to apply for a warrant. 
 
                                                          
186
  Par 28. 
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The respective constitutional findings in these cases can be summarised as follows:  
 
Table 5.1: Findings on the constitutionality of the legislative provisions under 
consideration in the Park-Ross, Mistry and Heath cases 
Case Infringement 
of the right 
to privacy? 
Reasonable 
limitation of 
the right to 
privacy? 
Finding and reasons 
Park-
Ross 
√ × The section under consideration was an 
unreasonable limitation to the right to privacy 
and therefore unconstitutional. It was a 
prerequisite for a reasonable search and seizure 
that the power to authorise such a search and 
seizure should be given to an impartial and 
independent judicial authority. The Director 
empowered in terms of the act under 
consideration cannot be an impartial arbiter to 
grant effective authorisation.  
Mistry √ × The extent of the invasion of privacy sanctioned 
by the act under consideration was 
disproportionate to its purpose, overbroad in its 
reach and thus invalid and unconstitutional. 
There were no safeguards in the Medicines and 
Related Substances Control Act, such as prior 
judicial authorisation, to limit the extent of the 
intrusion on the right to privacy. 
Heath  √ √ It was found that the section was 
constitutionally valid because the circumstances 
under which such a warrantless search and 
seizure could be conducted were narrowly 
defined, being consent or the reasonable 
grounds criterion as set out in section 6(6) of the 
act under consideration. 
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This table shows how our courts have dealt with search and seizure provisions in 
other cases and this serves as support for the findings made infra on the conclusion 
on the constitutionality of the warrantless search and seizure provisions of the TAB. 
 
3 5 Conclusion on the right to privacy and the warrantless provisions 
What is clear from the above is that the provisions under consideration in the Park-
Ross and Mistry cases granted “instant” warrantless powers without any form of 
judicial authorisation. There was no general requirement of or provision for a judicial 
warrant with exceptional circumstances in terms of which a warrantless search and 
seizure could take place, which is also how the previous section 74(3) of the Act 
operated. In the Park-Ross and Mistry cases, these “instant” powers were found to 
be an unreasonable limitation of the right to privacy. Accordingly, the conclusion was 
made in chapter 2 that the previous section 74(3) of the Act was unconstitutional. 
 
It is however submitted that the Heath case and the warrantless provisions of the 
TAB can be distinguished from the Park-Ross and Mistry cases and the previous 
section 74(3) of the Act. In terms of the TAB, the general rule is still that a warrant 
must be obtained. Only in exceptional circumstances can a search and seizure be 
conducted without a warrant.  
 
This is how warrantless provisions in other statutes are also worded. The provisions 
of the Criminal Procedure Act and the Competition Act (as discussed in chapter 4 
supra) also provide for the general rule of a judicially authorised warrant, with 
exceptional circumstances under which a warrantless search and seizure may be 
conducted. What has however not yet been decided by our courts in terms of the 
constitutionality of such warrantless provisions is exactly what the circumstances are 
under which such a warrantless search and seizure may be conducted in order to be 
a justifiable limitation of the right to privacy. The safeguards in the Competition Act 
which are not contained in clause 63 of the TAB include that an entry and search 
without a warrant may be carried out only during the day, unless doing it at night is 
justifiable and necessary in the circumstances, that the inspector must provide 
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identification before entering and searching and that the inspector must explain the 
authority on which the search is conducted.  
 
However, the warrantless provision accepted by the court in the Heath case only 
required a reasonable grounds satisfaction that a warrant will be issued if an 
application for such a warrant were made and that the delay in obtaining such a 
warrant would defeat the object of the entry and search. These two requirements 
must also be met in terms of section 63 of the TAB, but there is another reasonable 
ground satisfaction that must be met in terms of section 63 of the TAB, namely that 
there may be an imminent removal or destruction of relevant material likely to be 
found on the premises. Accordingly, section 63 of the TAB has an additional 
requirement in this regard when compared to what has been accepted by our courts 
in the Heath case. 
 
Furthermore, clause 63(3) of the TAB now explicitly provides that a SARS official may 
not enter a dwelling-house or domestic premises, except any part thereof used for 
purposes of trade, without the consent of the occupant. This is a safeguard included 
in the TAB, which is similarly found in the Competition Act, but which was not found 
in the statutes under consideration in the Park-Ross, Mistry or Heath cases. 
 
It is thus clear that the provisions in different acts authorising warrantless searches 
and seizures are not consistent. The warrantless provisions of the TAB are stricter 
than the one’s in the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act as 
accepted by our courts in the Heath case but less circumscribed in certain respects 
when compared to the warrantless provisions of the Competition Act. The 
warrantless search and seizure provisions of the Competition Act have not yet been 
constitutionally challenged. It seems however that the general principle of a 
warrantless search and seizure is not per se unconstitutional, but our courts will have 
to decided exactly what the circumstances are which allow for a warrantless search 
and seizure.   
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It has been argued that the new warrantless search and seizure provisions of the 
TAB, as any other warrantless provisions, do not have sufficient checks and balances 
in place.
187
 This is argued since the SARS, when contemplating a warrantless search 
and seizure, makes its own determination of whether the reasonable grounds 
criterion is satisfied. Accordingly, the SARS is required to objectively determine the 
reasonableness of its own view of the matter, which can give rise to difficulties.  
 
According to the legislature, the warrantless search and seizure provisions of the TAB 
are fully in accordance with the Constitution. The following is stated in the 2010 
Draft Memorandum on the Objects of the TAB:
188
  
“This power [referring to the warrantless search and seizure] is consistent with 
that found in other legislation in South Africa and has been reviewed and 
approved by the courts in that context. It should inter alia assist in tax base 
broadening and addressing the reality that tax evaders who, upon approach by 
SARS, waste no time in destroying all records and evidence of their fraudulent 
activities and details of income derived.” 
 
With reference to the Park-Ross case, it is furthermore argued by Williams that 
“there are differences in the respective objectives of the Serious Economic Offences 
Act and the Income Tax Act.”
189
 This relates to the above statement made in the 
2010 Draft Memorandum on the Objects of the TAB which explains what the 
purpose or objective of the warrantless provisions of the TAB is. The purpose of the 
NPA Act to combat crime was an important consideration in the Hyundai case and it 
is accordingly submitted that the purpose of section 63 of the TAB to curb tax 
evasion could outweigh the right to privacy in certain circumstances. It will however 
be for our courts to decide exactly which circumstances would justify a limitation of 
this fundamental right.   
 
                                                          
187
  Gad & Bovijn New Tax Administration Bill introduces new search and seizure provisions (2011) 
http://www.ens.co.za/newsletter/briefs/taxMay11newTax.html (accessed 29 May 2011). 
188
  Draft Memorandum on the Objects of the TAB (2010) page 12 http:// 
www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=52833 (accessed 6 November 2010). 
189
  Williams “Taxpayers’ rights in South Africa” 1997 (vol 7 issue 2) Revenue Law Journal 1 14. 
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4 Conclusion  
It is concluded, based on case law and academic writing, that the warranted search 
and seizure provisions of the Act and the TAB should be constitutionally valid. The 
independent authorisation from a judge when a warrant is issued is a sufficient 
safeguard and accordingly justifies a limitation of the right to privacy. 
 
The constitutionality of the new warrantless provisions of the TAB is however not 
beyond doubt. The fact that no “instant” warrantless powers are granted tends to 
lead to a conclusion that the provisions could be constitutionally valid. However, the 
courts will have to consider the purpose of the TAB and a determination will have to 
be made whether the circumstances under which such a warrantless operation may 
be conducted are defined narrowly enough. There is no standard test from the case 
law to be applied in order to determine the constitutionality of warrantless search 
and seizure provisions.  
 
Even though it may be found that the search and seizure provisions of the Act and 
the TAB are constitutionally valid, the conduct of the SARS officials when conducting 
such a search and seizure, whether in terms of a warrant or warrantless, must still be 
in compliance with the Constitution. It is therefore important to distinguish the 
statute which authorises a search and seizure from the actual conduct that took 
place. It is argued by Goldswain that “the revenue authorities must be very 
circumspect in their conduct, which is still subject to an individual’s rights in terms of 
the Constitution”.
190
  
 
Accordingly, should the provisions of the Act and the TAB be found to be 
constitutional, it might not be the end of the constitutional battle which can be 
fought by a taxpayer as it is still required from the SARS to conduct its search and 
seizure operations in compliance with the Constitution. 
 
                                                          
190
  Goldswain “Special or unusual defences or ‘extenuating circumstances’ that may be pleaded for 
the purposes of remission of penalties in income tax matters” 2003 (vol 11) 45 56. 
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Apart from a breach of constitutional rights, SARS’ search and seizure powers could 
lead to other types of harm or injustice to taxpayers. The next chapter analyses, inter 
alia, the rights available to a taxpayer who has been subject to either a warranted or 
warrantless search and seizure in terms of the Act or the TAB. 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the stage after a search and seizure has been conducted. It 
analyses the rights and duties of the SARS after a search and seizure and the 
remedies available to a taxpayer who has been subject to either a warranted or a 
warrantless search and seizure. These remedies are critically evaluated in order to 
determine whether any injustice that has been suffered by an aggrieved taxpayer 
can be made undone or could have been prevented. The problem relating to the 
remedies available to a taxpayer who has been subject to a search and seizure is 
twofold: what are the remedies and are those remedies sufficient? 
 
2 The rights and duties of the SARS after a search and seizure 
2 1 Introduction 
In terms of the Act and the TAB, the SARS and its officials have certain rights and 
duties after they have exercised their search and seizure powers. They have the right 
to retain the material seized, but they also have the duty to take reasonable care 
when retaining the material and to preserve the material.   
 
2 2 Preservation and retention of the seized material 
The Act and the TAB have certain provisions regarding the preservation and 
retention of the material seized. The relevant provisions read and compare as 
follows: 
Section 74D(8) of the Act:   The 
Commissioner, who shall take 
reasonable care to ensure that the 
information, documents or things 
are preserved, may retain them 
until the conclusion of any 
investigation into the non-
compliance or offence in relation to 
which the information, documents 
or things were seized or until they 
are required to be used for the 
Clause 61(9) of the TAB: If the SARS 
official seizes relevant material, the 
official must ensure that the 
relevant material seized is 
preserved and retained until it is no 
longer required for—  
(a) the investigation into the 
 non-compliance or the 
 offence described under 
 clause 60(1)(a); or  
(b) the conclusion of any legal 
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The same principle on the preservation and retention of the seized material still 
applies under the TAB, but the wording is somewhat different. There is no mention 
in clause 61(9) of the TAB of whichever event occurs last as used in section 74D(8) of 
the Act but the words until it is no longer required for in clause 61(9) of the TAB 
combined with the word or between the two options could have the same effect. 
When, for example, the investigation is completed but the legal proceedings are still 
running, section 74D(8) of the Act allows the SARS to retain the material until no 
longer required to be used for the legal proceedings under the Act as this would be 
the last event to occur. Similarly, in terms of clause 61(9) of the TAB, they could also 
be retained until no longer required for the conclusion of any legal proceedings 
under a tax Act.  
 
Another difference in this regard is that the TAB now allows that the relevant 
material seized may be retained until it is no longer required for criminal 
proceedings in which it is required to be used. This is a new ground on which the 
material may be retained by the SARS. It is however odd to grant this retention to 
the SARS since they are not the ones who would prosecute and thus use the material 
for the criminal proceedings. Clause 61(9) of the TAB could however also be read to 
mean that the SARS must hand the material over to the State for the criminal 
proceedings and that it can thus, in general, be kept until it is no longer required for 
those criminal proceedings. There is no literature or comments available on this 
specific aspect of the TAB but it is submitted that the right of the SARS to retain the 
relevant material for criminal proceedings is somewhat strange.  
   
2 3 Reasonable care  
Section 74D(8) of the Act requires that the Commissioner shall take reasonable care 
to ensure that the information, documents or things are preserved. In the case of 
purposes of any legal proceedings 
under this Act, whichever event 
occurs last. 
 
 proceedings under a tax Act 
 or criminal proceedings in 
 which it is required to be 
 used.  
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Haynes v Commissioner for Inland Revenue,
191
 it was held by Locke J that this part of 
section 74D(8) of the Act entails the following:
192
  
“In spite of these very wide definitions, it is in my view required of the 
Commissioner to ensure that detailed inventories are taken of each and every 
‘document’ or ‘thing’, or ‘information’ seized. The Commissioner is required to 
sufficiently identify each and every page of every document seized, to identify 
with precise description what data has been seized, and to identify with sufficient 
description each corporeal or incorporeal thing seized. … Obviously if documents 
are contained by way of a bound book it would not be necessary to identify each 
and every page but each document held as part of a loose-leaf system would have 
to be so identified. In the  absence thereof, the Commissioner would simply not be 
able to take reasonable care to ensure that such information, documents or things 
are preserved as required by s 74D(8). Such a detailed inventory prepared in the 
presence of the taxpayer and countersigned by the taxpayer would obviate any 
disputes thereinafter as to the preservation of the documents, information or 
things seized. It follows as a consequence that copies of the inventory made 
should be handed to the taxpayer.” 
 
The preservation part of section 74D(8) of the Act has thus been interpreted widely, 
even though the Act only required that the Commissioner shall take reasonable care 
to ensure that the information, documents and things are preserved. The TAB now 
contains a new provision regarding the making of an inventory. Clause 61(4) of the 
TAB now provides as follows:  
“The SARS official must make an inventory of the relevant material seized in the 
form, manner and at the time that is reasonable under the circumstances and 
provide a copy thereof to the person.”  
 
This has been described in the Draft Memorandum on the Objects of the TAB as 
“affording further protection of taxpayers subjected to a search and seizure”.
193
 
Exactly what is meant by “in the form, manner and at the time that is reasonable 
under the circumstances” is not yet known and will have to be decided by a court 
                                                          
191
  64 SATC 321. 
192
  On pages 365-366.  
193
  http://www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=52833 (accessed 6 November 2010), p 14 of the 2010 
Memorandum. 
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when dealing with this duty of the SARS to make an inventory. The Haynes 
judgement was very specific in its requirements of the making of an inventory 
whereas clause 61(4) of the TAB can be construed less strict. However, it is 
submitted that clause 61(4) of the TAB is a movement in the direction of the Haynes 
judgement which requires more diligence and painstaking conduct from the SARS 
when searching and seizing.  
 
3 The remedies of a taxpayer 
3 1 Introduction 
Apart from the above duties of the SARS (to, inter alia, keep an inventory and to 
preserve the seized material with reasonable care), a taxpayer should have certain 
other remedies at its disposal after a search and seizure has been conducted. Some 
questions that spring to mind when a taxpayer has been subject to a search and 
seizure could be the following: 
 When can the taxpayer get the seized material back and how? 
 What if the taxpayer needs the material urgently to e.g. ensure continuance 
of his or her business? 
 What if the taxpayer has suffered damage due to the search and seizure?
 What if the taxpayer needs access to the seized material when a case is 
pending against him? 
 
It is thus clear that legislation needs to protect a taxpayer who has been subject to a 
search and seizure. This protection is included in both the Act and/or the TAB and 
relates to the following: 
 the return of the seized material; 
 the right to examine and make copies; 
 the costs of damages; and 
 the office of the Tax Ombud. 
 
These remedies, as well as other remedies not explicitly contained in the Act and/or 
the TAB will now be discussed in more detail. 
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3 2 The return of the seized material  
In terms of the Act and the TAB, there are remedies available to a taxpayer for the 
return of the seized material. These remedies are contained in section 74D(9) of the 
Act and clause 66 of the TAB and these provisions read and compare as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 74D(9) of the Act:    
(a)  Any person may apply to 
 the relevant division of the 
 High Court for the return of 
 any information, 
 documents or things seized 
 under this section. 
(b)  The court hearing such 
 application may, on good 
 cause shown, make such 
 order as it deems fit. 
 
Clause 66 of the TAB:  
(1) A person may request SARS 
 to—  
 (a) return some or all of the 
 seized material; or  
 (b) pay the costs of physical 
 damage caused during the 
 conduct of a search and 
 seizure.  
(2) If SARS refuses the request, 
 the person may apply to a 
 High Court for the return of 
 the seized material or 
 payment of compensation 
 for physical damage caused 
 during the conduct of the 
 search and seizure.  
(3)  The court may, on good 
 cause shown, make the 
 order as it deems fit.  
(4)  If the court sets aside the 
 warrant issued in terms of 
 clause 60(1) or orders the 
 return of the seized 
 material, the court may 
 nevertheless authorise 
 SARS to retain the original 
 or a copy of any relevant 
 material in the interests of 
 justice. 
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Paragraph (a) of section 74D(9) of the Act was amended by section 38 of the 
Revenue Laws Amendment Act No 53 of 1999. The effect thereof is however 
insignificant as the amendment made was only the substitution of the words 
Supreme Court with the words High Court in accordance with the renaming of the 
Supreme Courts in South Africa to High Courts.  
 
It is clear from the length of the above quoted provisions that this aspect is now 
regulated more fully and in more detail in the TAB. The TAB now provides that a 
person must first request the SARS for the return of the relevant material before an 
application for such a return can be made to the High Court. There was no similar 
provision in the Act but it is argued that a person who wants the seized material back 
would in any case have requested the SARS first for such return before going to 
court. It is however clear in terms of the TAB that it is now a prerequisite in terms of 
clause 66(2) of the TAB that the SARS must have refused the request for the return 
before an application may be made to the High Court.   
 
An application for the return of material seized was made in the case of 
Deutschmann NO and Others; Shelton v Commissioner for the SARS.
194
 Two separate 
applications were dealt with in one judgment as the issues required to be decided 
were substantially the same. Two warrants for search and seizure had been 
authorised by judges against the applicants in terms of section 74D of the Act. The 
aforementioned warrants resulted in the seizure of a considerable amount of 
documents and information from the applicants’ business premises. The applicants 
thereafter made application to the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court for, inter 
alia, return of all material seized and certain ancillary relief. They also applied to 
have these warrants declared null and void ab initio, or alternatively for an order 
directing that they (specifically in the case of Deutschmann) be set aside. The 
seizures, they alleged, had negatively impacted on the proper running of their 
business causing them to suffer prejudice thereby. 
  
                                                          
194
  62 SATC 191. 
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However, both applications were dismissed since the applicants had failed to show 
good cause for the return of the information, documents and things seized in terms 
of the warrants. The court did not deal with the content of section 74D(9) of the Act 
in any detail but came to the conclusion that the applicants failed to show good 
cause since they failed to establish that the warrants were improperly sought and 
obtained.  
 
Shelton appealed and the SCA dealt with section 74D(9) of the Act in more detail in 
the case of Shelton v Commissioner for SARS.
195
 Counsel for the appellant submitted 
that a good cause was established in that:
196
 
 the application for a warrant did not comply with section 74D(2) of Act;  
 material facts were not disclosed to the judge who issued the warrant; 
 the application for the warrant was fatally defective; 
 the warrant itself was fatally defective; and 
 the execution of the warrant was irregular.  
 
The SCA decided that the legislature clearly intended to confer a wide discretion on a 
court dealing with an application for an order under section 74D(9) of the Act since 
the Act does not in any way specify what would constitute a good cause.
197
 The court 
then considered each of the above listed arguments of the appellant and rejected all 
of them. The taxpayer was thus once again not successful with his application for the 
return of the material seized.  
 
It seems, however, from this dictum that should one of the above listed arguments 
have succeeded, it could have established a good cause and it could thus justify the 
return of the material seized. It is also argued that it is clear from this judgement 
that a person who applies for the return of the seized material in terms of section 
74D(9)(a) of the Act has to show a good cause since the court hearing such 
application (referring to the application for the return) may, on good cause shown, 
make such order as it deems fit. It is also clear from the court a quo judgement and 
                                                          
195
  64 SATC 179. 
196
  On page 184. 
197
  Ibid. 
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from the judgement of the SCA that the courts will not easily grant an order for the 
return of the documents. It seems that there need to be serious shortcomings in the 
application for the warrant, the issuance thereof or the execution of the warrant.   
 
Even though it seems that our courts interpreted section 74D(9) of the Act more 
narrow in the Shelton cases and also rejected the application for the return of the 
seized material, this approach is not necessarily decisive. In the case of Ferela (Pty) 
Ltd and others v CIR,
198
 it was held that the legislature provided the mechanism in 
section 74D(9) of the Act by means of which any injustice or hardship caused by the 
draconian procedure of section 74D(1) of the Act may be corrected.
199
 The court 
further held that section 74D(9) of the Act gives the High Court power to reverse the 
effect of a warrant issued, in toto.
200
 The court held the following regarding the 
phrase make such order as it deems fit:
201
  
“It therefore empowers the court to grant such further relief as may be 
appropriate, which would obviously include an order for costs. It could of course 
order other relief as well, such as the retention of copies by the Commissioner. It 
is not necessary for me to speculate on all the types of grounds on which s 74D(9) 
could be invoked. Grounds that spring to mind are: if a party concerned needs any 
documents that have been seized; if the documents seized do not have any 
bearing on the affairs of a taxpayer; if the documents seized are not covered by 
the warrant and also if the warrant is deficient or if it should not have been 
obtained.” 
 
Another case in which the court addressed section 74D(9) of the Act and the setting 
aside of a warrant is the case of Ferucci and Others v Commissioner for SARS and 
Another.
202
  In this case, the court agreed with the above quoted passage from the 
Ferela case and added the following:
203
 
“It is perhaps necessary to elaborate on the one aspect raised by him [referring to 
the dictum of Botha J in the Ferela case], namely that a warrant can, in 
                                                          
198
  60 SATC 513. 
199
  On page 524. 
200
  Ibid. 
201
  On page 525. 
202
  2002 (6) SA 219 (C). 
203
  On page 11. 
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appropriate circumstances, be set aside on the grounds that it should not have 
been obtained. It must be borne in mind that a warrant is issued as part of an 
investigation against the taxpayer which will frequently result in criminal or civil 
proceedings. The taxpayer may, in seeking to have the effect of a warrant 
reversed in terms of section 74D(9), or the equivalent provision in the VAT Act, 
raise all manner of exculpatory and other explanations in regard to the material 
which has been put up by the Commissioner, when applying for the warrant. A 
number of factual disputes may be created in relation to the averments raised by 
the Commissioner. It cannot be the function of the Court, when determining an 
application for the setting aside of a warrant under section 74D(9) or an 
application for the return of documentation, to decide on the correctness or 
otherwise of such factual issues. That is a task reserved for the court dealing in 
due course with the criminal or civil proceedings which may be instituted against 
the taxpayer.” 
 
The court then held that when dealing with an application under section 74D(9) of 
the Act, all the court needs to do is to satisfy itself, as does the judge issuing the 
warrant, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that there has been a non-
compliance by any person of his obligations or an offence committed under the Act, 
and that information, documents or things affording evidence of such non-
compliance or offence are likely to be found at the premises specified in the warrant. 
Accordingly, if the court is not so satisfied, that may constitute a ground for setting 
aside the warrant.
204
 
 
It was thus decided in the Ferucci case that the court, when dealing with an 
application under section 74D(9) of the Act, has to place itself in the shoes of the 
judge who initially authorised the warrant. If all the requirements that the judge had 
to be satisfied with were met at that time, there would be no need to set the 
warrant aside in terms of section 74D(9) of the Act. 
 
It is argued that the above dicta on section 74D(9) of the Act will equally apply to 
clauses 66(2) and (3) of the TAB. The TAB provides, exactly the same as in the Act, 
                                                          
204
  Ibid. 
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that an application to a High Court for the return of the seized material can be made 
and that the court may, on good cause shown, make the order as it deems fit.
205
 The 
only prerequisite in terms of the TAB is that a request must first be made to the SARS 
for the return before the application can be brought to the High Court.
206
 
 
One aspect which might not be fair towards the taxpayer in this regard is that the 
TAB still provides that the order for the return of the seized material must be 
brought to the High Court. However, the SARS can now bring the application for a 
warrant to search and seize to a magistrate in terms of clause 59(3) of the TAB. 
When the SARS obtained the warrant from a Magistrates Court and the taxpayer 
now wants to exercise his rights in terms of clause 66(2) of the TAB based on that 
warrant, he has to bring such application to a High Court. There is thus no equality in 
this regard between the SARS and the taxpayer and this will be at the taxpayer’s 
disadvantage as the procedure, time and costs of bringing an application to the High 
Court is more comprehensive than bringing it to a Magistrates Court.    
 
Clause 66(4) of the TAB is a new provision and provides that if the court sets aside 
the warrant or orders the return of the seized material, the court may nevertheless 
authorise the SARS to retain the original or a copy of any relevant material in the 
interests of justice. There seems to be a discrepancy in this clause. How could the 
court order the return of the seized material on the one hand, and then also 
authorise the SARS to retain the original? It is submitted that clause 66(4) of the TAB 
should read that the court may nevertheless authorise SARS to retain a copy of any 
relevant material. The court can thus order that the original material should be 
returned but that the SARS could retain a copy should that be in the interests of 
justice. Exactly what would constitute in the interests of justice in this regard would 
still have to be decided by our courts.  
 
                                                          
205
  Clause 66(2) and (3) of the TAB. 
206
  Clause 66(1)(a) of the TAB. 
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3 3 The right to examine and make copies 
Section 74D(10) of the Act and clause 65 of the TAB relate to the right to examine 
the seized material and make copies thereof. These provisions read and compare as 
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Act and the TAB remain the same in the sense that a person to whose affairs any 
material seized relates may examine and copy such material. This may be done 
during normal business hours and under supervision as determined by the 
Commissioner or a senior SARS official.  The only difference in this regard is that the 
Act provides that the copies are made at the expense of the State whereas the TAB 
now provides that the copies will be made at the person’s cost. This change will 
bring the TAB in line with the Promotion of Access to Information Act No 2 of 2000 
Section 74D(10) of the Act:  
The person to whose affairs any 
information, documents or things 
seized under this section relate, 
may examine and make extracts 
therefrom and obtain one copy 
thereof at the expense of the State 
during normal business hours under 
such supervision as the 
Commissioner may determine. 
 
Clause 65 of the TAB:  
(1) The person to whose affairs 
 relevant material seized 
 relates may examine and 
 copy it.  
(2) Examination and copying 
 must be made—  
 (a) at the person’s cost in 
 accordance with the fees 
 prescribed in accordance 
 with section 92(1)(b) of the 
 Promotion of Access to 
 Information Act;  
 (b) during normal business 
 hours; and  
 (c) under the supervision 
 determined by a senior 
 SARS official.  
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which also requires that the fees must be paid by the requestor of the 
information.
207
 
 
3 4 Damages 
This remedy relates to the following question: If the taxpayer has suffered damage 
due to the search and seizure, does he have a claim for damages against the SARS?  
A few types of damage that could result from a search and seizure conducted by the 
SARS are the following:  
 physical damage to property from forced entry or while conducting the 
search; 
 loss of income due to e.g. the seizure of a computer; and 
 damage to the good name or reputation of a business.  
 
The Act does not contain any provisions on damages but this position is different 
under the TAB. Furthermore, the position under the first, second and third drafts of 
the TAB is also different and requires being distinguished.  
 
3 4 1 Damages under the first draft of the TAB 
Clause 53(7) of the first draft of the TAB provided that the official and SARS are not 
liable for damage to property necessitated by reason of the search. There was thus a 
clear exclusion of liability when the SARS officials caused damage to property when 
conducting the search.  
 
The question is, however, whether legislation can exclude liability for damage 
caused. It is a general principle in the Law of Damages that legislation may define 
damage in such way that some forms of harm are excluded.
208
 It means that a claim 
for damages from certain people or bodies can be excluded by legislation.
209
 Such 
exclusion is often found in legislation and this is exactly what the legislature has 
done in the first draft of the TAB: damage to property, which is a form of harm, is 
                                                          
207
  Section 22(1) of the Promotion of Access to Information Act. 
208
  Erasmus & Gauntlett Damages (2010) par 10. 
209
  Visser & Potgieter Skadevergoedingsreg (2003) 257. 
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excluded and this seems to be an acceptable exclusion in terms of the Law of 
Damages.  It means that a taxpayer would thus not be able to claim for damage to 
property necessitated by reason of the search by the SARS under the first draft of 
the TAB.   
 
3 4 2 Damages under the second draft of the TAB 
The second draft of the TAB also provided in clause 61(8) that the SARS official and 
SARS are not liable for damage to property necessitated by reason of the search. This 
is thus exactly the same as under the first draft of the TAB. However, clause 66(1)(b) 
of the second draft of the TAB explicitly provided that a person may request SARS to 
pay the costs of physical damage caused during the conduct of a search and seizure. 
Furthermore, clause 66(2) of the second draft provided that if SARS refuses the 
request, the person may apply to a High Court for the compensation for physical 
damage caused during the conduct of the search and seizure. There were no such 
remedies in the first draft of the TAB.  
 
Accordingly, clause 61(8) excludes liability for damage to property necessitated by 
reason of the search, whereas clause 66(1)(b) provides that a person may request 
SARS to pay the costs of physical damage caused during the conduct of a search and 
seizure. This might seem like some kind of inconsistency in the second draft of the 
TAB between the exclusion of liability for damage to property on the one hand and 
the granting of a claim for physical damage on the other hand.  
 
It is argued that there are a few possible explanations for this inconsistency. Firstly it 
could mean that reference to damage to property in clause 61(8) is not the same as 
physical damage as used in clause 66(1)(b) of the second draft of the TAB. It would 
then mean that a taxpayer would have a claim for physical damage but not for 
damage to property. This is however unlikely since it is argued that damage to 
property would be included in physical damage, which is a broader term. The term 
physical damage to property is used in the Law of Damages which also shows that 
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physical damage and damage to property would be the same.
210
 It is therefore 
argued that it is not likely that the legislature intended to exclude liability for 
damage to property and to also grant a claim for physical damage.  
 
The second explanation for this inconsistency is that there was an oversight in the 
drafting of the second draft of the TAB by not removing the exclusion of liability. This 
would mean that clause 61(8) of the second draft of the TAB can be ignored and 
should have been removed when the legislature inserted the claim for physical 
damage in clause 66(1)(b). However, as shown below under 3 4 3, it is not likely that 
this was an oversight in the second draft of the TAB as similar clauses remained in 
the third draft of the TAB. 
 
The writer was informed by Dr Beric Croome,
211
 who attended workshops on the 
TAB, that the SARS is not prepared to pay costs where a taxpayer, say, refuses to 
open a safe and the SARS forces it open, causing damage. Hence the exclusion of 
liability in clause 61(8) of the TAB.  It seems like the word necessitated is of particular 
importance in this regard. The SARS is not liable for damage to property necessitated 
by reason of the search. Necessitated is defined in the Oxford English dictionary as 
“made necessary or unavoidable; necessarily fixed, determined, or appointed”. 
Accordingly, damage caused which was necessary or unavoidably cannot be claimed 
from the SARS in terms of clause 61(8) of the TAB. 
 
However, according to Dr Beric Croome, where the SARS, for example, interferes 
with the taxpayer’s computer system and causes loss of data, the SARS should be 
liable for this consequential damage suffered. This would not constitute damage 
necessitated by reason of the search and damages could be claimed in terms of 
clause 66(1)(b) of the TAB. In terms of this clause, the person may then request SARS 
to pay the costs of physical damage caused during the conduct of a search and 
seizure and if the SARS refuses the request, the person may apply to a High Court for 
                                                          
210
  Erasmus & Gauntlett Damages (2010) par 13. 
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  Dr Beric Croome is an executive at Edward Nathan Sonnenbergs. 
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the compensation for physical damage caused during the conduct of the search and 
seizure. 
 
It seems accordingly that clauses 61(8) and 66(1)(b) of the second draft of the TAB 
could be read together. What would actually be included in a claim for physical 
damage is analysed below under 3 4 4. 
 
3 4 3 Damages under the third draft of the TAB 
Clause 66(1)(b) of the second draft remained exactly the same under the third draft, 
i.e. a person may request SARS to pay the costs of physical damage caused during 
the conduct of a search and seizure. However, clause 61(8) of the second and third 
drafts, respectively, provided as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is clear from the above that the words subject to section 66 were inserted in clause 
61(8). This means that, in terms of clause 61(8), the SARS official and SARS are not 
liable for damage to property necessitated by reason of the search but that a person 
may still request SARS to pay the costs of physical damage caused during the 
conduct of a search and seizure in terms of clause 66(1)(b). It is argued that this now 
brings the two clauses regarding damages more into harmony. However, what would 
actually be included in a claim for physical damage in terms of clause 66(1)(b) of the 
TAB? 
 
3 4 4 Physical damage 
In terms of the Law of Damages there is a clear difference between physical damage 
(which is saakskade in Afrikaans) and pure economic loss.
212
  Physical damage relates 
                                                          
212
  Visser & Potgieter Skadevergoedingsreg (2003) 60. 
Clause 61(8) of the second draft if 
the TAB:  
The SARS official and SARS are not 
liable for damage to property 
necessitated by reason of the 
search. 
Clause 61(8) of the third draft of the 
TAB:  
Subject to clause 66, the SARS 
official and SARS are not liable for 
damage to property necessitated by 
reason of the search. 
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to the physical harm of a thing. On the contrary, pure economic loss does not relate 
to the damage of a thing, it is a damage which takes the form of e.g. loss of 
income.
213
  
 
The TAB provides for a claim for physical damage in clause 66(1)(b), which would 
thus include damage to a thing or damage to property. It is argued that this would 
include damage which results from e.g. forced entry or from force used while 
conducting the search which was not necessitated by reason of the search.  
 
A few other types of damage that could result from a search and seizure conducted 
by the SARS, as listed above, are the loss of income due to e.g. the seizure of a 
computer, or damage to the good name or reputation of a business. This would, 
however, fall under pure economic loss. This would not be claimable under clause 
66(1)(b) of the TAB as that clause only allows for a claim for physical damage. In 
terms of clause 61(8) of the TAB, the SARS official and SARS are not liable for damage 
to property necessitated by reason of the search. There is accordingly no exclusion 
for a claim of pure economic loss (only damage to property necessitated by reason 
of the search is excluded) and there could be a claim for pure economic loss in terms 
of the Law of Damages. 
 
The general principle for such a claim is that the culprit must have committed a 
delict.
214
 A delict is an unlawful act which requires conduct, wrongfulness, fault, 
causation and damage.
215
 These elements and the Law of Delict will however not be 
further discussed as this detail is beyond the scope of this thesis. Reference was 
made to a delict to illustrate that should the requirements of a delict be met by 
unlawful conduct of the SARS, there could be a claim for pure economic loss even 
though this was not explicitly provided for in the TAB. 
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3 4 5 Conclusion on damages 
Even though the Act does not provide for a claim for damage caused during a search 
and seizure, or provides for the specific exclusion thereof, it is submitted that such a 
claim is available under the Act in terms of the Law of Damages, when a delict is 
committed.  Specific provision is however now made in the TAB for a claim for 
physical damage, with the exclusion of damage to property necessitated by reason 
of the search. It was concluded that a claim for pure economic loss would 
furthermore be available to a taxpayer suffering such loss from a search and seizure 
operation. 
 
3 5 The Office of the Tax Ombud 
The TAB has now also introduced a new concept of an independent office of the Tax 
Ombud. Clauses 15 to 21 of the TAB regulate the office of the Tax Ombud and 
according to the Draft Memorandum on the Objects of the TAB (2010) the office of 
the Tax Ombud should “provide accessible and affordable remedies for taxpayers 
affected by non-adherence to procedures or failure to respect taxpayers‘ rights”.
216
 
This means that the Tax Ombud will be a haven for taxpayers who have been 
exposed to conduct of the SARS which is not in compliance with the law.  
 
The Minister must appoint the Tax Ombud in terms of clause 14 of the TAB and this 
will thus ensure that the Tax Ombud is independent from the SARS.
217
 
 
One of the objectives of the Tax Ombud is to “achieve a balance between SARS‘ 
powers and duties and taxpayer obligations, remedies and rights”,
218
 and that is 
exactly what needs to be achieved by a search and seizure. The SARS needs the right 
to search and seize to carry out its tasks and duties, but on the other hand, a 
taxpayer needs protection of his or her rights. A taxpayer furthermore needs 
remedies to make any injustice that has been suffered undone or could have been 
prevented.  It is thus the object of the Tax Ombud to achieve a balance between the 
interests of the different parties involved. 
                                                          
216
  http:// www.sars.gov.za/home.asp?pid=52833 (accessed 6 November 2010) page 8. 
217
  Ibid page 8. 
218
  Ibid page 8. 
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Clause 16(1) of the TAB describes the mandate of the Tax Ombud as follows:  
“The mandate of the Tax Ombud is to, subject to section 18(4), review and address 
any complaint by a taxpayer regarding a service matter or a procedural or 
administrative matter arising from the application of the provisions of a tax Act by 
SARS.” 
 
It seems that this new Tax Ombud could thus be a counter balance regarding the 
search and seizure powers of the TAB. It is clear from the above mandate that the 
Tax Ombud would review and address a complaint made by a taxpayer regarding a 
search and seizure conducted by the SARS. The complaint would relate to a 
procedural matter, namely the procedure of search and seizure, arising from the 
application of the provisions of a tax Act, namely the search and seizure provisions of 
the TAB.   
 
The above mandate of clause 16(1) of the TAB was however qualified in the Draft 
Memorandum on the Objects of the TAB (2010):
219
  
“The mandate of the Tax Ombud will be to review and address any complaint by a 
taxpayer regarding a service matter or a procedural or administrative matter 
arising from the application of the provisions of a tax Act by SARS, generally only 
after the taxpayer has exhausted the available complaints resolution mechanisms 
within SARS.” (Own italics).  
 
This means that a taxpayer would first have to consult with the SARS before the Tax 
Ombud can be approached for help. The Tax Ombud will thus serve as a middle man 
in a dispute with the SARS and the position of the Tax Ombud in the tax system was 
described as follows in the Draft Memorandum on the Objects of the TAB (2010):
220
 
“An independent Tax Ombud will fill a gap in the mechanism that currently exists 
between SARS‘ internal processes and access to the normal court system.” 
 
However, there is currently no such independent Tax Ombud and thus no 
independent authority, apart from the courts, where a taxpayer could go when any 
                                                          
219
  Ibid Page 9. 
220
  Ibid Page 8. 
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harm or injustice was suffered. The development in this regard is thus welcome and 
positive in the light of the rights of a taxpayer.  
 
3 6 Access to the court file 
In the Ferela case, the applicants became aware of the issuance of a warrant against 
them and they then attempted to obtain a copy of the application for the warrant. 
They were however informed, on the instructions of the Commissioner, that they 
were not to be allowed access to the court file. They then applied for an order to 
grant them access to the court file. The court held that section 4 of the Act, which is 
on the preservation of secrecy, was not applicable as section 4 of the Act clearly 
“protects taxpayers against other parties gathering information about their 
information from the taxman”.
221
 That section is thus not applicable when the 
taxpayer himself wants to gather information. The court however also held that 
there could be reasons in a particular case why the contents of a file in an 
application for a warrant have to be withheld from the parties affected by it, but in 
this case there were no such reasons.
222
 The court further held that the applicants 
were entitled in terms of section 32(1) of the Constitution, which is the right to 
access to information, to have access to the file in order to exercise their rights in 
relation to the warrant. The applicants were entitled to consider the authenticity, 
validity and ambit of the warrant and they were entitled to consider what steps they 
could take to have its effect undone.  
 
Accordingly, another remedy is available to a taxpayer, originating from section 32(1) 
of the Constitution, which is not specifically provided for in the Act or the TAB. It 
allows a taxpayer access to the court file, which the file applicable to the application 
for the warrant, when an application for a search and seizure was made by the SARS. 
The taxpayer can then gather information from the court file which he might need 
when deciding what steps he should take. 
                                                          
221
  On page 522. 
222
  Ibid. 
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4  Conclusion  
This chapter addressed the rights and duties of the SARS after a search and seizure 
on the one hand and the remedies available to a taxpayer on the other hand. It is 
concluded that the remedies should indeed be sufficient. This is especially true with 
the advent of the new independent Tax Ombud. Some remedies are contained 
expressly in the Act and the TAB, e.g the right to examine and make copies in terms 
of section 74D(10) of the Act and clause 65 of the TAB, whereas other remedies 
originate from the Constitution, e.g. access to the court file. There are thus different 
sources of remedies. 
 
It is however acknowledged that there are seemingly no remedies available to a 
taxpayer to prevent injustice or harm. All the available remedies relate to the 
position after the harm has been done and they are available to undo or to balance 
the injustice or harm that has been suffered. There is thus still a lacuna in this regard 
but perhaps slender hope can be found in clause 61(5) of the TAB which requires 
that the SARS official must conduct the search with strict regard for decency and 
order. This could thus prevent harm or injustice during the course of the carrying out 
of the search, but does not cover the period before and after the search. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION  
 
The concept of search and seizure was examined in this assignment by considering 
the cases, academic writing and other material on the topic. The objectives of this 
assignment were to analyse the development of search and seizure in South African 
income tax law, to provide a basic understanding of the warranted and warrantless 
search and seizure provisions of the Act and the TAB, to determine the 
constitutionality of the search and seizure provisions of the Act and the TAB and to 
determine the remedies available to a taxpayer who has been subject to a search 
and seizure. 
 
It was found that search and seizure has developed in South African income tax law 
from warrantless in terms of the previous section 74(3) of the Act into the 
requirement of a warrant in terms of section 74D of the Act into a combination of 
both in terms of the TAB. It was found that the previous section 74(3) of the Act 
would not have passed the constitutional test and would accordingly be 
unsustainable in our constitutional democracy, even though its constitutionality was 
never decided by our courts. A summary of the content of the search and seizure 
provisions of the Act and the TAB showed that certain aspects will remain the same 
under the TAB, but that there are also certain new provisions introduced by the TAB, 
as well as some additions to existing provisions in section 74D of the Act. 
 
The basic principles of a search and seizure by warrant remain the same under the 
TAB. In terms of the TAB, however, the SARS must now bring the application for a 
warrant ex parte and this could be seen as a fundamental difference between the 
Act and the TAB. It was shown that an ex parte application is permissible in terms of 
section 74D of the Act (if, for example, the nature of the relief sought is such that 
notice to the respondent may render the relief nugatory or if, due to the urgency of 
the matter, notice cannot be given to the respondent, for instance, if the harm is 
imminent) while it is now compulsory in terms of the TAB. It was found that the 
compulsory ex parte application as required by the TAB would not justify its 
unconstitutionality per se but that this is an aspect of the application procedure 
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which is now in favour of the Commissioner. It was however also acknowledged that 
an ex parte application makes sense in this regard as notice of the search and seizure 
could render the object of the search and seizure nugatory. It was found that the 
Commissioner has a need to bring the application ex parte in order to act on a 
surprise basis, but that this could lead to situations where an application is brought 
by the Commissioner, based on incorrect false facts, which could lead to serious 
infringements on taxpayers’ rights. 
 
Another area of uncertainty which was examined in this assignment is the validity of 
a search and seizure warrant before and after is has been exercised. The TAB now 
provides for the 45 business days validity period and accordingly closed the lacuna in 
the Act relating to the validity period of a warrant before it has been executed. 
However, regarding whether a warrant expires when exercised or whether the same 
warrant can be used again to conduct a second search and seizure, it was concluded 
that the position is not quite certain in terms of the Act or the TAB. It was argued 
that the aspects of uncertainty regarding the validity of a warrant after it has been 
exercised needs further legislative regulation and could be brought in line with the 
Criminal Procedure Act, which would mean that the warrant lapses once it is 
exercised. In terms of the TAB, however, the warrantless provisions of clause 63 
could be invoked to conduct further searches.  
 
It was furthermore found that there is no defined meaning in the Act or the TAB of 
the reasonable grounds criterion, which is often required to be met by the 
Commissioner, a SARS official, a judge or a magistrate in terms of both the Act and 
the TAB. It was found that anyone exercising the reasonable grounds criterion in 
terms of a warranted or a warrantless search and seizure must be satisfied that the 
grounds in fact exist objectively. It is not sufficient that the police officer or the SARS 
officer subjectively and bona fide believed that they existed. A mere hope is also not 
enough to satisfy the reasonable grounds criterion. This can similarly be applied to a 
judge’s or magistrate’s discretion. He must have reasonable grounds at the time of 
the granting of the application for a warrant, based on the objective facts existing at 
that time. It is however necessary, in the context of the discretion of a judge or 
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magistrate, that the information which is put before the judge or magistrate must 
contain sufficient detail to enable him to satisfy himself on reasonable grounds. It is 
therefore a burden on the Commissioner to place the correct facts before the judge 
or magistrate to allow him or her to be satisfied on reasonable grounds. 
 
The new warrantless search and seizure provisions were analysed in this assignment 
and it was found that these new provisions did not come into being without 
commentaries from all quarters. It was shown that there is strong discontentment 
and concern about the new warrantless search and seizure provisions of the TAB.  
On the other hand, it seems that the SARS really has a need for provisions 
authorising them to conduct a warrantless search and seizure. The fact that these 
provisions are proposed might be an indication that the current provisions on search 
and seizure are not adequate enough to meet the needs of the SARS. It was however 
also shown that the criticism on the new warrantless provisions is perhaps a bit 
harsh and too wide when the context in which the SARS wants to execute the 
provisions is as limited as said by them, being only to target serious tax evaders. 
However, the TAB still grants the wide powers and the comments of the SARS that 
they will only target serious tax evaders and that it would only be applied to a very 
limited number of taxpayers is not binding. 
 
It was also established that warrantless search and seziure provisions are not 
uncommon in other statutes, but the content thereof often differs. The new 
warrantless provisions of the TAB were accordingly compared to the warrantless 
search and seizure provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act, which are very similar to 
the warrantless provisions of the TAB. It should however be kept in mind that the 
Criminal Procedure Act falls under criminal law and that the context and objectives 
of the Criminal Procedure Act are very different from the TAB. Therefore, the 
warrantless provisions of the TAB were also compared to a statute outside the 
sphere of criminal law, i.e. the Competition Act, and the conclusion was reached that 
the warrantless TAB provisions are not in all respects as circumscribed as the 
warrantless provisions of the Competition Act. It was therefore recommended that 
the warrantless provisions of the TAB should contain the counterbalances as found 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
141 
 
in the Competition Act to equal the rights of taxpayers to the needs of the SARS. 
Those counterbalances should include a requirement that the official identifies him 
or herself to the owner or person in control of the premises before entering and 
searching, an explanation from that official to that person on the authority by which 
the search is being conducted and a requirement that an entry and search without a 
warrant may only be carried out during the day, unless doing it at night is justifiable 
and necessary in the circumstances.  
 
It was concluded that the warranted search and seizure provisions of the Act and the 
TAB should be constitutionally valid. The independent authorisation from a judge 
when a warrant is issued is a sufficient safeguard and accordingly justifies a 
limitation of the right to privacy. It was however found that the constitutionality of 
the new warrantless provisions of the TAB is not beyond doubt. The fact that no 
“instant” warrantless powers are granted tends to lead to a conclusion that the 
provisions could be constitutionally valid. However, the courts will have to consider 
the purpose of the TAB and a determination will have to be made on whether the 
circumstances under which such a warrantless operation may be conducted are 
defined narrowly enough. There is no standard test from the case law to be applied 
in order to determine the constitutionality of warrantless search and seizure 
provisions. It was also concluded that even though it may be found that the search 
and seizure provisions of the Act and the TAB are constitutionally valid, the conduct 
of the SARS officials when conducting such a search and seizure, whether in terms of 
a warrant or warrantless, must still be in compliance with the Constitution. 
Accordingly, should the provisions of the Act and the TAB be found to be 
constitutional, it was found that this might not be the end of the constitutional 
battle which can be fought by a taxpayer as it is still required from the SARS to 
conduct its search and seizure operations in compliance with the Constitution. 
 
The stage after a search and seizure was also analysed in this assignment and entails 
the rights and duties of the SARS and the remedies available to a taxpayer who has 
been subject to a search and seizure. The rights and duties of the SARS after a search 
and seizure, for example the duty to retain and preserve the material seized with 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
142 
 
reasonable care, were analysed and weighed up against the remedies of taxpayers 
subsequent to a search and seizure operation. It was found that some remedies are 
contained expressly in the Act and the TAB, e.g. the right to examine and make 
copies, whereas other remedies originate from the Constitution, e.g. access to the 
court file. It was accordingly found that there are different sources of remedies and 
the conclusion was reached that these remedies should indeed be sufficient, which 
includes the right to claim damages in certain circumstances. This is especially true 
with the advent of the new independent Tax Ombud. It is however acknowledged 
that there are seemingly no remedies available to a taxpayer to prevent injustice or 
harm. All the available remedies relate to the position after the harm has been done 
and they are available to undo or to balance the injustice or harm that has been 
suffered. There is thus still a lacuna in this regard but perhaps slender hope can be 
found in clause 61(5) of the TAB which requires that the SARS official must conduct 
the search with strict regard for decency and order. This could thus prevent harm or 
injustice during the course of the carrying out of the search, but does not cover the 
period before and after the search. 
 
--0o0-- 
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Annexure A: Extracts from the Income Tax Act No 58 of 1962 
74D Search and seizure 
(1) For the purposes of the administration of this Act, a judge may, on application by the 
Commissioner or any officer contemplated in section 74 (4), issue a warrant, authorising the officer 
named therein to, without prior notice and at any time— 
 (a)  (i) enter and search any premises; and 
(ii) search any person present on the premises, provided that such search is 
conducted by an  officer of the same gender as the person being searched, for any 
information, documents or  things, that may afford evidence as to the non-
compliance by any taxpayer with his obligations in terms of this Act; 
 (b) seize any such information, documents or things; and 
(c) in carrying out any such search, open or cause to be opened or removed and opened, 
anything in which such officer suspects any information, documents or things to be 
contained. 
 
(2) An application under subsection (1) shall be supported by information supplied under oath or 
solemn declaration, establishing the facts on which the application is based. 
 
(3) A judge may issue the warrant referred to in subsection (1) if he is satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that— 
(a) (i) there has been non-compliance by any person with his obligations in terms of this 
Act; or 
  (ii) an offence in terms of this Act has been committed by any person; 
 (b) information, documents or things are likely to be found which may afford evidence of— 
  (i) such non-compliance; or 
  (ii) the committing of such offence; and 
(c) the premises specified in the application are likely to contain such information, 
documents or things. 
 
(4) A warrant issued under subsection (1) shall— 
 (a) refer to the alleged non-compliance or offence in relation to which it is issued; 
 (b) identify the premises to be searched; 
(c) identify the person alleged to have failed to comply with the provisions of the Act or to 
have committed the offence; and 
 (d) be reasonably specific as to any information, documents or things to be searched for and 
 seized. 
 
(5) Where the officer named in the warrant has reasonable grounds to believe that— 
 (a) such information, documents or things are— 
  (i) at any premises not identified in such warrant; and 
  (ii) about to be removed or destroyed; and 
(b) a warrant cannot be obtained timeously to prevent such removal or destruction, such 
officer may search such premises and further exercise all the powers granted by this section, 
as if such premises had been identified in a warrant. 
 
(6) Any officer who executes a warrant may seize, in addition to the information, documents or things 
referred to in the warrant, any other information, documents or things that such officer believes on 
reasonable grounds afford evidence of the non-compliance with the relevant obligations or the 
committing of an offence in terms of this Act. 
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(7) The officer exercising any power under this section shall on demand produce the relevant warrant 
(if any). 
 
(8) The Commissioner, who shall take reasonable care to ensure that the information, documents or 
things are preserved, may retain them until the conclusion of any investigation into the non-
compliance or offence in relation to which the information, documents or things were seized or until 
they are required to be used for the purposes of any legal proceedings under this Act, whichever 
event occurs last. 
 
(9)  (a) Any person may apply to the relevant division of the High Court for the return of any 
information, documents or things seized under this section. 
(b) The court hearing such application may, on good cause shown, make such order as it 
deems fit. 
 
(10) The person to whose affairs any information, documents or things seized under this section 
relate, may examine and make extracts therefrom and obtain one copy thereof at the expense of the 
State during normal business hours under such supervision as the Commissioner may determine. 
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Annexure B: Extracts from the Tax Administration Bill No 11 of 2011, as 
released on the 23 June 2011 
Application for warrant 
59. (1) The Commissioner personally or a senior SARS official may, if necessary or relevant to 
administer a tax Act, authorise an application for a warrant authorising SARS to enter a 
premises where relevant material is kept to search the premises and any person present on 
the premises and seize relevant material. 
(2) SARS must apply ex parte to a judge for the warrant, which application must be 
supported by information supplied under oath or solemn declaration, establishing the facts 
on which the application is based.  
(3) Despite subsection (2), SARS may apply for the warrant referred to in subsection (1) and 
in the manner referred to in subsection (2), to a magistrate, if the matter relates to an audit 
or investigation where the estimated tax in dispute does not exceed the amount determined 
in the notice issued under section 109(1)(a). 
 
Issuance of warrant 
60.  (1) A judge or magistrate may issue the warrant referred to in section 59(1) if satisfied that 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that— 
(a) a person failed to comply with an obligation imposed under a tax Act, or 
committed a tax offence; and 
(b) relevant material likely to be found on the premises specified in the application 
may provide evidence of the failure to comply or commission of the offence. 
(2) A warrant issued under subsection (1) must contain the following information: 
(a) the alleged failure to comply or offence that is the basis for the application; 
(b) the person alleged to have failed to comply or to have committed the offence; 
(c) the premises to be searched; and 
(d) the fact that relevant material as defined in section 1 is likely to be found on the 
premises. 
(3) The warrant must be exercised within 45 business days or such further period as a judge 
or magistrate deems appropriate on good cause shown. 
 
Carrying out search 
61.  (1) A SARS official exercising a power under a warrant referred to in section 60 must produce 
the warrant. 
(2) Subject to section 63, a SARS official’s failure to produce a warrant entitles a person to 
refuse access to the official.  
(3) The SARS official may— 
(a) open or cause to be opened or removed in conducting a search, anything which 
the official suspects to contain relevant material; 
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(b) seize and retain a computer or storage device in which relevant material is 
stored for as long as it is necessary to copy the material required; 
(c) make extracts from or copies of relevant material, and require from a person an 
explanation of relevant material; and 
(d) if the premises listed in the warrant is a vessel, aircraft or vehicle, stop and board 
the vessel, aircraft or vehicle, search the vessel, aircraft or vehicle or a person found 
in the vessel, aircraft or vehicle, and question the person with respect to a matter 
dealt with in a tax Act. 
(4) The SARS official must make an inventory of the relevant material seized in the form, 
manner and at the time that is reasonable under the circumstances and provide a copy 
thereof to the person. 
(5) The SARS official must conduct the search with strict regard for decency and order, and 
may search a person if the official is of the same gender as the person being searched. 
(6) The SARS official may, at any time, request such assistance from a police officer as the 
official may consider reasonably necessary and the police officer must render the assistance. 
(7) No person may obstruct a SARS official or a police officer from executing the warrant or 
without reasonable excuse refuse to give such assistance as may be reasonably required for 
the execution of the warrant. 
(8) Subject to section 66, the SARS official and SARS are not liable for damage to property 
necessitated by reason of the search. 
(9) If the SARS official seizes relevant material, the official must ensure that the relevant 
material seized is preserved and retained until it is no longer required for— 
(a) the investigation into the non-compliance or the offence described under 
section 60(1)(a); or 
(b) the conclusion of any legal proceedings under a tax Act or criminal proceedings 
in which it is required to be used. 
 
Search of premises not identified in warrant 
62. (1) If a senior SARS official has reasonable grounds to believe that— 
(a) the relevant material referred to in section 60(1)(b) and included in a warrant is 
at premises not identified in the warrant and may be removed or destroyed; 
(b) a warrant cannot be obtained in time to prevent the removal or destruction of 
the relevant material; and 
(c) the delay in obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of the search and 
seizure, 
SARS may enter and search the premises and exercise the powers granted in terms of this 
Part, as if the premises had been identified in the warrant. 
(2) A SARS official may not enter a dwelling-house or domestic premises, except any part 
thereof used for purposes of trade, under this section without the consent of the occupant. 
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Search without warrant 
63.  (1) A senior SARS official may without a warrant exercise the powers referred to in section 
61(3)— 
(a) if the person who may consent thereto so consents in writing; or 
(b) if the senior SARS official on reasonable grounds is satisfied that— 
(i) there may be an imminent removal or destruction of relevant material 
likely to be found on the premises; 
(ii) if SARS applies for a search warrant under section 59, a search warrant 
will be issued; and 
(iii) the delay in obtaining a warrant would defeat the object of the search 
and seizure. 
(2) Section 61(3) to (9) applies to a search conducted under this section. 
(3) A SARS official may not enter a dwelling-house or domestic premises, except any part 
thereof used for purposes of trade, under this section without the consent of the occupant. 
 
Legal professional privilege 
64.  (1) If SARS foresees the need to search and seize relevant material that may be alleged to be 
subject to legal professional privilege, SARS must arrange for an attorney from the panel 
appointed under section 111 to be present during the execution of the warrant. 
(2) An attorney with whom SARS has made an arrangement in terms of subsection (1) may 
appoint a substitute attorney to be present on the appointing attorney’s behalf during the 
execution of a warrant. 
(3) If, during the carrying out of a search and seizure by SARS, a person alleges the existence 
of legal professional privilege in respect of relevant material and an attorney is not present 
under subsection (1) or (2), SARS must seal the material, make arrangements with an 
attorney from the panel appointed under section 111 to take receipt of the material and, as 
soon as is reasonably possible, hand over the material to the attorney. 
(4) An attorney referred to in subsections (1), (2) and (3)— 
(a) is not regarded as acting on behalf of either party; and 
(b) must personally take responsibility— 
(i) in the case of a warrant issued under section 60, for the removal from 
the premises of relevant material in respect of which legal privilege is 
alleged; 
(ii) in the case of a search and seizure carried out under section 63, for the 
receipt of the sealed information; and 
(iii) if a substitute attorney in terms of subsection (2), for the delivery of the 
information to the appointing attorney for purposes of making the 
determination referred to in subsection (5). 
(5) The attorney referred to in subsection (1) or (3) must within 21 business days make a 
determination of whether the privilege applies and may do so in the manner the attorney 
deems fit, including considering representations made by the parties. 
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(6) If a determination of whether the privilege applies is not made under subsection (5) or a 
party is not satisfied with the determination, the attorney must retain the relevant material 
pending final resolution of the dispute by the parties or an order of court. 
(7) The attorney from the panel appointed under section 111 and any attorney acting on 
behalf of that attorney referred to in subsection (1) must be compensated in the same 
manner as if acting as chairperson of the tax board. 
 
Person’s right to examine and make copies 
65.  (1) The person to whose affairs relevant material seized relates, may examine and copy it. 
(2) Examination and copying must be made— 
(a) at the person’s cost in accordance with the fees prescribed in accordance with 
section 92(1)(b) of the Promotion of Access to Information Act; 
(b) during normal business hours; and 
(c) under the supervision determined by a senior SARS official. 
 
Application for return of seized relevant material or costs of damages 
66.  (1) A person may request SARS to— 
(a) return some or all of the seized material; and 
(b) pay the costs of physical damage caused during the conduct of a search and 
seizure. 
(2) If SARS refuses the request, the person may apply to a High Court for the return of the 
seized material or payment of compensation for physical damage caused during the conduct 
of the search and seizure. 
(3) The court may, on good cause shown, make the order as it deems fit. 
(4) If the court sets aside the warrant issued in terms of section 60(1) or orders the return of 
the seized material, the court may nevertheless authorise SARS to retain the original or a 
copy of any relevant material in the interests of justice. 
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